



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

### Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

### About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

















Y1253V8U

119398





## INTRODUCTION.

---

**I**F the Annals of the London East-India Company, from its foundation, to its re-establishment at the Restoration, have exhibited the enterprizes and perseverance of a commercial nation, the Annals of this Company, from the Restoration to the Revolution, in 1688, will open, on a larger scale, the progress of the same commercial and political interests.

CHAP. II.

*Introduction.*

Comparison of the general aspects of Indian affairs, during the first and second periods of the Company's Annals.

In the first of these periods, an authorised and profitable commerce to the realm, intrusted to a Company of privileged Merchants, has been discovered to be exposed to opposition and to oppression, not only by an European ally, and commercial rival, in the East-Indies, but by the insidious interference of Private Traders, sometimes licensed, and, at other times, protected by the Crown, from which the chartered rights and privileges of the Company had issued; and yet this Company, amid such foreign and domestic burdens, by its prudence, and by its fortitude, preserved to the kingdom a right to a great foreign trade, and what, in later times, will be



## INTRODUCTION.

and more valuable, an extensive and productive outlet to national enterprize and industry.

In the period which we are about to review, we have known the London East-India Company, by their exertions and public spirit, preserving the same valuable sources of wealth to their country, in times when its constitution, and its relations with the continental maritime powers, were frequently unhinged; and when their trade and foreign possessions were again to be upheld, by their own steady and persevering character, favoured by the Crown, which had secured them to their rights and privileges.

To bring under review the Annals of the London East-India Company, during this eventful period, it may be proper, in general manner, to advert to the vicissitudes of the European maritime powers, and to the political and commercial characters of the countries within the Company's dominion, with the object of ascertaining the wisdom, or the incapability of the London East-India Company's efforts, to preserve, and to maintain, the possession of their commercial possessions, and their connexions with the powers by whom those countries were governed.

With this preliminary knowledge, we can continue the history of the Company, and be qualified to draw from them, (the preceding Chapter) political and commercial Results, illustrating the real state of Indian affairs, at the æra of the formation of the constitution of Great-Britain.

In



CHAP. II.

*Introduction.*

over those of the other European maritime kingdoms and states; and, what is memorable in this transaction, is, that the establishment of power, in this instance, was accommodated to the preservation and extension of commerce. The wisdom of this measure was so positive, that, at the Restoration of the Monarchy (which, with narrow and uninstructed minds, would have led to a contradiction of a system devised by rebels), it was deemed wise and prudent, as one of the first measures, to adopt this Navigation System, as one which, in its spirit as well as in its practice, had been the source of the commercial and naval glory of Great-Britain.

It may be observed, however, that notwithstanding the political wisdom which could devise this system, the Usurper failed in the means which could carry it into practice; for though jealous of the Dutch, whose commercial encroachments in the West and in the East-Indies had narrowed, if not crushed, the English interests in both, he engaged in wars with that people (the natural ally of these realms); and though he obtained reparation for commercial and political aggressions, yet, in those proceedings, without probably intending to do so, he increased the means of France (the natural enemy of England), and allowed her to add to her northern frontier, possessions wrested from Spain, which opened an entrance to her ships into the Narrow Seas, and lessened the barrier against her future aggrandizement. This political error is the more remarkable, from the consideration,













**CHAP. II.** that, from the date of the refusal to accept his mediation,  
*Introduction.* whatever places the Dutch might conquer from the Portuguese, the forces of the King were to assist in recovering. <sup>(1)</sup>

Two leading objects, at this juncture, appear equally to have guided the English councils, and both were intimately connected with the preceding treaty:—on the one hand, Charles wished to support Portugal, in recovering its weight in the political balance of Europe, against any depression it might experience from Spain; and, on the other, to check any farther encroachments of the Dutch, on the Portuguese Asiatic possessions. These objects were wise and politic, considered in themselves; but improvident and impracticable, under the political and commercial relations between England, Spain, France, and the States General. Spain was in possession of the Netherlands, and, in fact, of the barrier between France and the States:—France, at this juncture, had no Asiatic interests, and, therefore, no political antipathy to Portugal:—the States General had Asiatic interests, and these were not more opposed to the renovation of the Portuguese power and trade, than to the progress of the trade of the London East-India Company:—so that, at home, Charles had

(1)—Original Ratification, by the King of Portugal, of the Treaty of Peace and Commerce between England and Portugal, and of Marriage between King Charles II. and the Infanta Catherine of Portugal; with the Secret Articles, relative to King Charles mediating a Peace between Portugal and the States General: concluded at Whitehall, 23d June 1661. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)











**CHAP. II.** equally of England and the States General. The urgency of  
*Introduction.* this circumstance led to the Triple Alliance between England, Holland, and Sweden, the accession of which last power can only be traced to so remote a cause as the Spanish interests in the Netherlands, in which the combined forces were to repel, and keep in check, the armies of France.

This event, or the Triple Alliance, proceeded from the conduct of Louis XIV., who, at the time he was negotiating the Treaty of Breda, and publicly in alliance with Holland, was making rapid conquests of the towns in Spanish Flanders, and approaching the Dutch frontier. This measure induced England to enter into a treaty of Defensive Alliance with the States General, dated 23d January 1668, and with Sweden, (influenced by Spain), to stop the French conquests, if not to recover them, as forming a part of the barrier. By this treaty, England and the States united those very fleets against France, which had improvidently been employed to destroy each other, and stipulated the military forces, (six thousand foot and four hundred horse each,) with which they were to defend the Netherlands. To this treaty the King of Sweden acceded, on the 25th April 1668.<sup>(1)</sup>

The

(1)—Original Treaty of Defensive Alliance between Charles II. and the State General, dated 23d January 1668, with Separate Articles and Ratifications.—Original Treaty of Triple Alliance, between England, Holland, and Sweden, dated 25th April 1668, with Separate Articles and Ratifications. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)





CHAP. II.  
Introduction.

this treaty gave Spain the alternative, only, of renewing its claims to the late French conquests, or of narrowing its frontier from Dunkirk, in a line to the Bishoprick of Leige, which last alternative was accepted by Spain, by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, between France and Spain, 2d May 1668: France, thus, gained the only advantage, while the other powers were left in a narrower situation, to resist the future aggressions of that Crown. <sup>(1)</sup>

In this state of the European balance, England formed treaties of commerce with Denmark and with Spain, to adjust the disputes in America, and in the West-Indies; while France, which, in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, had evidently no other view than to extend its frontier, persuaded Charles into an alliance, for the subjugation and division of the United Provinces; still leaving the flimsy pretext, of allowing the Spanish barrier to remain: but if this conquest had been made, that barrier would no longer have been of any value. That Charles was deceived by Louis XIV. in this transaction, appears, from the frivolous reasons assigned by him, for the war, viz. the irregular proceedings of the Dutch, at Surinam and the East-Indies, which had obliged him to join with France  
in

(1)—Original Treaty between England, Holland, and France, for mediating a Peace between France and Spain, concluded at St. Germain-en-Laye, 15th April 1668, with Separate Article and Ratifications.—Original Treaty of Peace between France and Spain, by the mediation of Holland and England, concluded at Aix-la-Chapelle, 2d May 1668, with Separate Articles and Ratifications. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)

in subverting that very power, in Europe, which, from the reign of Elizabeth, had been the means of upholding the independence, and balancing the powers of the greater European states; while the pretext of Louis XIV. was only, that his farther toleration of the interferences of the Dutch with the greater powers of Europe, was inconsistent with his glory. <sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
*Introduction.*

The war, of course, between France and England on the one part, and the States General, on the other, took place. In this detail, it is necessary only to state, that the French army made a conquest of the provinces of Guelderland and Utrecht, while the troops of the Bishop of Munster (the ally of England) took possession of Overysse, Zutphen, and Groningen, leaving to the States General the provinces of Holland and Zealand only; and that the battle of Solebay, whether considered as a victory or as a defeat, weakened the maritime powers, whose union and efforts had, hitherto, averted the universal monarchy projected by France.

The projects of Charles II. and Louis XIV. were not confined, at this crisis, to the destruction of the States General, as a sovereignty, in Europe, but went to the subversion

(1)—Original Ratification by the King of Denmark of a Treaty of Commerce with England, concluded at Copenhagen, 11th July 1670.— Original Treaty between England and Spain, relative to America and the West-Indies, concluded at Madrid, 18th July 1670.— Original Treaty of Alliance between Louis XIV. and Charles II., concluded at Whitehall, 12th February 1672, with Secret Articles and Ratifications. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)— English and French Declarations of War against Holland, dated 17th March and 6th April 1672.

**CHAP. II.** sion of their power and commerce in the East-Indies;—with  
*Introduction.* this view, a project of a treaty was concerted, for bringing in the Prince of Portugal to be a party in the war, both that he might have the temptation of recovering the possessions in the East-Indies, of which the Dutch had dispossessed that Crown, and that he might be secured against farther losses of territories, or commerce, in that distant quarter.

By this project, France was to furnish ten ships of war, England ten, and Portugal twenty gallies and gallions:—the fleets were first to seize on the Dutch colony at Saldanha Bay; they were then to rendezvous at Goa; Cochin and Cannanore were to be conquered, and restored to Portugal; Ceylon was next to be reduced; Punto de Gallé ceded to England, Negambo to France, and Columbo to Portugal, and the cinnamon trade to be equally divided; Polaroon and Amboyna were to be obtained for England; and, in the event of Spain attacking Portugal, France and England were to unite their arms in its defence; and this treaty was to be followed up by a commercial treaty between England and Portugal. This transaction was to be kept secret, till the combined fleets should put to sea. <sup>(1)</sup>

During

(1)—Project of an Offensive and Defensive Treaty between England, France, and Portugal, against the States General, 1673.— Project of a Treaty of Commerce between England and Portugal, January 1673. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)



**CHAP. II.** December 1674: but it was not till the 18th of March following, that they fixed, in general terms, to refer the disputes to an arbiter, and agreed, that the ninth article of the Treaty of Peace had been fulfilled.<sup>(1)</sup>

*Introduction.*

These treaties of peace and commerce between England and the States, in fact, only delivered the Dutch from one of their most powerful opponents, but left the barrier of the Netherlands exposed to the armies of France; and as it was followed by a commercial treaty between Charles II. and Louis XIV., an opportunity was given, to supply the French fleet with naval stores, to enable them to combat with, and destroy the Dutch navy; an evil, which, had it taken place, would have probably rendered the fleet of France superior to that of England, and not only destroyed the balance among the European powers, but endangered the marine and commerce of Great-Britain. The marriage, however, of the Prince of Orange with the Princess Mary, the King's niece, produced a more strict alliance with the States General; and the talents of that Prince, who now began to be considered

(1)—Original Commission from the States General to the Marquis del Fresno, to mediate a Peace between England and Holland, 12th February 1674.— Original Ratification of the Treaty of Peace between England and Holland, concluded at Westminster, 11th December 1674.— Original Marine Treaty between England and Holland, concluded at Westminster, 11th December 1674, with the Ratification and Agreements.— Original Declaration of the English and Dutch Plenipotentiaries, respecting the fulfilment of the Ninth article of the Treaty of Peace, relative to the East-Indies. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)

sidered as the Preserver of the liberties of Europe, brought forward the Congress of Nimeguen, in 1678, for the general pacification of Europe, under the mediation of England and Holland.

CHAP. II.  
Introduction.

The treaty between France and Holland was signed at Nimeguen, 10th August; that between France and Spain, on the 17th September 1678; and that between France and the Emperor, on the 3d February 1679.<sup>(1)</sup>

It does not appear, that Charles, during the remainder of his reign, made any alterations in the relations established by the Treaty of Nimeguen, between England and foreign powers; for though he did not recede from his partiality towards France, yet he had either become too indolent, or too absorbed in pleasure, again to risk the perilous results of uncertain war.

There did not occur, during the short reign of James II., any event affecting the foreign relations of England, except the treaty with Louis XIV., for a neutrality in America, dated 16th November 1686, by which the foreign possessions of the two Crowns (even in the event of a war) were to be left unmolested by either; and as the French were, at this time, beginning to form a trade and factories in the East-Indies, this neutrality

During the  
reign of King  
James II.

VOL. II.

E

was

(1)—Printed Copy of the Treaty Marine between England and France, 14th February 1677.—Original Treaty of Defensive Alliance between England, and for procuring a general Peace, 26th January 1678; with the original Separate Articles and Ratifications; and printed Copies of the Treaties of Nimeguen, 1678. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)

## CHAP. II.

*Introduction.*

was deemed, by Louis XIV., favourable to his project of trade in the countries within the London Company's limits; anticipating, that, as he might there be opposed by the Dutch, his relations with England would be sufficient to afford protection to his subjects or factories in that distant quarter. This scheme, however, as well as the obvious intentions of France, to aggrandize itself in Flanders, Germany, and Holland, was the source of the league of the German Princes, at Augsburgh, formed, at this time, by the Prince of Orange; a measure which led to the Revolution, of 1688, in Great-Britain.<sup>(1)</sup>

Sketch of the political and commercial characters of the Native Powers in the Peninsula of India, during the reign of Aurungzebe

II.—Having referred to the political and commercial relations of Great-Britain with the European powers, from the Restoration, to the Revolution, as a necessary preliminary to explain the sources of the proceedings of the London East-India Company, either in forming factories, or carrying on their commerce, we have to re-assume the historical abridgment of the actual political state of the countries within their limits, that from a knowledge of the great facts regarding them, we may measure the value and the extent of the Company's transactions.

In

(1)—Original Ratification, by Louis XIV., of the Treaty of Neutrality in America, concluded at Whitehall, 16th November 1686. (Preserved in the State Paper Office.)





CHAP. II.  
*Introduction.*

and, as the reign of Aurungzebe terminated only one year before the Union of the London and English East-India Companies, in 1708, it will be necessary to keep this detail unbroken, that we may trace the rise of those powers, in the Peninsula of India, which appeared during this reign, partly from the Hindoo States and Princes reclaiming their independence, and partly from the officers, who had commanded in the Mogul Provinces, beginning to lay the foundations of those lesser sovereignties, which we shall find contributing, in the sequel, to the subversion of the Empire.

State of the  
Mogul Em-  
pire, at the  
accession of  
Aurungzebe.

Aurungzebe became Emperor, under the title of Al-  
lumguire I., in 1659, and though Shah Jehan lived seven  
years after his degradation, he was a prisoner in the castle of  
Agra.<sup>(1)</sup>

The dominions of the Moguls, during the period of Shah  
Jehan's confinement, were considerably extended; for, at his  
death, in 1666, they stretched from Cabul to the Nerbuddah;  
westward of this river, to the Indus, and, to the eastward,  
comprehended Bengal and Orissa, and in the intermediate  
region, or the Decan, the countries of Brampore, Aurung-  
abad, Ahmednagur, and Beder, which had been reduced and  
consolidated into one government, bounded on the east, by  
Bahar,

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, page 3.—Dow's History of Hindostan (Edit.  
1803) page 275.—Rennel's Introduction, page 61.—Bernier's History of the Revo-  
lution in the Mogul Empire.—Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, page 9, dates the  
accession of Aurungzebe, in 1657.



CHAP. II.  
Introduction.

army; and his son, Soliman, was hastening with another to join him:—aware of the active character of Soliman, Aurungzebe determined to destroy his army:—he knew how easy it was to detach the Indian soldiery from their allegiance, and he, therefore, sent his emissaries among them, to work partly on their fears, and partly on their avarice, and succeeded so completely, that, in a few weeks, desertion became so general, that this army was no longer formidable.

This unexpected reverse broke the high spirit of Darah, who abandoned an advantageous post, which he had taken on the banks of the Bea, and retreated from the province of Lahore.<sup>(1)</sup>

Sultan Sujah, during these transactions, assembled a considerable force at Allahabad, and marched to meet the army of Aurungzebe:—the conflict was long and obstinate:—the guards of the Princes, commanded by themselves, in person, encountered each other, with the most obstinate perseverance:—victory at last declared for Aurungzebe:—after his defeat, Sujah fled first to Patna, and next to Mongheer, and Aurungzebe returned towards Delhi, leaving his son, Mahomed, to pursue Sujah with ten thousand horse.<sup>(2)</sup>

Darah, who had passed the Desert, again made his appearance at the head of an army:—in his flight, he applied

to

(1)—Dow's History of Hindostan, vol. iii. pages 286, 290, 292.—Bernier's History of the Revolution in the Mogul Empire.

(2)—Dow's History of Hindostan, vol. iii., pages 296—304.—Orme's Historical Fragments, note 10.—Bernier's History of the Revolution in the Mogul Empire:

to Shah Nawaz, the governor of the province of the Guzzerat ; and was joined by the troops of the Maha-Rajah, who had lately revolted from Aurungzebe ; but this chief was easily seduced, and, in an unexpected and critical moment, deserted the cause of Darah.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
Introduction.

Aurungzebe approached the camp of Darah, who had taken an advantageous position in Agimere, which was fortified and defended by a small body of European artillery, composed of Portuguese, French, and English, whom he had collected for this service. On this occasion, Aurungzebe had recourse to stratagem, and having among his followers two Indian chiefs, who had formerly been attached to the army of Soliman, Darah's son, employed them in the scheme of surprising his brother's camp ;—these men were sent to Darah, with professions of penitence for their past treachery, and with an offer to betray Aurungzebe, as a proof of their new sincerity :—Darah listened to the plausible tale, and confided in their promises :—it was agreed, that they should march out of Aurungzebe's camp, as if they intended to attack that of Darah, and then throw off the mask, and join his army :—Darah, the following morning, beheld their approach, with anxious hopes of the important change in his favor, which it would have produced :—they marched up to his trenches, entered them without opposition, but, instead of turning on his

(1)—Dow's History of Hindostan, vol. iii., pages 308—315.—Orme's Historical Fragments, Note 10.—Bernier's History of the Revolution in the Mogul Empire.

**CHAP. II.** his enemy, opened a passage for Aurungzebe's army :—a complete defeat was the consequence ; Darah's army was dispersed, and his misfortunes were now drawing to a close.

*Introduction.*

Darah fled towards the Desert of Scindi, where his friends forsook him :—after a thousand hardships, he reached its other extremity, and took refuge with Jihon-Chan :—Jihon made fair promises to support him, but secretly sent offers to Aurungzebe to deliver him into his power :—Aurungzebe hesitated not a moment to accept this offer, and Darah and his son became his prisoners :—as soon as they were in the tyrant's power, he conducted them to Delhi, and ordered them to be led, with every mark of ignominy, in his procession through the streets of that capital, and then employed two Afghans, to enter Darah's prison the following night, and put him to death, on the 11th September 1659.<sup>(1)</sup>

The fate of Sujah seems to have been equally tragical :—After his defeat, he retreated towards Tanda, where he had made a halt, expecting to be reinforced with troops which had been levied in the lower Bengal ; to prevent a surprise on his camp, he had collected, like Darah, a small train of European artillery, and hoped, by this expedient, to hold out, till he should bein force to meet his enemies in the field. Mahomed, whom Aurungzebe had left to pursue his uncle, was joined by the Vizier Jumlah, and by the greatest part of the Imperial

(1)—Dow's History of Hindostan, vol. iii., pages 316—334. — Orme's Historical Fragments, Note 10. — Bernier's History.



## CHAP. II.

*Introduction.*

Sujah, driven out of the Bengal provinces, fled into Aracan :—Jumlah, as he could not follow him into that country, sent to its Rajah, and by operating, partly on his fears, and partly on his avarice, persuaded him, first to distress the Sultan, and then to pursue him with a force, which his few followers could neither resist nor repel, and in his flight he was driven into a river, where he perished. <sup>(1)</sup>

Aurungzebe had now either enclosed in prisons, or cut off, the pretenders to the Crown, and, at last, considered the possession of it to be secure :—he soon, however, found, that the same sources from which he had drawn down misery on others, were about to pour it on himself :—his second son, Mahomed Mauzim, had already secretly begun to indulge the hopes of finding means and opportunity to dethrone his father :—Mauzim had talents and hypocrisy, equal to his ambition ;—for a time he kept his intentions concealed, but as they ripened, and were drawing near to execution, they could not escape the notice of Aurungzebe's emissaries, nor be concealed from himself :—the affectation of forgiveness in the father, was followed by pretensions of gratitude in the son :—Aurungzebe, soon after this event, was seized with a fever, and this disorder, easily magnified itself, in the imagination of the Prince, to be dangerous and mortal ;—the  
near

(1)—Dow's History of Hindostan, vol. iii, pages 336—352. — Orme's Historical Fragments, page 69, Note 31. — Bernier's History of the Revolution in the Mogul Empire.

near and unexpected appearance of possessing the throne, CHAP. II.  
 convinced Aurungzebe that his son was still taking measures Introduction.  
 to seize on it :—Jehan was still alive, though in prison,  
 and Aurungzebe was apprehensive, that a war with his son  
 might draw on a new and serious contest ; and, therefore,  
 had recourse to his usual address, and, instead of using force,  
 extricated himself out of this difficulty, by a seeming reconcilia-  
 tion with his son. Shah Jehan's death, soon after this  
 event, relieved him from one of his anxieties, and lowered  
 Mauzim's hopes ;—it was the general opinion, that he died  
 by poison, administered to him by Aurungzebe's orders : be  
 that as it may, Aurungzebe made this event subservient to a  
 scheme of recommending himself to his subjects, by preten-  
 sions to filial affection, and compunction for his past crimes. <sup>(1)</sup>

The *second* object of Aurungzebe's reign was to reduce His second  
object, or the  
conquest of  
the Decan.  
 the Decan, and, in general, to enlarge the frontiers, and,  
 at the same time, the resources of his empire.

To trace the progress of Aurungzebe, in his acquisition  
 of territory, we must take a chronological view of his mixed  
 military and political projects. The wars in the northern parts  
 of his dominions prevented this Prince, at his accession, from  
 prosecuting his plan of conquest in the Decan, which he had  
 originally projected, at the time he was Governor of the  
 depend ent countries of Brampore, Aurungabad, Ahmednagur,  
 and Beder, which had been reduced by the Moguls into one

F 2

government,

(1)—Dow's History of Hindostan, vol. iii, pages 358, 359.—Bernier's History of  
 the Revolution in the Mogul Empire.



CHAP. II. government. As the time approached when he was to realise  
*Introduction.* this plan, a new power was rising up in that quarter of the Peninsula, which, from local circumstances, or from the number of its inhabitants, furnished the means of opposing his army, and, in the sequel, “able to retaliate, on his successors, the injuries of his sword.” <sup>(1)</sup>

Origin and  
 progress of  
 the power of  
 Sevagee.

This new power took its origin in the active mind and talents of Sevagee, the founder of the Mahratta Empire. Sevagee was descended from the highest cast among the Rajpoot Tribes, that of Chitore; he had been employed, with his brothers, in the service of the King of Visiapore, but being suspected by the ministers of that Prince, had retired with a few followers to the mountains near the sea coast;—the security of this retreat, and his influence in the army of Visiapore, brought numbers into his service, while his lineage induced many of the Rajpoots to attach themselves to him:—he offered them the plunder of the open country, and interested their religious prejudices, by carrying on war against their oppressors, the Mahomedans. The King of Visiapore sent a considerable force against him, under Abdul, whom Sevagee seduced into a conference, and, while making submissions to him, stabbed him:—a body of Sevagee’s followers, who lay in ambush, at the moment rushed on the retinue of this general, and cut them to pieces. <sup>(2)</sup>

Aurungzebe,

(1)—Orme’s Historical Fragments, page 5.

(2)—Orme’s Historical Fragments, pages 5, 6.— Scott’s History of the Decan (Edition 1794) vol. ii, page 8.

Aurungzebe, who, at this time, commanded in the Decan, congratulated Sevagee on his success against Visiapore, in the hope that he might render it an easy conquest to himself ;—to add to Sevagee's power, he gave him two or three forts, on the limits of Visiapore, on his promising that, if he conquered that country, he would hold it of the Mogul.

CHAP. II.  
*Introduction.*

Sevagee next directed his arms against Pannela, one of the strongest fortresses in the Decan, and took it by stratagem : he then defeated the army, sent against him, under Abdul's son, and persuaded a considerable body of that general's cavalry to join him :—he next marched up to the walls of Visiapore, but was obliged to fall back towards Pannela, which Siddee-Jore, who held the government of Danda-Rajahpore, under the King of Visiapore, was then besieging :—by another stratagem, at the moment this town was disposed to surrender, Sevagee got into Danda-Rajahpore, and thus, instead of losing his former conquest, made a new one, of the capital of the besiegers.

Sevagee next attempted to get possession of the fortified island of Gingerah and of Rajahpore :—it was defended by the heir of Siddee-Jore, who treated with the generals of Aurungzebe in the Guzzerat and in the Decan, and offered to surrender it, and the whole fleet of Visiapore, to them : these offers were readily accepted, and, in return, he was appointed Admiral of the Mogul, with an annual assignment of the revenues

CHAP. II. revenues of Surat, and was to be assisted in defending himself,  
*Introduction.* in his new situation, against Sevagee. <sup>(1)</sup>

Affairs were in this situation, at the accession of Aurungzebe; so that, now, the opposition, which he had dreaded from Visiapore, had become less formidable to him, and, in 1661, his schemes of conquest, in that quarter, were apparently more practicable. The King of Visiapore the following year died, and left his dominions to his son, a minor : Sevagee (as we shall afterwards find) soon reduced the dominions of Visiapore, along the sea coast of Concan, and, at the same time, encouraged the piratical practices of the inhabitants of the remaining sea coast, and laid the neighbouring districts under contribution. Aurungzebe, who had hitherto considered Sevagee as an useful instrument, in 1663 began to discover, that he had been fostering and encouraging an enemy, who could more effectually check his schemes of conquest, than that power which he had weakened, and, in a manner, subverted ; Chaest-Chan, the maternal uncle of Aurungzebe, was therefore sent to oppose him, with a considerable army. Sevagee, who had hitherto been held as depending on the Moguls, and the enemy of the King of Visiapore, now directed his attacks against the Siddee, who had become their professed vassal : he began his new career, by laying waste the country between Ahmednagar and Aurungabad :—it was on this occasion, that Aurungzebe sent Chaest-Chan with instructions to stop Sevagee in his predatory incursions, and, if possible, to extirpate him and

(1) Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 7—11.



... rival at the capital of the Mogul, the wife of Chaest-Chan, in revenge for the defeat of her husband, solicited Aurungzebe to put Sevagee to death : Sevagee complained to the Emperor of this intended treachery : Aurungzebe renewed his assurances, and asked Sevagee to assist him in the war against Candahar, to which he assented, provided he could bring his own army into the field, and was allowed to send for them :—by this expedient, he escaped from Delhi to his advanced parties, crossed the Jumna, and after a well planned flight, joined his army in the Guzzerat, and again pillaged Surat.<sup>(1)</sup>

The campaign against Sevagee, in 1665, was opened by an army, composed of all the troops in Aurungabad and Ahmednagur :—Sevagee kept to his original plan of desultory warfare, with the object of conquering the country between the hills and the sea :—after so many proofs of romantic bravery and political address, Aurungzebe was satisfied he could neither reduce nor assassinate Sevagee, and therefore laid a plan for his destruction, with great address and foresight :—it was agreed with his son, Mauzim, that he should revolt and join Sevagee, then seize him, and send him to Delhi.

Mauzim,

(1)—Orme's *Historical Fragments*, pages 16—20, Note 12.—Dow's *History of Hindostan*, vol. iii, pages 396—394.—Scott's *History of the Decan*, vol. ii, pages 13—16.



CHAP. II.  
Introduction.

In 1667, Mauzim was removed from the command of the army, which was entrusted to Bahadar Chan:—Sevagee was, at this time, in possession of the territory from Goa to Damaun, in length about two hundred and forty miles:—a chain of mountains, at no place more than fifty, or less than thirty miles from the sea, runs along this coast:—these hills are like a connected wall; and the *Gauts*, or passages from them, are inaccessible, except by winding and intricate paths:—he likewise possessed several of the strongest towns; Pannela, Saler Molier, on the Tapti, and Rairee; and, except Chaul, which was occupied by the Portuguese, commanded the sea coast, from the river of Rajapore to the river Pen.<sup>(1)</sup>

Sevagee, in 1669, appeared unexpectedly before Surat, which obliged Aurungzebe to reinforce the army, and to order ships to be built, to carry troops for making descents on the shores of the Concan; and yet, in 1670, Sevagee entered the town of Rajapore, and plundered the inhabitants.<sup>(2)</sup>

Sevagee again appeared before Surat, in 1671, and levied heavy contributions on the inhabitants:—this event produced an order to Delhire Chan, to invade the upper, or northern country of Sevagee, who took Penna Chaukna:—to stop his progress,

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 28, 30.

(2)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 33—35, Note 18.— Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, page 25.— Letter from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 30th March 1670.





CHAP. II. *Introduction.* la Haye, after this repulse, landed on the Coast of Coromandel, and took St. Thomé from the King of Golcondah; and while this Prince was preparing to retake the place, Sevagee, at the head of ten thousand horse, attacked Golcondah, prepared for an irruption into the Carnatic, appeared before Hyderabad, which he laid under a heavy contribution, and with this treasure returned to Rairee, without any interruption from Sultan Mauzim, then advancing from Aurungabad, towards Golcondah; while the Siddee, as the officer of the Mogul, attempted to enter the harbour of Bombay, and to pillage the Corlahs, or districts, in its vicinity.<sup>(1)</sup>

The death of the King of Visiapore, at this crisis, and the assumption of the Crown by a collateral Prince (not the heir of the late King) were events from which Sevagee hoped to derive advantage, by making conquests along the Malabar Coast:—for this purpose he endeavoured to create dissention among the dependents on the Crown of Visiapore, and then suddenly descended the Gauts, with an army, into the country on the eastern side of the mountains, near Carwar and Goa:—this tract abounded with manufacturing villages, which traded to the capital and to the sea:—the booty which he carried off was immense:—after conveying his plunder to Rairee, he put in execution his principal plan, or an attack on the country, situated south of Carwar, and still a part of the kingdom of Visiapore.

The

(1)—Orme's *Historical Fragments*, pages 38—42.—Scott's *History of the Decan*, vol. ii, pages 31—35.



CHAP. II. was paid to procure an exemption from their depredations :  
*Introduction.* —they founded this demand on a pretended right, that these districts, in ancient times, had belonged to a Mahratta Rajah : it does not, however, appear, that the Governor of Bassein complied with the demand. <sup>(9)</sup>

The attention of Aurungzebe, in 1675, was divided by a new, but not less dangerous enemy, than Sevagee, the Patans of Pishwar and Cabul ; who, in 1673, had cut off several detached parties of the imperial troops, and obliged the Mogul Governor of Pishwar to pass the Indus, with his army, to stop their farther inroads ; who, instead of effecting this service, was, with his army, surrounded and destroyed, in the defiles of the mountains.

Enthusiasm and political intrigue were the distinguishing characters of the Patans, of which they gave frequent proofs ;—and to embarrass Aurungzebe, in his plan of reducing them to obedience, they set up a soldier, who happened to resemble in face, person, and manner, the unfortunate Sujah, and published that this Sultan had been miraculously preserved among them, and was now to re-appear, and to assert his just right to the Crown of Delhi :—with this view, they proclaimed this adventurer, King of Hindostan, and were ready to support him with a powerful army : Aurungzebe, aware of the danger, took the field in person, and required all the Mahomedans to join him ;  
and

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 62, 63.



**CHAP. II.** burnt the town of Carwar (the English factory excepted),  
*Introduction.* reduced the whole country, to the river Mirzeon, the northern limit of the kingdom of Canara, and then marched to Rairee.<sup>(1)</sup>

Aurungzebe, on his return, in 1675, from the Indus, issued orders to Bahadar-Chan and to the Siddee, to prosecute the war against Sevagee with vigour:—Bahadar sat down before Gallian:—this place, with the country below the hills, stretches as far north as Damaun, and (the districts of the Portuguese excepted) had been reduced by Sevagee, but lay exposed to the Mogul army;—to prevent the desolation with which it was threatened, Sevagee gave Bahadar a bribe of ten thousand pagodas:—the Siddee was not included in this agreement, but sailed along the coast, and burned the town of Vingorlah, near Goa:—to oppose the Siddee, Sevagee had been equipping a fleet, which amounted to fifty-seven sail, fifteen of which were grabs, the remainder gallivats:—this fleet sailed from Geriah and Rajahpore, to meet that of the Siddee, who had already proceeded to the relief of Gingerah:—during this interval, in 1676, Siddee Cossim's fleet, which rode off Mazagong, was detached to reinforce Gingerah, which Morah Pundit, descending the Gauts, was approaching with ten thousand men.<sup>(2)</sup>

Sevagee, in 1677, marched, with his whole army, to attack the kingdom of Visiapore: his route lay by Tripety,  
 and

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 72 and 73.

(2)—Ibid. - - - - - pages 74—78.



CHAP. II. Mogul at a stand, and Visiapore as a barrier to his own  
*Introduction.* dominions. <sup>(1)</sup>

As the talents and success of Sevagee had hitherto been the principal check on the progress of the Mogul, and on the operations of the Siddees, after the Visiapore Government had alternately leaned to the one side, or to the other, it is impossible to have a clear estimate of Aurungzebe's reign, during this active period of it, but by bringing into view the characters of the different powers with which he had to act, or to contend.

*Origin of the  
 Siddees.*

The Siddees owe their origin to a few natives of Abyssinia, who having gained some ascendancy over a King of Visiapore, and being Mahomedans, had collected numbers, both of their countrymen, and of the Coffrees, from Africa, and, by their valour and enterprize, had been useful in defending the maritime districts of that kingdom. When Sevagee revolted from it, three of its principal provinces were governed by Siddees, of whom the admiral was one:— he had under his jurisdiction a considerable extent of coast, to the north and south of Gingerah, at the very time when Sevagee got possession of Danda-Rajahpore:—it was from their dread of Sevagee's power, that we have seen the Siddees putting themselves under the protection of the Mogul Government, but reserving Gingerah as their particular retreat:—

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 94, 95, Note 42.— Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, pages 46—49.





CHAP. II.  
Introduction. apore had also the forts and districts between Conimere and Vellore, but it does not appear that Tanjore belonged to it.

Golcondah comprehended all the hilly country which stretches north of Vellore, from Gundicottah, toward the sea coast, between the rivers Penar and Palliar, that run into the sea at Nellore and Sadras.<sup>(1)</sup>

Progress of  
Aurangzebe,  
in subjugat-  
ing these  
kingdoms.

Such were the powers against whom Aurungzebe had to contend; and, from their force and situation, it was evident that they might furnish him with active scenes, which would retard his favourite plan of enlarging and consolidating the Mogul Empire

The Siddees, in 1678, still retained Gingerah, and laid waste the Mahratta coasts:—as the fleet of the Siddee had found shelter at Bombay, a force was sent to destroy his ships in the harbour:—this was successfully opposed, as will appear in the sequel, by the English ships, and by the garrison:—Dowlat Chan, who commanded Sevagee's ships, on this occasion, burnt several villages in the Portuguese districts, because the Governor of Bassein had refused him permission to cross to the island of Bombay, by Tannah: he sent also a part of his troops, by Pannela to Damaun, and to plunder round Surat, while Sevagee himself conducted the ineffectual siege of Gingerah.<sup>(2)</sup>

Aurangzebe,

(1)—Orme's *Historical Fragments*, pages 83—86, Note 38.

(2)—*Ibid.* . . . . . pages 96—100, Note 44.



CHAP. II.  
Introduction.

cession Aurungzebe held himself to be his lord paramount, and proposed that Ram-Sing "should no longer strike coin in his own name; that the Pagodas should be demolished, or converted into Mosques; and that justice should be administered according to the Alcoran: if these terms were refused, his whole people were to be subjected to the general capitation of the Hindoos." The Ranah remonstrated, and prepared for war:—in October 1678, Aurungzebe took the field with two armies;—one conducted by himself, against Chitore and Joudpore; the other by Sultan Mauzim against Sevagee, who had joined the confederacy of his countrymen:—the Ranah, and the widow of the Rajah of Abnir, called upon all the Hindoos to defend their liberties and their religion:—Sultan Mauzim advanced to Brampore, and soon afterwards fixed his residence at Aurungabad.<sup>(1)</sup>

The conflict between the armies would have been immediate and bloody; but it was averted by an event, which predicted ruin to the Hindoo allies:—Sambagee, the son and heir of Sevagee, secretly corresponded with the Imperialists, and, at last, deserted with two thousand horse, from Rairee to Aurungabad; nor was this unexpected blow to Sevagee, single: Bullull-Chan, the Minister of Visiapore, and Cowis-Chan, one of the Siddees, had been assassinated, and their successors took part with Sultan Mauzim: a mind, less intrepid and vigorous than that which Sevagee possessed, would have been  
overset

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, page 100—106, Notes 48, 49.

overset by these dangers ; but they served only to rouse him to greater exertion :—he detached a large party to lay waste the country round Surat; collected a fleet of twenty two-masted grabs, and forty gallivats, and took possession of the small islands of Kenery and Henery, within a short distance of the harbour of Bombay, to force the Governor of that island into a neutrality.

CHAP. II.  
Introduction.

Sevagee next endeavoured to procure a passage for five thousand men, by Bassein, into the Island of Bombay, but was refused by the Portuguese ; and a negotiation for peace was opened, between him and the Governor of that island.<sup>(1)</sup>

During these transactions, Sevagee marched towards Visiapore, at the head of twenty thousand horse :—a general action ensued, in which his son fought against him ; and for the first time, he was defeated, but not conquered :—this misfortune he endeavoured to repair, by uniting with the discontented Rajah of Berar, and they laid waste the country between Aurungabad and Brampore, and plundered the English factories at Chupra and Dongong, while Morah-Pundit, his general, desolated the villages round Surat, and kept the field till the close of the year.

Notwithstanding so many adverse circumstances to prevent his great object, or the conquest and conversion of the Hindoos, Aurungzebe found, that he had to contend with a people, equally

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 107—117,—— Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, page 51.

**CHAP. II.** *Introduction.* equally fruitful in expedients, and intrepid in the field with himself; and though he pursued, with a large force, the Ranah, and the Rajah of Marwar to their inaccessible mountains and defiles, he was himself inclosed, and in danger of seeing his army perish by famine, or of being taken prisoner; but, at this crisis, the Ranah withdrew his troops, and Aurungzebe left the army under the command of his sons, Azim and Mauzim, and retired to Agimere, that he might, from time to time, send them the necessary instructions.

The Mogul army, on the side of Visiapore, carried on an equally fruitless war; for Sambagee, at this time, abandoned Aurungzebe, and, with four hundred horse and a thousand foot, marched to Pannela, where he was reconciled to Sevagee, and entrusted by him with the command of that fortress. <sup>(1)</sup>

Death of Sevagee, and Accession of Sambagee.

The events, in 1680, were equally indecisive:—the Siddee and Dowlat-Chan, Sevagee's admiral, had several partial encounters at sea, but the latter still kept possession of the two small islands of Kenery and Henery; and a treaty was, this year, (to be detailed in the subsequent annals), concluded between the Governor of Bombay and Sevagee. It was in this season, that Sevagee took a large convoy, with money and stores, which Aurungzebe had sent to Aurungabad; but his excessive fatigue, on this excursion, brought on an inflammation in his breast, of which he died.

The

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 117—122, Notes 51, 52.—Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, pages 51—52.



CHAP. II.  
*Introduction.*

throne; his sons, the competitors for the succession, had those opposite qualities, which rendered the ultimate success of any one of them uncertain. Sultan Mauzim, the eldest, was the favorite of the army; Acbar was restless and turbulent, and disposed to embarrass the administration of his father, and to excite the jealousy and hatred of his elder brothers, Mauzim and Azim:—Acbar, with the assistance of thirty thousand Rajpoots, projected to seize on Aurungzebe in Agimere, and then to proclaim himself Emperor:—a superstitious prejudice, of not commencing the enterprize till a fortunate day, discovered the plot:—Aurungzebe, on this occasion, addressed a letter to Acbar, admonishing him of his undutiful conduct, but this letter Acbar answered, by one of defiance:—Mauzim and Azim made rapid marches to support their father's interests: Acbar fled to the country of the Maha-Rajah, and soon afterwards to the districts adjoining to the Guzzerat: Mauzim was ordered to pursue, and, if possible, to take him prisoner; but Acbar escaped to Pawleegur, a fort at the foot of the Gaults, opposite to Bombay, and afterwards joined Sambagee at Rairee.

Aurungzebe, alarmed at the support which Acbar was receiving from Sambagee, made peace with the Ranah, and then prepared to attack Sambagee with his whole force; for this purpose, Sultan Azim's army rendezvoused at Ahmednagur, Sultan Mauzim's at Aurungabad, and Aurungzebe's at Bram-pore;







tion it would make to the power of the Mahrattas, and to the pretensions of Acbar, might be of material weight in the issue of the war. Fifteen thousand men, however, passed the Gauts, in December, and laid waste the Portuguese country, between Bassein and Damaun;—it was at this juncture, that the Mahratta gallivats took possession of the Portuguese Island of Caranjah, situated at the bottom of the harbour of Bombay. <sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.

*Introduction.*

Aurungzebe, that he might more effectually check the growing power of Sambagee, sent Sultan Mauzim with a large army, of which forty thousand were cavalry, to act against him:—Mauzim, descending the Gauts, almost surrounded Sambagee's army, at Rajahpore, and desolated the whole country between Goa and the river Cary, destroying the pagodas, and sacking Vingorlah, for having given refuge to Sultan Acbar:—the Mogul fleet, to co-operate with the army, attempted to penetrate into the harbour of Goa, and to get possession of the city:—this attempt required time; and as the provisions of the Mogul fleet were exhausted by the month of March, Mauzim was compelled to repass the Gauts;—he took, however, a station, from which he could either join the army of Azim, acting against Visiapore; or return, and carry on the war against Sambagee:—these events disposed the Portuguese to offer terms to Sambagee, and to abandon the Mogul interest; but their offers were rejected,

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 161—180.

**CHAP. II.** jected, unless they would pay a ransom of five millions of  
*Introduction.* rupees. <sup>(1)</sup>

Aurangzebe  
 conquers Vi-  
 siapore and  
 Golcondah at  
 this juncture.

The country of Mysore had been divided between the Kings of Visiapore and Golcondah :—it had been subjected to several rajahs, of which that of Seringapatam was the chief; but had paid irregular tributes to Visiapore :—the arms of that country were now no longer able to compel these chiefs to payments; it was, therefore, agreed, that the King of Golcondah should possess the tract from Gundicotta, and its frontier, to the south-west, and, in return, that this government should pay a large sum to Visiapore, and another, to induce Sambagee to act against the Moguls, who were continuing their invasions of this country.

Sultan Mauzim, while this arrangement was made, remained with his army near the Gauts of Goa, and Sambagee desolated the country to the west of that city, and attempted to reduce Bassein. The Emperor had now armies in every quarter of this large field of war :—Aurangzebe himself was at the foot of the Gauts, about one hundred and thirty miles to the south-west of Sambagee; and Sultan Azim was in the northern division of Viziapore, where he took the strong fort of Solapore by treachery :—Mauzim, on this event, advanced towards Visiapore, and took Gocuck, Hubely, and the strong citadel

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 189—198.— Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, page 59.



CHAP. II.  
Introduction.

The event of Acbar's flight lessened the importance of the war against Sambagee; and induced Aurungzebe to break the treaty, lately made by Sultan Mauzim, with the King of Golcondah, who fled into the fortress. Aurungzebe fixed his quarters at Hyderabad :—the siege was long, for it continued till April 1687 :—the capture of the place would have been impracticable, had not Azim, to whom the enterprize was committed, corrupted some of the officers in the fort, and having scaled the walls in the night, reduced this capital, and made the King a prisoner. <sup>(1)</sup>

Sambagee, during these revolutions, prepared for vigorous exertions, for he could no longer look for terms from a monarch who had no feelings, and no principles, to influence or direct him. The conquests which Sambagee and his father had made in the Carnatic, it was evident, would become the next object of Aurungzebe's arms; for Visiapore and Golcondah had fallen, and no powers now remained, with whom he could league, either to divert or to divide the storm :—collecting, therefore, troops from the garrisons of Sattarah, Pannela, and Pundah, Sambagee made a successful attack on the western frontier of Visiapore, and detached twelve thousand horse to Gingee, with secret orders to seize on Hargee Rajah, who had governed that country from the time it had been

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 211—218.—Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, pages 66—72.

been conquered by Sevagee, but whose fidelity he began to suspect.

CHAP. II.

*Introduction.*

Aurungzebe, alarmed at this expedition, detached an army from Golcondah, by the west of the Carnatic mountains, which invested and took Bangalore :—the Mahratta generals, for a moment, were reconciled to each other, and Hargee-Rajah conducted himself, in this affair, with the most politic prudence :—to conciliate Sambagee, he sent two generals, at the head of eighteen thousand horse, to make an irruption into the Mysore country, at the time when Aurungzebe detached a force to reduce the maritime provinces, from Masulipatam to Ganjam.

Sambagee, in person, conducted the war on the side of Visiapore :—the countries south of Pannela submitted to him, and his army, at the close of the year, had advanced among the mountains, beyond the Gauts, to the westward. <sup>(1)</sup>

Early in 1688, Aurungzebe left Delhi, determined to conduct the war against Sambagee, and sent another army by Cudapah :—in its progress it took Chittapet and Coverpauk, but the troops of Hargee-Rajah still retained possession of the country to the north of the Palliar :—the army, at last, moved on from Golcondah into the Carnatic, under the command of Mahomed Sadick :—it consisted of twelve thousand Mogul cavalry, and a great number of irregular infantry :—on its

Death of  
Sambagee.

VOL. II.

K

approach,

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 219—225.— Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, pages 74—76.

CHAP. II.  
*Introduction.*

approach, the Mahrattas retreated from Conjeveram, but occupied the posts on each side of the Palliar :—after strengthening the garrisons of Poonamalee and Vandevash, the Moguls encamped near this last place, and sent detachments to the gates of Madras :—the Mahratta army was at Chittapet :—both armies seemed cautious of risking a general engagement, and wasted their time in frequent, but indecisive skirmishes :—Aurungzebe had remained at Visiapore, to watch the motions of Sambagee ; and though he reduced the towns in the open country, the strong holds among the mountains remained to the Mahrattas. Pannela was next invested by Aurungzebe, but in vain ; seeing, therefore, no probability of the war being terminated in the field, he resorted to the project of getting Sambagee betrayed into his power :—one of his generals accepted a bribe, and delivered Sambagee to the Emperor, who ordered him to be put to death. <sup>(1)</sup>

State of the  
war after this  
event.

The events, towards the close of the reign of Aurungzebe, cannot be so fully ascertained, from the authors who have written on Indian History, as the recent period in which they happened, would have led us to expect :—it will appear, however, from the documents on which the Annals of the London East-India Company proceed, that after he had conquered Golcondah and Visiapore, and had murdered Sambagee, he either considered his favourite scheme, of enlarging

(1)—Orme's Historical Fragments, pages 225—233, Note 78.— Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii. pages 77, 78.





**CHAP. II.** situation of the Moguls, which could be seized on, or turned  
*Introduction.* to the re-establishment of the Hindoo interests; and the  
 disputes between Aurungzebe's sons, for the succession, afforded one of the events which Sahogee watched for, and steadily improved on:—in the sequel, Sahogee mingled in their disputes, and thus preserved his influence on the side of the Carnatic, as well as extended his dominions on the west of the Peninsula.

State of Tan-  
 jore at this  
 juncture.

The Hindoos, anterior to this period, had established themselves at Tanjore, under Eccogee, a brother of Sevagee:—Eccogee had held a command at Visiapore, before the fall of that kingdom, and had marched with a body of troops to the assistance of the Naig of Tanjore, then at war with the Naig of Tritchinopoly:—after defeating this chief, he seized on Tanjore, which he had been called to defend:—the pretext was, to collect the money required for defraying the expences of the war. Eccogee must have been King, or Rajah of Tanjore, at the time when Sambagee, his nephew, was put to death; but it is doubtful, whether he was acting as a member, or as an officer, of the Hindoo confederacy: he continued, however, superior of this district to his death, and was succeeded by his son, Shahgee, the ancestor of the Rajahs of Tanjore.<sup>(1)</sup>

This establishment of the Hindoos in Tanjore, and the continuance of their vicinity to the other parts of the Carnatic, discovers

(1) — Orme's Historical Fragments, Note 76.

discovers an important fact, or the basis on which their interests were placed, after the death of Aurungzebe. Such CHAP. II.  
Introduction. seems to have been the situation of Aurungzebe's conquests in this part of India, that they required his personal presence to preserve them; for he was kept almost always in the field, during the last years of his life.

The frequent and long absence of the Emperor from the seat of government produced an irregularity in the administration of the Empire, and this circumstance gave a beginning to those disorders, which afterwards contributed to its subversion. The Rajpoots of Agimere first rebelled, but were checked, in what has been termed the second rebellion of the Rajpoots:—the Patans, towards the Indus, renewed their attacks, and were rather resisted than subdued:—a new race, the Jats, appeared in the province of Agra, and from having been a banditti, were becoming a considerable people.<sup>(1)</sup>

The talents of Aurungzebe, however, supported his empire, as they were fitted for his situation. He died in 1707, after a reign of fifty years, leaving the Mogul empire in the full measure of its extent:—his authority reached from the tenth to the thirty-fifth degree of latitude, and nearly as much in longitude, with a revenue exceeding thirty-two millions sterling.<sup>(2)</sup>

The

(1)—Rennel's Introduction, page 63.

(2)—Scott's Memoirs of Eradut Khan, page 10.— Scott's History of the Decan, vol. ii, page 123.— Rennel's Introduction, page 63.





## CHAP. II.

*Introduction.*

The laws, as well as the maxims of jurisprudence, introduced by Aurungzebe, seem all to have arisen from the circumstances in which he was placed, and from his knowledge of the prevailing passions of the various orders of his subjects:—he had early been trained in habits of observation by Shah-Jehan, whom he always attended, while that Emperor sat distributing justice, and by whom he was appealed to, though then at a period of life at which young men are scarcely beginning to discriminate:—when Emperor, he not only sat every day himself to administer justice, but was attended by those who were the most distinguished for their knowledge of the laws:—men of learning made up reports of the cases, but the Emperor himself examined them, before he pronounced judgment:—that he might diffuse the administration of justice over the whole Empire, he had an officer in the principal courts in the provinces; and whenever he received any complaint, respecting the conduct of a judge, he brought the accused before him, put the accusation in his hands, and if he found him guilty, degraded and banished him.

Aurungzebe was equally attentive to the sources of his revenue: that arising from the lands, in a particular manner, was under the strictest regulations:—he allowed of no variation from the ancient tenures, but held it to be a maxim, that the raising of the rents, on those who had improved their farms, was as impolitic in the prince, as unjust to the subject.

The













CHAP. II.  
Contents.

*decline, from the ancient grants being disregarded by the Persian officers. . . . . Trade on the Coromandel Coast precarious, from the opposition of the Dutch. . . . . Project of opening a trade, through Siam, with Japan, Tonquin, and China. . . . The trade between Bantam, the Coromandel Coast, and the Southern Islands, obstructed by the Dutch.*

*1664-65.—Court's instructions to their foreign settlements, on the appearances of a war with the Dutch. . . . . French East-India Company formed, and instructions of the Court regarding it. . . . . Precautions to be observed at Surat, should a war take place with Holland . . . . . King's troops at Angedivah ordered to be transferred to Fort St. George. . . . . Equipments and stock of this season limited. . . . . Sir Edmoard Winter superseded, and Mr. Foxcroft appointed Agent at Fort St. George, with orders to reduce the out-agencies. . . . . The Agent at Bantam directed not to attempt the recovery of Polaroon, if not already ceded. . . . . The death of Sir Abraham Shipman, induced his secretary, Mr. Cooke, to accept Bombay, on the terms prescribed by the Portuguese. . . . . Return of the King's troops landed at Bombay, and estimate of their expences. . . . . Effect of this event on the Company's settlements and trade. . . . . Trade at Madras depressed, from the Agent not having authority to use forcible measures against the Natives, and from the want of a double stock. . . . . Polaroon delivered to the Agent at Bantam, but in a desolated state. . . . . The Agent*



CHAP. II. *ter's statement of this event to the Court; and his complaints against*  
 Contents. *the Agent in Bengal, for disobedience of orders. . . . . Polaroon re-*  
*occupied by the Dutch, and the trade at Bantam on the decline.*

1666-67.—*Court's detail of the events of the war with Holland*  
*. . . . . Loss sustained by the Company by the Fire of London. . . . .*  
*Court make an application to the King, to issue orders to Sir Gervase*  
*Lucas to disavow the proceedings of Mr. Cooke at Bombay. . . . . Ad-*  
*dress to the King and Council, to issue a proclamation against Sir*  
*Edward Winter and his adherents. . . . . Sir Gervase Lucas protests*  
*against the conduct of Mr. Cooke at Bombay. . . . . Dispute between*  
*Sir Gervase Lucas and Sir George Oxinden, relative to issuing passes*  
*in the King's name. . . . . Sir Gervase Lucas's report on the state of*  
*Bombay. . . . . Company's ships at Surat blockaded by the Dutch. . . . .*  
*The purchase of an investment difficult, from the wars between Aurung-*  
*zebe and Sevagee. . . . . Trade also affected by the exaggerated accounts*  
*of the French Agents of the magnitude of their stock and shipping.*

1667-68.—*The Islands of Polaroon and Damm ceded to the*  
*Dutch by the Treaty of Breda. . . . . The Island of Bombay granted*  
*by the King to the Company. . . . . Court's instructions to Sir George*  
*Oxinden, to receive the Island of Bombay from Sir Gervase Lucas*  
*. . . . . Equipments and stock for Surat enlarged, on account of the*  
*grant of Bombay. . . . . Precautions to be observed by the Company's*  
*officers, in case Sir Edward Winter had delivered Fort St. George to*  
 the

*at Sumatra. . . . . Death of Sir Gervase Lucas, at Bombay, communicated to the Secretary of State, by Sir George Oxinden. . . . . The appointment of Mr. Gary, to be Deputy Governor of Bombay, opposed by Mr. Cooke. . . . . Mr. Gary's report on the revenues of Bombay . . . . . Phirmaund obtained from Aurungzebe, for reducing the customs payable by the English, at Surat, to two per cent. . . . . Sir Edward Winter supported by Governor Gary, in his usurpation of the government of Fort St. George.*

*1668-69.—Memorial of the Court to the Privy Council, requesting explanations of the Treaty of Breda; and decision of the Council on the subject. . . . . Instructions to Sir George Oxinden on this decision. . . . . Equipments and stock for Surat and Bombay. . . . . Mr. Rolt appointed Agent in Persia, under instructions to revive that trade. . . . . Sir George Oxinden appointed Governor and Commander-in-chief of Bombay. . . . . Regulations for the government of Bombay . . . . . Equipments and stock for the Coromandel Coast enlarged. . . . .*

CHAP. II.	<i>Establishment of pilots for the navigation of the Ganges.</i>
Contents.	..... <i>Trade to be revived between the Coast of Coromandel and Acheen.</i> ..... <i>Equipments and stock for Bantam enlarged.</i> ..... <i>Project of reviving the trade to Japan.</i> ..... <i>The island of St. Helena confirmed, by charter, to the Company, and Captain Stringer appointed Governor.</i> ..... <i>Project of Sir George Oxinden for reviving the trade with Mocha ;...with Acheen ;...and with Quedah.</i> ..... <i>Sir George Oxinden takes possession of Bombay, in the name of the Company.</i> ..... <i>Statements of Mr. Gary, and the Commissioners from Surat, of the revenues and disbursements of Bombay.</i> ..... <i>Regulations established by Sir George Oxinden, for the administration of the Island.</i> ..... <i>Sir Edward Winter, in obedience to the King's commission, resigns the Government of the Fort ; and Mr. Foxcroft released, and vested with the Agency.</i> ..... <i>Mr. Foxcroft's report to the Court on this occasion.</i> ..... <i>The Agent at Hughly recommends a direct trade between Bengal and England.</i>

1669-70.—*Company present a memorial to the Council, on the Dutch evasions of the Treaty of Breda.*..... *System of administration at Surat new modelled.*..... *Commercial instructions to Surat on the Persian and Southern markets.*..... *Regulations of the Court for the marine and military establishments at Bombay.*..... *Equipments and stock for Surat.*..... *Mr. Foxcroft re-appointed Agent at Fort St. George for one year, and to be succeeded by Sir William Langhorne*  
..... *Equipments,*

..... Equipments, stock, and commercial instructions to Fort St. George for the season. .... Court's orders to the Agents at Masulipatam, Bengal, and Bantam. .... Death of Sir George Oxinden, and provisional appointment of Mr. Gerald Aungier to be President of Surat. .... Measures of President Aungier for disposing of the Company's goods and procuring an investment. .... Difficulty of procuring Indian produce, from the apprehension of another attack by Sevagee. .... Failure of the project for opening trade at Acheen and Quedah. .... Persian trade on the decline, and receipt of the Company's customs at Gombroon precarious. .... Report of the Deputy Governor of Bombay on the state of the Island. .... The Deputy Governor of Bombay superseded. .... President Aungier proceeds to Bombay, and establishes courts of judicature and other internal regulations. .... Mr. Gary appointed Deputy Governor of Bombay. .... Fort St. George besieged by the Naig; but the siege raised, on application to the Nabob. .... State of trade at Madras. .... in Bengal. .... and at Bantam.

1670-71.—Court's instructions to their foreign settlements accommodated to the maritime laws of England. .... Commercial instructions to the Presidency of Surat. .... Mr. Aungier's provisional appointment, as President, confirmed. .... Equipments and stock for Surat. .... Regulations for settling the Government of Bombay, for encreasing the garrison, and erecting a mint. .... Directions to the Agent at Fort St. George, for his conduct towards the Native Powers



## CHAP. II.

## Contents.

..... Equipments and stock for Fort. St. George ..... Equipments and stock for Bantam. .... Two ships dispatched from England, to attempt re-opening the trade to Bantam. .... Additional equipments and stock for Bantam. .... Surat again attacked and pillaged by Sevagee ; and the English Factory defended, and the Company's property preserved. .... Trade precarious from this event, and from the attempts of the French to establish a Factory. .... State of trade at the subordinate stations to Surat. .... Measures taken to strengthen Bombay, and encrease the garrison. .... Sir William Langhorne's report on the trade on the Coromandel Coast. .... Pepper trade encreased at Bantam, but the Factory embarrassed, by English seamen entering into the service of the Native Powers. .... Commercial regulations between the King of Bantam and the English Agent.

1671-72.—Instructions of the Court to Surat, on the probability of a war in Europe, and equipments and stock limited, in expectation of that event. .... Court's regulations for Bombay. .... Directions for encreasing the garrison at Fort St. George. .... Equipments and stock for Fort St. George and subordinate stations. .... Equipments and stock for Bantam, and instructions to attempt trade at China, Tonquin, Tywan, and Japan. .... Regulations for St. Helena. .... The trade at Surat, for a time, suspended by the Governor, from a dispute between the Dutch and the Natives. .... A large French Fleet arriving at Surat, occasions a depression of the English trade. ....

An

*An English Agent sent to Sevagee, to solicit payment of the Company's losses by his armies. . . . . Dutch again interfere with the Company's trade. . . . . Apprehensions at Surat of another attack from Sevagee . . . . . Measures at Bombay for defending the Island. . . . . Sir William Langhorne assumes the Government of Fort St. George, and Mr. Foxcroft and Sir Edward Winter return to England. . . . . Phirmaund, conferring additional privileges on the English, obtained from the King of Golcondah. . . . . State of trade at Fort St. George and subordinate settlements. . . . . Trade at Bantam impeded, by disputes with the King, and by the interferences of the Dutch, Danes, and French.*

*1672-73.—Measures of the Company accommodated to the war between England and Holland. . . . . Court's memorial to the King, praying their affairs might be taken into consideration, in any negotiation with the Dutch. . . . . General instructions to the Foreign Settlements, in consequence of the war. . . . . Particular orders to President Aungier, whose salary was augmented. . . . . Instructions to place Fort St. George in a state of defence. . . . . Commercial orders to Bengal . . . . . Political and commercial relations of Bombay and Surat with the Portuguese and the Native Powers. . . . . Measures of President Aungier and the Deputy Governor, for putting Bombay into a state of defence, under the plan of transferring to it the seat of Government . . . . . Appearance of a Dutch fleet off Bombay. . . . . French Factories established at Trincomalé and St. Thomé. . . . . Investment in Bengal limited.*











*the trade at Amoy, but to lessen the expences at Siam, Tonquin, and Tywan. . . . . New regulations for St. Helena. . . . . Court's orders for reducing the establishment at Surat found impracticable. . . . . Bombay endangered, from Sevagee, and the Mogul Admiral, or Siddee, having respectively occupied the Islands of Henery and Kenery. . . . . Difficulty of executing the Court's orders for reducing the military establishment at Bombay.*

1680-81.—*Court's instructions to Surat, on intelligence of a large fleet fitting in the Baltic, for the East-Indies. . . . . Equipments and stock for Surat. . . . . Directions not to employ force, to expel Sevagee and the Siddee from Henery and Kenery. . . . . Captain Keigwin, and seventy soldiers, sent as a reinforcement for Bombay. . . . . New plan of administration for Fort St. George, of which Mr. Gyfford was appointed Agent. . . . . Equipments and stock for Fort St. George and Bengal. . . . . New plan of administration for Bantam. . . . . Equipments, stock, and commercial instructions, for Bantam and subordinate stations. . . . . More favourable prospects of trade, from the death of Sevagee, and the accession of Sambagee. . . . . Order of Aurungzebe to augment the customs at Surat, from two, to three and a half per cent. . . . . The investment for Europe considerable. . . . . Trade and revenue of Bombay improving. . . . . Phirmaund obtained from the King of Persia, for payment of part of the arrears of customs at Gombroom.*



CHAP. II.  
Contents.

1681-82.—*Surat restored to the rank of a Presidency. . . . Equipments and stock for Surat. . . . Mr. John Child appointed President of Surat, with particular instructions to promote the sale of English manufactures in India. . . . Orders for limiting the civil and military charges of Bombay to a fixed sum. . . . Plan for reviving the Persian trade, and connecting it with the trade to Mocha. . . . Directions to the Agent at Fort St. George, for counteracting the schemes of the Interlopers. . . . Large equipments and stock to Fort St. George and Bengal. . . . Bengal constituted a distinct Agency from Fort St. George; and Mr. Hedges, one of the Directors, appointed Agent at Hughly, and Governor of the Company's settlements in Bengal. . . . Equipments and stock for Bantam; and instructions to resettle the Factory at Amoy, and to extend the trade to Canton. . . . Judicial regulations for St. Helena. . . . Increase of investments at Surat attributed to its restoration to the rank of a Presidency. . . . Embarrassed state of Bombay, from Sambagee continuing the plans of Sevagee. . . . Intelligence from Fort St. George and Bengal defective this season . . . . King of Bantam sends an embassy to England.*

1682-83.—*Disputes between the East-India and Levant Companies the origin of the first attempts to form a New East-India Stock . . . . Instructions to Surat, to re-establish the Factory at Rajahpore, and to form an alliance with Sambagee. . . . Court determine to employ force, to recover their proportion of customs at Gombroon. . . .*

*Plan*



CHAP. II.	<i>seat of the Company's trade in the East-Indies. . . . . Court's directions</i>
Contents.	<i>for encreasing the revenues of Bombay. . . . . Two fleets, under the</i>
	<i>command of Sir John Wetwang, and Sir Thomas Grantham, sent to</i>
	<i>India, for recovering the Persian and Bantam trades. . . . . Fort St.</i>
	<i>George constituted a Presidency, and Mr. Gyfford appointed President.</i>
	<i>. . . . . Commercial instructions for Fort St. George and subordinate</i>
	<i>stations. . . . . Mr. Hedges, Agent in Bengal, dismissed, and Mr.</i>
	<i>Gyfford appointed President of Fort St. George and Bengal. . . . .</i>
	<i>Measures for protecting the Coromandel and Bengal trade. . . . .</i>
	<i>Stock for Bengal, and instructions to obtain a fortified station at the</i>
	<i>Mouth of the Ganges. . . . . Court's orders to Sir Thomas Grantham</i>
	<i>to recover the trade at Bantam. . . . . Regulations for St. Helena.</i>
	<i>. . . . . Trade at Surat depressed, by the wars of the Mogul and Sam-</i>
	<i>bagee, the want of sufficient stock, and the interferences of the French</i>
	<i>and Interlopers. . . . . Presidency of Surat establish a Factory at Telli-</i>
	<i>cherry. . . . . Captain Keigwin seizes the Deputy Governor of Bombay,</i>
	<i>and takes possession of the Island, in the name of the King. . . . .</i>
	<i>. . . . . Measures of Captain Keigwin, on assuming the Government of</i>
	<i>Bombay. . . . . Measures of President Child, on receiving intelligence</i>
	<i>of the revolt at Bombay. . . . . The recovery of Bombay impeded by</i>
	<i>the Interlopers. . . . . Declining state of the trade in Persia. . . . . The</i>
	<i>Presidency of Fort St. George endeavour to procure an investment,</i>
	<i>and to obstruct the Interlopers. . . . . The Company's servants, at their</i>
	<i>late</i>

*late Agency of Bantam, obliged to retire to Surat, and the trade to Siam, Tonquin, &c. lost.*

CHAP. II.  
Contents.

1684-85.—*Court's plans to check the Interlopers, and lessen the charge of Bombay. . . . . Commercial instructions for Bombay. . . . . A Secret Committee of Directors appointed to report to the King, on the revolts at Bombay. . . . . The King's orders to Captain Keigwin, to deliver Bombay to the Company; and commission to Sir John Child, to offer a general pardon to the revolters, except the four ringleaders. . . . . Court's instructions for reducing the Island. . . . . Captain Tyrrel, of the Navy, sent out, to receive the Island from the revolters, and redeliver it to the Company. . . . . Commercial instructions to Surat; . . . . . to Persia; . . . . . and to Fort St. George, in consequence of the decision of the Court of King's Bench, in favor of the Company, against the Interlopers. . . . . Equipments and stock for Fort St. George. . . . . Regulations for improving the town, and encreasing the garrison of Madras. . . . . Instructions to the Bengal Agents, to procure a station which might be fortified. . . . . Death of King Charles II. . . . . Court's project of making Acheen the centre of the southern trade. . . . . Additional orders for St. Helena. . . . . Connexion between the Revolters at Bombay and the Interlopers at Surat. . . . . Captain Keigwin sends an Agent, to negotiate a treaty with Sambagee. . . . . Arrival of Dr. St. John, Sir Thomas Grantham, and the fleet, at Surat. . . . . Dr. St. John's report on the state of the Company's affairs . . . . . Surrender*

CHAP. II.  
Contents.

..... *Surrender of the Island of Bombay to Sir Thomas Grantham, and redelivery to the Presidency of Surat..... Able measures of President Child to procure an investment..... Unsettled state of Bombay at this period..... Efforts of Sir Thomas Grantham, to obtain satisfaction for losses in Persia, ineffectual..... Obstructions to the trade on the Malabar Coast..... Trade on the Coromandel Coast more favorable..... President Gyffords regulations for extending and improving the trade to Bengal..... Failure of the plan for resettling the Company's Agency at Bantam.*

1685-86.—*Resolution of the Company to institute prosecutions, in England, against the Interlopers..... Sir John Child appointed, under the King's authority, Captain General and Admiral of the Company's Settlements in India..... Discretionary powers given to him to recover, by force, the arrears of customs at Gombroon..... Seat of Government ordered to be transferred from Surat to Bombay..... Court's regulations for the internal administration of Bombay..... Commercial instructions for Surat, Bombay, and Persia..... The Agents in Bengal censured for their timidity, respecting the Nabob..... Orders to Fort St. George, for strengthening the fortifications, and improving the revenues..... Court's secret instructions to commence hostilities against the Mogul and the Nabob of Dacca, with the object of obtaining possession of Chittagong; and an expedition fitted out, for that service..... Subordinate objects of the expedition, to attack*



## CHAP. II.

## Contents.

*Fort St. George. . . . . Dutch endeavour to excite jealousy between the Company and the Persian Government. . . . . Premature commencement of hostilities at Hughly. . . . . Demands of the Company on the Nabob of Bengal. . . . . English retire to Chutanuttee, or Calcutta. . . . . Part of the garrison of Fort St George dispatched to Bengal. . . . . President Gyfford represents to the Mogul, the object of the English armament in Bengal. . . . . A Settlement formed at Bencoolen, in Sumatra.*

*1687-88.—Court determine to constitute Bombay a Regency, in imitation of the Dutch at Batavia. . . . . Sir John Child appointed Governor General, with control over all the Settlements and Factories. . . . . Court's orders to coin money at Bombay, and for all country ships to take passes from their Governor General. . . . . Commercial orders for Surat and Bombay. . . . . Court resolve that Madras should assume the rank of an Independent Power. . . . . York Fort, at Bencoolen, to be strengthened, and a factory formed at Tenasery. . . . . The Union flag to be used at the Fort. . . . . Charter obtained for erecting Madras into a Corporation. . . . . Constitution of the Corporation of Madras. . . . . Commercial instructions for Fort St. George. . . . . Court disapprove of the truce made by Mr. Charnock with the Nabob of Bengal, and send a reinforcement under Captain Heath. . . . . Private merchants in Bengal allowed to send goods to England in the Company's ships. . . . . The Fortress at Bencoolen to be strengthened,*

*strengthened, and a duty levied on the pepper belonging to private merchants. . . . . New regulations for St. Helena required after the mutiny. . . . . Precautions of Sir John Child to preserve the Company's property at Surat, when intelligence should arrive of the war in Bengal. . . . . Sir John Child proceeds to Bombay, and dispatches a fleet to the Persian and Arabian Gulfs. . . . . Mr. Harris, and the Company's property, detained at Surat. . . . . Negotiation between Sir John Child and the Governor of Surat. . . . . Treaty with Sambagee Rajah, to counteract the oppressions of the Mogul. . . . . Sir John Child applies for support to the French and Dutch Factories, and sends instructions to Fort St. George to co-operate in the war. . . . . Negotiations continued with the Governor of Surat. . . . . Muchtar Khan, the new Governor of Surat, opens an insidious communication with Mr. Harris. . . . . Trade in Persia very limited. . . . . Deficiency of information, this season, from Fort St. George. . . . . Truce concluded by Mr. Charnock with the Nabob of Bengal, and recommencement of hostilities, on the violation of it, by the Nabob's General.*

*1688-89.—Court determine to make Bombay the chief seat of their trade and power, and reduce Surat to an Agency. . . . . Approve of the Provisional Convention with the Governor of Surat. . . . . Fortifications at Bombay to be strengthened, and duties levied, to defray the charges. . . . . Factories on the Malabar Coast to be fortified. . . . . Commercial instructions for rendering Bombay the general depôt of*



CHAP. II.  
 Contents.

*the Company's goods. . . . . Encouragement to be given to the Armenians, in Persia. . . . . The Government of Madras blamed for not co-operating in the war in Bengal. . . . . Directions to farm St. Thomé from the Nabob. . . . . Sir John Child to proceed to Bengal, as Supervisor of the Company's Affairs. . . . . Settlers at St. Helena encouraged to remove to Bombay. . . . . Interesting proceedings of the East-India Company, during the successive events which terminated in the Revolution. . . . . Political and commercial events at Surat and Bombay . . . . . The Convention between Muchtar Khan and Mr. Harris, an artifice to gain time. . . . . Muchtar Khan seizes the Company's servants and property at Surat. . . . . Sir John Child intimates to the Siddee, that the movement of his fleet would be considered as an act of hostility against Bombay. . . . . Court's order to occupy Salsette impracticable, and the delivery of their letter to the Mogul, inexpedient. . . . . Bombay acts on the defensive. . . . . Sir John Child attempts negotiation with Ettimand Khan, the new Governor of Surat, and sends envoys to the Mogul, at Visiapore. . . . . Death of Sir John Child, and succession of Mr. Harris, at this time a prisoner at Surat. . . . . The Phirmaund granted by Aurungzebe, at this period, reduces the Presidency of Surat to the most degraded situation. . . . . The Siddee's fleet and forces invade Bombay, but evacuate the Island, on payment of the fine imposed by the Phirmaund. . . . . The revenues and trade*

at

*at Bombay depressed by these events. . . . . Trade in Persia obstructed by the Dutch, and by Pirates. . . . . Affairs of Fort St. George and Bengal blended, at the period of the disastrous Phirmaund of Aurungzebe. . . . . Proceedings of Captain Heath in Bengal, who retires with the Company's servants to Madras. . . . . Report of the Agent and Council of Bengal, on the failure of the attack on Chittagong. . . . . Expedients of the Agency of Fort St. George on this emergency. . . . . Mogul's order for expelling the English from his dominions. . . . . Sambagee betrayed, and put to death by the Mogul, and succeeded by the Ram-Rajah, who granted to the English liberty of trade at Comere. . . . . Stipulations regarding Madras evaded in the Mogul's Phirmaund. . . . . The new Nabob of Bengal's offer to the English, to resettle their Factory at Hughly, declined. . . . . Revolution in Siam obviates the necessity of the war against that country. . . . . The commercial efforts at Fort St. George, and its subordinate stations, depressed by these political events; and by the appearance of English pirates on the Coromandel Coast. . . . . State of the trade of the European Maritime Powers in the East-Indies, at this juncture. . . . . Report on the improving state of Fort St. George and the town of Madras. . . . . Trade at Bencoolen and Indrapore increased, and the Settlement in an improving condition. . . . . Interesting proceedings of the Company's foreign Settlements, on receiving intelligence*

CHAP. II.  
Contents.

CHAP. II.	<i>gence of the successive events which terminated in the Revolution.....</i>
Contents.	<i>Results, from the preceding detail of events, ascertaining the Company's Rights, from the Restoration of King Charles II. to the Revolution, 1688-89.</i>

## CHAPTER II.

---

REVIEW OF THE ANNALS OF THE LONDON EAST-INDIA COMPANY, FROM THE RESTORATION OF THEIR PRIVILEGES BY KING CHARLES II., IN 1660-1, TO THE REVOLUTION, 1688-9.

---

1661-62.

---

HAVING traced the political relations between England and the maritime states of Europe, as preliminary subjects, required to explain the transactions of the London East-India Company, after they had their Charter and exclusive privileges renewed by King Charles II., and having prospectively followed up those relations, during this, and the subsequent reign, that reference might be made to them, in explaining the annual proceedings of the Company, during the second period of their progress; and having, also, with the same object, traced the political and commercial relations

CHAP. II.  
1661-62.  
Bombay ceded by Portugal to England, by the Treaty of Marriage between Charles II. and the Infanta of Portugal.

of

CHAP. II. of the principal kingdoms and states in the East-Indies with  
 1661-62. which the London Company were to have connexion, not only during this period, but during the long reign of Aurungzebe, which continued nearly to the Union of the London and English East-India Companies, we are prepared to resume the Annals of the London East-India Company, and to connect their proceedings with those of the government, on which they were dependent in Europe, and with those of the powers, at whose ports and dominions they were to revive and carry on the direct trade between England and the East-Indies.

The Charter of King Charles II. to the London East-India Company had scarcely been recorded when their affairs assumed a new aspect, by the event of the Island of Bombay, (within their limits,) having been ceded by the Crown of Portugal to the King, as part of the dowry of the Infanta Catherine, whom the King married, in June 1661, two months after he had granted to the London East-India Company the renewal of their Charter.

Commercial  
 jealousy of  
 the Dutch on  
 this event.

This acquisition of the King, was held to be an extension of the dominions of his Crown, which would afford to the English a port, at which their trade could be in security, and more immediately under the royal protection :—this was viewed with jealousy by the States General, as calculated to connect, more strictly, the London East-India Company with the Crown, and to revive the rivalry of the two European powers in the East-Indies, by assimilating the Company's interests with those of the

the State, in the same manner as the Dutch Companies had been with the States General, and therefore to render the rivalry of the two nations in the East-Indies, more immediately connected with the relations which subsisted between them, in Europe.

CHAP. II.  
1661-62.  
Terms of the  
treaty with  
Portugal, re-  
lative to the  
cession of  
Bombay.

By the eleventh article of the Treaty of Marriage between King Charles II. and the Infanta Catherine of Portugal, dated 23d June 1661, the Crown of Portugal ceded and granted to the Crown of England, the Island and Harbour of BOMBAY, in full sovereignty; and it was understood, that this grant would enable the two Crowns to maintain their respective dominions in the East-Indies, against any future aggressions and encroachments on their subjects and trade, by the Dutch Company.

By the Secret Article of this treaty, the King of England obliged himself to guaranty to the King of Portugal, the possessions of that Crown, in the East-Indies; and to mediate a peace between Portugal and the States General, with the object, that the respective possessions of the two nations, in that quarter, might be ascertained; and then explained, that should the States General refuse to accept of such mediation, the King would employ his forces and fleets, to compel the States to accede to these conditions, and to obtain restitution to the Crown of Portugal, of such Portuguese settlements in the East-Indies, as the Dutch might, subsequent to this treaty, become possessed of.<sup>(1)</sup>

VOL. II.

P

On

(1)—Original Ratification by the King of Portugal, of the Treaty of Peace and Commerce, between England and Portugal, and of Marriage, between King Charles II. and







CHAP. II.  
1661-62. ferences of the Private Traders or Interlopers, or when the licences had been withdrawn from traders of this description, form any new stock, or enlarge their equipments, to the extent which might have been expected; but, on the contrary, discovered a commercial caution, proceeding, probably, from the disappointment and heavy losses they had experienced, in trusting to the stability of re-grants of privileges; and therefore, though Sir George Oxinden, and their shipping, were to proceed with the King's fleet, the Court resolved to narrow the line of their trade, and to confine it to the Presidencies of Surat and of Fort St. George, and the factory at Bantam, and to their respective dependencies.

Sir George Oxinden was, in particular, to endeavour to preserve the Factories and Agencies on the Malabar Coast, and to restore the trade between Surat and Fort St. George, and between the Fort and Bantam, for which ships would be dispatched, at the proper seasons, from England, to bring home goods, suited to the home sales:—he was also to specify, distinctly, the prices at which the exports from England could be sold.

The attention of the President was, in a particular manner, to be directed to put a stop to the private trade of the Company's servants, who, under the pretext of acting for the Company, had been engaged in dealings on their own account, to the detriment of the Company's sales and purchases:—such of those servants whom he might find engaged in this illicit



## CHAP. II.

1661-62.

The Governor of Surat and the Private Traders continue their oppressions of the Surat trade.

The uncertainty which, in this season, prevailed in all the Company's foreign Presidencies and Factories, respecting the actual situation, either of the government in England, or of the powers which might remain with the Company, sufficiently accounts for their servants at SURAT continuing to act under the former instructions of the Court, by calling in their Out-factories and Agencies, and confining their efforts to provide a limited investment for the homeward shipping. In discharging the first of those duties, they had not been able, from want of shipping, to bring off the Company's estate, either from Persia or Bussora, and had been exposed, from the debts due by the Merchant Adventurers, or as they are termed in the dispatches from Surat, "*Open Traders*," to the most unreasonable demands by the Governor of Surat, by whom, at one time, they had been shut up in their Factory, till he could extort money from them, under pretext of the payment of those debts:—in this situation, they could only direct their ships to touch at Goa, Cochin, Carwar, and other places on the Malabar Coast, to purchase pepper, or any goods they might think suited to the home market.

The Agency of Bengal exposed to the oppression of Meer Jumlah.

If, in the preceding year, the conduct of Meer Jumlah, the

1661-62, inclosing Copy of Warrant under the Privy Seal, for seizing unlicensed persons in India, 21st February 1661-62.



**CHAP. II.** obliged, not only to come in fleets, but to make a circuitous  
**1661-62.** voyage, till they should receive intelligence from England,  
we discover the reason why the Court, in this year, remained  
ignorant of the state of their affairs at **FORT ST. GEORGE** and  
at **BANTAM**, and their dependencies.



**CHAP. II.** it is not possible to bring under review the transactions, between the East-India Company and this African Company, and the Colonies which the Duke of York projected to establish, without adverting to those interesting commercial facts.

During the reign of Queen Elizabeth, a commercial speculation prevailed, that gold, elephants' teeth, and labourers, might be obtained on the Coast of Africa, and that the gold and ivory might become important articles of trade, and the labourers employed, with advantage, in cultivating the West-India Islands. Queen Elizabeth granted exclusive privileges to what was termed the First African, or Guinea Company, and this grant is interesting, as marking the first commercial relations between England and the Coast of Africa.

In the preceding detail it has appeared, that the Assada Association had been formed, and the London Company compelled to unite with them; and, on this event, the London East-India Company formed settlements at Cape Cormantine, Benin, &c. After the capture of Jamaica, the English settlements having encreased, it became impracticable to cultivate them, except by means of a large proportion of African labourers, denominated slaves, whose constitutions were fitted to cultivate the valuable produce brought from the West-Indies to England:—this led to the employment of capital and shipping in the African trade, and to considerable demands for British manufactures, for maintaining and clothing these labourers, who were found not only necessary to enable the  
planters





## CHAP. II.

1662-63.  
Agreement  
between the  
Royal African  
Company  
and the East-  
India Com-  
pany.

The Court of Committees, or Directors, on this occasion, sent instructions to their Factors on the Coast of Africa, founded on an agreement, dated the 16th of October 1662, between the London East-India Company and the Royal African Company, of which the following is the substance:—

That the East-India Company should be allowed to the 25th of March 1663, to dispose of their goods and estate on the Coast of Guinea, and that they might leave two Factors there, to superintend and manage the sale;—that the African Company should be allowed ten per cent. by the East-India Company, for all goods sold after the said 25th of March;—that Fort Cormantine, Fort Wyamba, and the Factories at Cape Coast Castle, and Benin, should be delivered, by the East-India Company, to the Royal African Company, with all military stores, &c. on the 25th of March 1663, who were to take into their employ, the soldiers of the East-India Company, serving at those stations;—that the Royal African Company should pay to the London East-India Company the purchase-money of Cape Coast Castle;—that the East-India Company should be allowed to send a ship, within twelve months after the said 25th of March, to take off the remains of their goods, and that all household furniture, and spare stores, belonging to the East-India Company, should be taken off by the Royal African Company, at a fair valuation.<sup>(1)</sup>

It

(1)—Articles of Agreement between the Royal African Company and the East-India Company, dated 16th October 1662, enclosed in a letter from the Court to the Factors

It was under these circumstances, that the London Company sent out the following instructions to their servants at Fort Cormantine :—to sell off all the goods and property belonging to the Company, on such terms as they could obtain ;—to endeavour to dispose of as much of them as possible, to the Dutch Company, and to vest the proceeds in gold, to be sent, this season, to their Factories in India ;—to purchase from the Dutch, Danes, Swedes, and adventurers from every country, gold, at £3. 10s. per ounce, and to grant bills on the Company for the amount :—as the Court expected £25,000, in gold, would be collected by these sales, the Factors were to dispatch a ship to India, with the value ;—another ship was to proceed from England, for the Coast of Africa, in one month after these orders had been sent off ; on this ship the Factors were to send the amount of all the stores of the Company, which might remain, which were to be sold for whatever price they would bring, in gold ; and that such of the Company's servants, as might wish to return to England, were to be allowed a passage to St. Helena, (which, since the year 1657, the Company had been endeavouring to settle and colonize, as a station at which their ships might touch for fresh water and provisions, and which was granted to them, in full possession, by the Charter of King Charles II., in 1661) to which Island orders had

CHAP. II.  
1662-63.  
Court's Instructions to their Factors, at Fort Cormantine, in Africa, on this agreement.

at Fort Cormantine, 27th October 1662.—Anderson's History of Commerce, vol. ii, page 473.

CHAP. II. had been sent, to accommodate them with a passage to  
1662-63. England. <sup>(1)</sup>

Captain Mitchell, of the ship *Castle Frigate*, on account of the great mortality of the Company's servants on the Coast of Africa, had been appointed the Company's chief Agent there, with instructions to wind up their affairs, and to sell the whole of the Company's stock, either to the Royal African Company, or to individuals, but to take gold, rather than to grant bills on England :—the gold, with the elephants' teeth which might remain unsold, were to be forwarded to Madras :—after delivering over the forts, and the troops in the Company's service, to the Royal African Company, Captain Mitchell was to consign whatever goods might remain to four factors, who were to reside at Fort Cormantine, till they could dispose of them, and finally wind up the Company's affairs on the Coast of Africa. <sup>(2)</sup>

During the period in which the East-India Company occupied stations on the Coast of Africa, besides the gold, elephants' teeth, &c. which they sent to their factories at Madras and at Bantam, they also embarked a proportion of African labourers, both to assist in erecting their houses of trade, and forts ; and, from being foreigners, and dependant on  
their

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Factors at Fort Cormantine, 27th October 1662.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Factors at Fort Cormantine, 2d January 1662-63.

— Commission and Instructions from the Court to Captain Mitchell, of the *Castle Frigate*, 2d January 1662-63.

their factors, were to be trained to the use of arms, and to assist in the defence of their establishments, when attacked by the natives. In the sequel, we shall discover, that the descendants of those Africans formed a constituent part of the military guards of the Company's principal establishments.

After explaining the relations between the Crown and the Company, in so far as regarded the acquisition of Bombay, in the preceding season, and the transfer of the Company's African Settlements to the Royal African Company, we have to trace the proceedings of the Court, with respect to the equipments and stock appropriated to each of their foreign Presidencies, and the instructions which they gave to their servants, as to the mode of reviving their trade :—on these subjects it may be observed, that, during the confusions which had preceded the re-establishment of their Charter and exclusive rights, their funds for trade were frequently kept out of view, that they might neither attract the notice of the ruling factions, nor bring on questions, respecting their rights ; but when those rights were restored, all difficulties of this kind were removed, and the trade of the Company returned to its original principles.

CHAP. II.  
1662-63.

Equipments,  
stock, and  
commercial  
instructions  
of this season;

The equipments for this season, consigned to SURAT, —to Surat. consisted of two ships, and the stock and money was estimated at £65,000. The instructions of the Court open with a reference to the treaties which had been concluded, between the King and the States General, and the prospect that, on the

**CHAP. II.** the basis of those treaties, the differences between the **East-**  
**1662-63.** India Companies of the two powers would be adjusted :—after approving of the precautions which this Presidency had taken, in observing the former orders to call in the out-stations, they recommended, that if the factories had been withdrawn from Agra and Ahmedabad, persons, properly qualified, might be occasionally sent to those towns, to purchase indigo, cloths, &c., suited to the Europe market ; and farther recommended, after examining the details which they had received, of the arbitrary manner in which the Governor of Surat had shut up their servants within their house, and obstructed them in obtaining investments, that they should, by every prudent expedient, endeavour to conciliate his favor ;—that the measure, however, of sending an Agent to congratulate the Emperor, was unwise, both because the expences (which had been calculated at twenty thousand rupees) were great, and because the project of obtaining, through this mission, farther exemptions from the payment of duties of customs at the port, might bring on new demands, which they neither had the power, nor the means to satisfy ; and, as this Presidency was still exposed to the interference of the Private Traders, the Court left it to the discretion of the President and Council, to dispose of the English broad-cloths and manufactures at small profit, which would depress the sales of the Private Traders in those articles.<sup>(1)</sup>

The

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 25th September 1662, 24th March 1662-63, and 4th April 1663.



CHAP. II. been tried, which made the Bengal silks pass in the market,  
1662-63. as Italian silks:—when the assortments obtained in Bengal should reach the Fort, one proportion of them was directed to be sent to Bantam, at which they were in demand, and the other, to make part of the investment for Europe;—the purchase of Coast cloths was, however, to be abridged, from the exports of them to the Spice Islands having become impracticable; but cloths, suited for the Persian market, were to be bought, it being in contemplation to revive and re-establish that trade.<sup>(1)</sup>

Letter of  
King Charles  
II. to the  
King of Ban-  
tam, solicit-  
ing protection  
for the Com-  
pany's ser-  
vants.

The King, during this season, having received a congratulatory letter, on his Restoration, from the King of BANTAM, had been graciously pleased to send an answer, to be forwarded by the Company, with a present of arms, consigned to their Agent at Bantam;—in this letter, His Majesty recommended his subjects, the servants of the East-India Company, to the protection of the King of Bantam, and trusted that this recommendation would obtain for them his particular favor:—the Company, at the same time, transmitted the commission from the King and the States General, for the occupation of Polaroon, with the orders of the States to the Dutch Governor General at Batavia, and the Governor of Banda, to re-deliver the Island of Polaroon to the English; but, aware of the evasions of the Dutch, and that they would

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, dated 31st December 1662, and 20th and 26th February 1662—63.





CHAP. II. at the same time, the Company's rights and trade at Surat,  
1662-63. and at its dependencies.

Before the fleet under the Earl of Marlborough, and ~~the~~ Company's ships under its convoy, left England, an agreement had been made, between the Commissioners of the Navy and the East-India Company, that three of the King's ships (the Dunkirk, Mary Rose, and Convertine) should, after landing the troops at Bombay, be at the disposal of the President at Surat, to bring goods to Europe on their account, and that the Leopard frigate, which had been victualled by the Company, and sent to Lisbon, to bring over the Portuguese Viceroy, who was to attend the Earl of Marlborough to Bombay, with powers to see the articles of the treaty, for the cession of it, fulfilled, should, after this service, proceed to Goa, and be offered to the Viceroy, to bring a cargo, on his account, or on that of the merchants of Goa, to Lisbon, at such rates as might be agreed on, between the Viceroy and Mr. Aungier, who was to be dispatched by Sir George Oxinden to Goa, for this express purpose.

Mr. Aungier, on the fleet arriving at Johanna Roads, was sent with instructions from Sir George Oxinden to Goa, on this service :—in the event of the Portuguese Viceroy accepting the offer, the money which the Company had expended, in victualling the ship, was to be repaid at Lisbon, at the rate of seven shillings and six-pence per mill-rea, out of the freight paid by the Portuguese :—in the event of the Viceroy declining  
this



CHAP. II. Johanna on the 22d August, and arrived at Bombay on the 1662-63. 18th September 1662, and demanded the cession of the Island, and of its dependencies, conformably to the treaty between the King and the Crown of Portugal :—the Portuguese Governor of Bombay evaded the cession of the Island, and the Viceroy, who had come out in the English fleet, refused to interpose his authority, till he should proceed to Goa, and receive instructions from the Portuguese Viceroy of the Indies. It now appeared, that the English Admiral had interpreted the terms of the treaty to signify Bombay, *and its dependencies*, or the Islands of Tannah and Salsette, and that the Portuguese Viceroy interpreted the treaty to signify the cession of the Island of Bombay *only*, not the cession of the dependencies situated between Bombay and Bassein, because that would lay open this principal Portuguese station, to the English at Bombay.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Earl of Marlborough demanded, in the first instance, the cession of Bombay, which was admitted to be within the terms of the treaty :—this was objected to, by the Portuguese Governor, on the pretext that Sir Abraham Shipman, the commander of the English troops, had not arrived ; and therefore he refused to allow the troops to be landed, though the Earl of Marlborough stated the length of the voyage, and

(1)—Letter from Captain Browne, of the Dunkirk, to Sir George Oxinden, dated Bombay, 20th September 1662.— Letter from Mr. Aungier to Sir George Oxinden, dated Bombay, 26th September 1662.



CHAP. II. King's troops to the Mauritius, and to leave them there, till  
 1662-63. orders came from England. On learning this resolution, Sir  
 George Oxinden held a consultation at Surat, at which it was  
 resolved, to request the Earl of Marlborough to leave the Con-  
 vertine man of war, at Surat, to take on board the invest-  
 ment, for England, that the Company might have some return  
 for the heavy charges incurred; and, in the mean time, to  
 postpone sending the Company's ships or goods to Bantam,  
 leaving the investments at that place to come to England  
 on the ships destined to that port, till they should receive  
 instructions from the Court.<sup>(1)</sup>

Plan of Sir  
 George Ox-  
 inden, to  
 open a com-  
 mercial inter-  
 course with  
 the Viceroy  
 of Goa.

Mr. Aungier, it has already been mentioned, had been  
 sent from Surat to Goa, to offer to the Viceroy to carry a  
 Portuguese investment to Lisbon, on freight:—Though he was  
 favorably received, the conduct of the Viceroy was neither con-  
 formable to the intentions of the Commissioners of the Navy,  
 to accommodate the Portuguese, by receiving their goods on  
 board the King's ship Leopard, nor to the expectations of the  
 Company, of receiving from the freight a compensation for  
 the charges they had incurred, in sending this ship to Lisbon,  
 to accommodate the Viceroy, and to carry this officer to  
 Bombay.

After a tedious negotiation, respecting the freight, Mr.  
 Aungier offered it, at the rate of £21. 3s. 6d. per ton, to  
 the

(1)—Surat Consultations, 22d October 1662.



CHAP. II. of Cochin and Cannanore, and, in fact, excluded the English  
 1662-63. from every port, except Carwar, at which, also, they were  
 establishing a factory.<sup>(1)</sup>

Trade on the  
 Coromandel  
 Coast imped-  
 ed, by the  
 war in the  
 Carnatic.

The Company's affairs at FORT ST. GEORGE remained nearly in the same situation, in which they were described in the season 1660-61, that is, with the funds they had received, but embarrassed in the application of them, both in their sales and in their purchases, by the wars in the Carnatic between the Country Powers; and therefore directed their efforts, on the one hand, to improve the trade between the Coromandel Coast and Bengal, and, on the other, to revive the trade between the Coast and Bantam, till the arrival of Sir Edward Winter, in September 1662.

Proceedings  
 of Sir Ed-  
 ward Winter  
 on his arrival  
 at Fort St.  
 George.

In the home transactions of last season, the powers with which Sir Edward Winter was vested, under the Charter of Charles II., have been explained. On entering on his duties, he found, that the Company's servants, over whom he had been appointed, had been much reduced in number, by mortality; and, therefore, one of his first demands was for persons, properly qualified, to fill up his Council, and to be Agents at the Out-factories, as, from his present situation, in point of assistance, it was necessary to withdraw the Agencies from Verasheroon and Pettipolee: at a time when his efforts were required, if possible, to restore the trade at Masulipatam and Madapollam.

On

(1)—General Letter from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 6th April 1663.





## CHAP. II.

1662-63.

Evasions of  
the Dutch to  
cede the Is-  
land of Pola-  
roon, and dif-  
ficulty of pro-  
curing an in-  
vestment at  
Bantam.

It might have been expected, from the treaty in Europe, between the King and the States General, and the commission of the States to the Governor General of Batavia, and the Governor of Banda, and from the powers with which the Agent and Council at BANTAM had been vested, under authority from the King, that the Island of Polaroön would have been ceded, as soon as these full powers should have been produced; but, so far from this being the case, the Dutch Governor at Polaroön refused to deliver up the Island, till he should receive instructions from the Governor of Banda, to which he was more immediately subordinate:—When application was made to the Governor of Banda, and the same orders produced to him, he, in like manner, refused to deliver the place, till he should receive instructions from the Governor General of Batavia:—these evasions the Agent and Council at Bantam endeavoured to counteract, by remonstrances, and by a resolution to send home to the Court, for the information of the King, this glaring breach of treaty; but, instead of receiving satisfaction, he was informed, that the private orders from Europe, to the Governor General of Batavia, were to postpone the delivery of the Island of Polaroön to the English, whatever public orders they might produce to that effect.

Under such oppressions, and with reference to the great force which the Dutch possessed, by having troops at Batavia, sufficient to control the Native Powers to an observance of their monopoly of the pepper trade, and with reference to their  
naval

naval power, which had excluded the English, both from the CHAP. II.  
Bandas and Moluccas, and to the very inferior force, of either 1662-63.  
description, which the English possessed, the Agency of Bantam  
were reduced to great distress, for they had no means of obtain-  
ing any quantity of pepper, or the finer spices, for an invest-  
ment, or of procuring Malabar or Coromandel goods, required to  
revive the southern markets ; besidea, under the pretext of the  
cargoes of the English ships including Portuguese property, the  
Dutch had seized and pillaged those ships : oppressions which  
would explain the reason of the small investment which the  
Agency of Bantam could this season procure, either for the  
Company's, or for the King's ships, which had arrived at  
Bantam to receive them.<sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Letter from the Agent and Council of Bantam to the Court, 30th September 1662, and 25th May 1663. — Letter from the Agent and Council of Bantam to the President and Council of Surat, 18th August 1663.

## 1663-64.

---

CHAP. II.      THE transactions of the London East-India Company, in  
 1663-64. this season, continued to be mixed with those of the State; and  
 Remon- the events, in which the Court and the King's ministers were  
 strance of the concerned, become necessary preliminaries to the full under-  
 King to the standing of the instructions, which the Court of Committees  
 Portuguese Ambassador, sent to their foreign Presidencies and Factories.  
 on the con-  
 duct of the  
 Viceroy of  
 Goa, in re-  
 fusing the  
 cession of  
 Bombay and  
 its dependen-  
 cies.

In the foreign transactions of the preceding year, it was mentioned, that on the refusal of the Portuguese Governor of Bombay and the Viceroy of Goa, to deliver up Bombay and its dependencies to the Earl of Marlborough and Sir Abraham Shipman, and on finding it impracticable to land the troops, for refreshment, at Surat, which would have excited the jealousy, if not the direct opposition of the Mogul Governor, the Earl of Marlborough set sail with the King's ships for England, with the exception of the Leopard frigate. On his arrival, the Governor and Committees of the London East-India Company waited on him, to express their acknowledgements, for the care which he had taken of their shipping, on the outward voyage, and for the support which he had afforded to Sir George Oxinden, on his assuming the administration of the Presidency of Surat; and, particularly, for his protection to  
 their



CHAP. II. cle of the treaty, for counterbalancing the commercial and  
1663-64. naval superiority of the Dutch in the East-Indies.<sup>(1)</sup>

Remon-  
strance to the  
States Gene-  
ral, on the  
Leopard Fri-  
gate being  
obstructed, in  
procuring an  
investment of  
pepper at  
Porcat.

When the Earl of Marlborough sailed from the Malabar Coast, with the King's fleet, for England, he had consented to leave the Leopard frigate at Surat, to take in part of the Company's investment, and to proceed to Porcat, under the idea, that the Dutch would be less disposed to resist a King's ship, than they would to obstruct a vessel belonging to the Company :—It would appear that, at this time, the Dutch had so far succeeded in their war against the Rajah of that place, as to have got possession of the port, and that they had prevented the Leopard from taking in the Company's investment which had been provided at that place; upon which the Leopard had returned to Surat :—this breach of the subsisting treaty, between the King and the States General, produced a remonstrance from Sir George Downing, the King's Ambassador at the Hague, in substance, that, admitting the Dutch to have acquired possession of Porcat, or having it ceded to them by the Rajah, they had no right to interfere with the English Factory in its trade, or to prevent the putting the investment, which had been prepared for Europe, on board the ship. In the conferences of the Ambassador with the Pensionary De Witt, the States General and the Dutch Directors were so much assimilated,

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 10th August 1663.— Historical Account of Bombay, pages 9, 10, in which copies of the Memorials and Answers are printed.



**CHAP. II.** send orders to their foreign Presidencies, that the home-  
**1663-64.** ward ships should sail as a fleet, and be prepared to defend themselves against any enemy.<sup>(1)</sup>

*Instructions to Sir George Oxinden, for the trade on the Malabar Coast, and in Persia.*

The particular instructions to Sir George Oxinden, respecting the trade at Surat and on the Malabar Coast, enjoined, that the sales of English produce should be effected, at as low rates as possible, to bear down the Private Traders, and the investment collected, partly at Surat, and partly on the Malabar Coast; that, though it would be expedient to keep up the Company's right to the moiety of the customs at Gombroon, the other Factories in Persia ought to be withdrawn, and two or three persons only left at Gombroon, to wait opportunities for the trade renewing, and allowed five per cent. on such customs as they might recover, to defray all expences; but if this plan should not be practicable, the President was annually to send an Agent from Surat to Gombroon, to demand, and to receive, the money due to the Company on that account.<sup>(2)</sup>

*Orders to Sir Edward Winter, to strengthen the garrison of Fort St. George, and to revive the trade between Madras and Bantam.*

The Court, not having heard of the measures which Sir Edward Winter had adopted at FORT ST. GEORGE, under the instructions which he had received in the preceding season, after repeating the information which they had conveyed to Surat, on the subjects of the negotiation between the King and

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 9th and 17th March 1663-64.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 10th August 1663.

December 1663.



CHAP. II. session of it, when the crew of his vessel was superior in  
 1663-64. numbers to the small Dutch garrison, was considered by the Court to be so improper, that they recalled him ; as they were of opinion, from a conversation with the Dutch Ambassador at London, that he had been bribed by the Dutch, and  
 • that he had been guilty of a breach of trust. Mr. Quarles Browne was appointed to succeed him :—the instructions to Mr. Browne were, to take decisive measures to get possession of the Island, and not to be prevented from asserting the Company's right to it, by any Dutch force which it might be within his power to subdue. The more effectually to secure Polaroon, Major Francis Willoughby was appointed to be Lieutenant, or Governor, of the Island, at a salary of £50 per annum, for five years:—he was furnished with a plan, for erecting a fortification for the defence of the place, and was to receive all his orders from Agent Browne and the Council at Bantam.

It being of the utmost consequence to the East-India Company, to revive the trade at Bantam, the Court signified their intention to send shipping sufficient to bring home two thousand tons of pepper, annually, from this port, and from Jambee, and such proportions of the finer spices, as could be procured from Maccassar:—the spices, however, to be sent to Bantam regularly, as they were obtained, to make part of the investment from that place :—as soon as this tonnage could be filled up, it was the intention of the Court to increase it ; and  
 they



CHAP. II. events induced Sir Abraham Shipman to make a proposition  
 1663-64. to Sir George Oxinden and the Council of Surat, to cede the rights to Bombay to the Company, if the Viceroy of Goa could be brought to assent to this arrangement.

This offer refused, Sir George Oxinden not having authority from the King or the Company to accept it.

On consultation, it was resolved by the President and Council to reject this offer, from its being doubtful, whether, without fresh instructions from Portugal, the Viceroy could consent; and because the Presidency had not a force which could occupy or protect the Island; and, besides, the cession of the right to the Company, could be made by the King only:—these reasons Sir George Oxinden stated to Sir Abraham Shipman, to prevent him, under the distressed circumstances in which he, and the troops, were placed, from disposing of the right to any other power; and to preclude the Company from being involved in so perilous a question, as the propriety of accepting the Island from any source, but from the King.

The prudence of this resolution (though it left Sir Abraham Shipman and the King's troops in a perishing state) was confirmed, by the actual circumstances of the President and Council at Surat. The Mogul Governor of this port had persevered in drawing frequent small sums from the Factory, for permission to carry on their sales and purchases; and the only restraint on his exactions, from the English and from the Dutch, was, the superior naval power of both,

both, which the Prèsident emphatically describes to be “the  
 “ only hold which they had to defend them.” <sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
 1663-64.

With the object of bringing before the Court the commercial situation of this Presidency and its dependencies, on the Malabar Coast, Sir George Oxinden explained, that it would be expedient to send, on the next ships, a proportion of lead, copper, quicksilver, coral, and English broad-cloths, to keep open the purchases in the interior, and, if possible, sales and purchases in Persia;—that the order of the Court, to withdraw the Factory from Ahmedabad, might easily be obeyed, because, as common merchants, they might have sent Agents to that city; but, by relinquishing the Factory, they might lose the right to resettle it;—that withdrawing the Agency from Agra would preclude them from the purchase of baftaes, mercoles, or derebauds, portions of which, with drugs, cotton-yarn, and calicoes, were required for the Europe investment, and were essential in any experiment to reopen the trade with Persia;—that the proportion of the investment from the Malabar Coast, or pepper, cardamoms, &c. had, in this season, been with difficulty obtained at Porcat and Batticolo;—for, at Carwar, purchases had been impracticable, from the civil wars between the Rajahs and Princes; though, on this Coast, the sale of lead and broad-cloths had continued, and pepper, cardamoms, and dungarees, been  
 procured

State of trade  
 at Surat, and  
 its dependencies.

(1)—Letters from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 14th November 1663, and 28th January 1663-64.

CHAP. II.  
1663-64. procured in exchange; and that the ships, as they arrived, had been dispatched, to take in these assortments. <sup>(1)</sup>

As the Dutch power extended over almost every port on the Malabar Coast, Sir George Oxinden, at this juncture, listened to an offer made by the Government of Acheen, to grant to the Company the whole of the trade of that port, provided the English would undertake to defend it against the Dutch;—this offer was referred to the Court, the Presidency not having the force this protection required; but after stating to them the value of the trade which might be established between Sumatra and Surat, desired instructions on the subject.

Surat attacked and pillaged by Sevagee, and the Company's Factory defended by Sir George Oxinden.

These commercial arrangements were unexpectedly interrupted, in January 1663-64, by a sudden attack on Surat, by Sevagee's army, commanded by this chief, in person. On his approach, the Governor shut himself up in the castle, while the inhabitants fled, either in boats, or into the adjoining country:—in this emergency, Sir George Oxinden, and the Company's servants, shut themselves up in the Factory, with their property, which they estimated at £80,000, and, after fortifying it, called in the ships' crews for its defence:—when attacked, they made a brave and obstinate resistance, and this opposition not only preserved the Factory, but the town, from destruction:—Sevagee, however, carried off an immense booty.

On

(1)—Letter from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 28th January 1663-64.



**CHAP. II.** of copper, tin, spices, &c the English character had sunk  
 1663-64. in the estimation of the Persians, and the President had not power to enforce the observance of treaties ;—that, in the opinion, both of the Agent at Gombroon, and of the Presidency, it was in vain to seek grants, without power sufficient to command the observance of them ; and therefore, they had been obliged to recur to the expedient of sending country vessels, with small assortments, to be disposed of at Gombroon, and to return with Persian produce to Surat ; a measure intended rather to keep up the right to the moiety of the customs, than calculated to afford any profitable result.<sup>(1)</sup>

Trade on the  
 Coromandel  
 Coast precarious,  
 from the opposition  
 of the Dutch.

Sir Edward Winter, in the preceding season, had, under his instructions, adopted such temporary measures at **FORT ST. GEORGE**, as, with the limited funds which he then possessed, appeared to him requisite for reviving the Company's trade on the Coast of Coromandel, and carrying it eastwards to Bantam, and had sent an Agent to Bengal, to adjust the unhappy dispute which had occurred, respecting the seizure of a junk. The death of the Nabob in this year, and the uncertainty respecting the person who might succeed him, notwithstanding the protection expected from Aurungzebe, again left the grants to the Company, at Fort St. George, in a precarious situation ; and yet, it was under these circumstances,

(1)—Letters from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 14th November 1663, and 28th January 1663-64.





CHAP. II. to, would have been adequate to the restoration of the **Coro-**  
 1663-64. mandel trade, as well as to the extension of that in **Bengal** ;  
 but which, from the state of the markets at **Masulipatam**,  
**Madapollam**, &c., could not be employed on the **Coast**, and,  
 therefore, led to the project of employing a proportion of  
 them in establishing a trade at **Siam**, at which sales of **Coast**  
 goods could be effected with profit, and returns had of pro-  
 duce from **Japan**, **Tonquin**, and **China**.

In regard to the Fort itself, the Agent and Council re-  
 quested a supply of arms for the garrison, and the appoint-  
 ment of an officer to command it.<sup>(1)</sup>

The trade be-  
 tween **Ban-**  
**tam**, the **Co-**  
**romandel**  
**Coast**, and  
 the **Southern**  
**Islands**, ob-  
 structed by  
 the **Dutch**.

The **Dutch**, this season, availing themselves of the in-  
 efficiency of the treaty between the King and the States  
 General, to prevent their encroachments on the trade at  
**Bantam**, got possession of **Cranganore** and **Cochin**, on the  
**Malabar Coast**, and prohibited the **Natives** from trading  
 between **Cochin** and **Cape Comorin**, without their passes,  
 by which means they not only excluded the trade between  
**Bantam** and the **Malabar Coast**, but the trade between that  
 port and the **Southern Islands**.<sup>(2)</sup>

(1)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Fort St. George to the Court, 6th and  
 10th January 1663-64.

(2)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Bantam to the Court, 25th August 1663:

## 1664-65.

---

IN connecting the Annals of the East-India Company with the existing relations between Great-Britain, and the maritime powers of Europe, and with the political and commercial circumstances of the seats of the Company's trade in the East-Indies, we have discovered the sources of the measures which the Court of Directors adopted, for preserving their trade, and retaining their factories, at this juncture, under the shifting political events of the European and Asiatic nations.

CHAP. II.  
1664-65.

Court's instructions to their foreign Settlements, on the appearances of a war with the Dutch.

Early in the season 1664-65, the Court anticipated, from their applications to Government for protection, against the monopolizing and violent projects of the Dutch in the East-Indies, and from other political circumstances, more immediately within their notice, that a Dutch war was approaching : —aware of the superiority of the naval power and funds of the Dutch in the East, they had been taught, by experience, that in that distant quarter, the British commercial interests were more exposed to hazard than in Europe ; and therefore they instructed their President at SURAT to lose no time, in putting the investment on board their ships, and ordered the commanders to hasten from the Indian Seas, and during the whole of their

CHAP. II. their voyage, to keep themselves prepared against the enemy,  
1664-65. and to avoid touching at Dutch ports.<sup>(1)</sup>

The uncertainty of a Dutch war continued, during the subsequent summer, from the circumstance of an Ambassador having arrived in London, to accommodate the disputes between the States and the King, and from an English envoy having been sent to the Hague, to meet those pacific overtures; but as His Majesty had expressed his determination to obtain redress for the grievances which his subjects (particularly those in the East-Indies) had experienced, and as the Court were, by no means, sanguine in their expectations of such redress, the great naval preparations, both in England and in Holland, produced an opinion, that though peace might be the result of negotiation, war was the more probable event:—for this reason, the Court intimated their intentions to the President of Surat, to send out one ship only to that port, and directed him to dispose of the Company's country vessels to the best advantage; not to hazard a coasting trade, and to transmit lists of what chintzes, calicoes, and Lahore indigo, they expected to be able to ship for Europe.

French East-India Company formed, and instructions of the Court regarding it.

It was, at this crisis, that the Court discovered they had to meet a new European rival in a French Company, the equipment of the ships of which, in the last year, they had conjectured might be intended for piratical purposes; but

it

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 27th May 1664.







CHAP. II.  
1664-65. Jambee was to be cultivated, and the ships were to be dispatched in the shortest possible time:—if the island of Polaroön should not have been ceded, the attempt to obtain possession of it was to be postponed; but, if acquired by the Presidency of Bantam, every effort was to be made for its defence;—and no farther stock was to be sent to Maccassar, or the other dependencies of Bantam, while the uncertainty of a war continued. <sup>(1)</sup>

The death of Sir Abraham Shipman induced his Secretary, Mr. Cooke, to accept Bombay on the terms prescribed by the Portuguese.

While the events, which have been detailed, were occurring in Europe, the situation of the Company's foreign settlements discover only despondency, from all their measures having been checked, if not frustrated, by the superior naval and commercial means of the Dutch, even when they could not have anticipated a war between the two maritime powers in Europe.

The distressed situation in which Sir Abraham Shipman and the King's troops were left, on the Island of Angedivah, in the preceding season, after Sir George Oxinden had, on consultation, refused to accept the Island of Bombay, on the ground that the Viceroy of Goa had not power to transfer the rights to the Island, from the King to the Company,

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 2d September 1664.





## CHAP. II.

1664-65.   
 Return of the   
 King's troops   
 landed at   
 Bombay, and   
 estimate of   
 their ex-   
 pences.

The events which followed this agreement, affecting the remains of the armament, discover, not more their defenceless situation under Mr. Cooke, than the diminished numbers which actually left Angedivah, and proceeded to Bombay.

Mr. Cooke, on concluding this agreement with the Vice-roy of Goa, made application to three of the captains of the Company's ships, then lying at Carwar, lading pepper for Europe, to take on board the King's troops and stores, and accommodate them with a passage from Angedivah to Bombay :—these ships being already laden, and under orders to return to Surat, the captains explained to Mr. Cooke, that they were not at liberty to deviate from their orders, and that they trusted Sir George Oxinden, to whom notification of the treaty had been sent, would dispatch shipping from Surat to Angedivah, for this service.

From an original return, signed by Mr. Cooke, dated Angedivah, 3d December 1664, it appears, that the King's troops which embarked in England, in February and March 1661-62, amounted to four companies, of one hundred men each, exclusive of officers, and that the charges for levying these troops, and their pay, from the period of their embarkation in England, to the time when they left Angedivah for Bombay, amounted to £13,166. 17s. 11d., and that, by casualties, during this period, they were reduced to one hundred and three privates.

By direction of Sir George Oxinden, on the arrival of  
the

the troops at Bombay, a general muster and inventory of CHAP. II. stores, was taken by Captain Gary, on the 25th February and 1664-65. 3d March 1664-65, and the numbers were,—Mr. Cooke, governor, one ensign, four serjeants, six corporals, four drummers, one surgeon, one surgeon's mate, two gunners, one gunner's mate, one gun-smith, and ninety-seven privates; and twenty-two pieces of cannon, eight hundred and seventy-eight rounds of shot, and various articles of stores. <sup>(1)</sup>

This unfortunate termination of the measures which had been adopted, by the Crowns of England and Portugal, for ensuring to the former an independent seat of trade in the East-Indies, and obtaining for the latter, the co-operation of the English force, to balance the superior military and naval power of the Dutch, instead of relieving the Company's Presidency of Surat from those oppressions, of which they had, for so many years, complained, tended to increase them.

Effect of this event on the Company's settlements and trade.

Several large Dutch ships arrived at Surat, from Batavia, Cochin, and Japan, and others from Persia, with cargoes of articles, suited to the Surat and Indian markets, and these arrivals depressed the English sales and purchases, at the time when the misfortunes at Angedivah and Bombay, of which the Mogul government were fully informed, had lowered the English

(1)—Letter from Captain Bowen, Captain Barker, and Captain Higgenson, to Mr. Cooke, dated Carwar, 28 November 1664.— Account of Pay and Disbursements to the King's Troops, from February 1661-62 to 3d December 1664.— Muster taken at Bombay, by Mr. Gary, 22d February 1664-65. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, Nos. 228, 229, 230, 235.)

**CHAP. II.** English character for power, in the opinion of the Na-  
**1664-65.** tives, and discovered their inferior means for reviving the trade.

The situation of the Out-stations had become equally precarious :—the Dutch had excluded the English from making purchases of pepper, and other Malabar goods, at Porcat, and had, at this time, got possession of Calicut, and expelled the Company's Agent from that port; Sir George Oxinden, therefore, informed the Court, that unless an effectual interposition by the King with the States General, should take place, and orders be sent out to the Dutch Governor General, to desist from farther aggressions, the Company's trade on the Malabar Coast must be given up; and unless a sufficient naval force should be dispatched from England, to counter-balance that which the Dutch had in the Indian Seas, it would be impracticable for the Presidency of Surat to proceed with the trade at that port, or to preserve even their claims to those rights, which, at so much expence and danger, had been recently ceded to them by the Mogul.

In this critical situation, information reached Sir George Oxinden, that the Company's Factory in Bengal was experiencing the most heavy exactions and obstructions from the Nabob; with a request, that the President, from his influence at the court of the Mogul, would solicit a Phirmaund for the protection of that branch of the Company's trade. This application the Presidency of Surat referred to the Court,

the Court, that an Agent might be expected to succeed him at **FORT ST. GEORGE**, endeavoured to throw the whole blame on his Council, of the Company's trade not being prosecuted with sufficient zeal, for they had thwarted his best efforts, which had been directed to make retaliation on the vessels of the petty Chiefs, whose depredations, inland, prevented the Company's sales and purchases :—this plan he had, in the preceding season, recommended to the Court, and notwithstanding what had happened in Bengal, had required their authority to sanction it :—to support this project, he referred to the practice of the Dutch, whose large stock and naval power, he asserted, would not have given them the trade which they enjoyed, had they not kept in awe the Native Powers ;—that when he had represented to one of the country Chiefs the depredations committed by his followers on the goods passing to Madras, as well as the arbitrary duties imposed on them, he received for answer, that “ when the English horns and teeth grew, he “ would then free them from the duty ;”—Sir Edward, there fore,

pressed, from the Agent not having authority to use forcible measures against the Natives, and for want of a double stock.

(1)—Letter from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 31st March and 5th April 1665.



money in the treasury must be applied to build and maintain CHAP. II.  
boats on the river, to bring the saltpetre from Patna to 1664-65.  
Hughly, and the silks and muslins from Cossimbuzar to the  
English Factory, as otherwise the Nabob's boats would exact an  
exorbitant freight. The plan of inducing the weavers to come  
to Hughly had failed, from Cossimbuzar being more im-  
mediately under the observation of the Nabob; it was, there-  
fore, by a Double Stock only, that the trade, either at Madras  
or in Bengal, could be revived or extended; and, on the Coast,  
by a naval force, to counterbalance, at sea, the obstructions  
and arbitrary demands of the Chiefs on shore.

The investment for the season was estimated at 192,000  
pagodas, which sum had exhausted the treasury, allowing for  
the proportion of the money remitted to Bengal and to Ban-  
tam. The five ships which were to sail with this investment  
had, agreeably to the Court's directions, received orders to  
keep together, as a fleet, and to act for the common defence.<sup>(1)</sup>

The attention of the Agent and Council at BANTAM, in Polaroon de-  
livered to the  
Agent at Ban-  
tam, but in  
a desolated  
state.  
1664-65, was directed to the recovery of the Island of Pola-  
roon from the Dutch; the forming a settlement on the Island  
of Damm, situated within a few leagues of Banda; and to  
the re-opening the trade with Japan.

During the whole of this season, the evasions of the  
Dutch, to comply with the treaty in Europe, continued; and

VOL. II.

Y

it

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Council at Fort St. George to the Court, 12th .  
January 1664-65.



that with the English, expelled the Company's servants, who CHAP. II.  
 could only offer an unavailing protest against their conduct:— 1664-65.  
 this event, therefore, instead of relieving the Agent and Council of Bantam from the embarrassment into which they had been thrown, by the desolated state in which Polaroon had been delivered up to them, in fact, rendered even their pepper trade more difficult ; the stock of £12,800, which the Agent had received, to invigorate it, and to connect, with it, the trade from Polaroon, not being sufficient, either to support the trade against the superior stock of the Dutch, or to obtain the requisite quantity of this article, to meet the demands at Surat, or in the Europe market :—these circumstances had made it impracticable to comply with the Court's orders for pepper this season, the Dutch having engrossed the whole of the best quality, and allowed the English Agents only to purchase the inferior kinds, that they might, in the East, monopolize the valuable part of the trade, and in Europe the profitable sales.

The third object which had been recommended by the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, was to institute an inquiry, how far it might be practicable for the Company to obtain a share in the trade to JAPAN. Mr. Quarles Browne, who, at this period, was Agent at Bantam, and who was the only surviving Company's servant who had been at Japan, conducted this enquiry, and, in general, reported to the Court; that they must adopt the plan which the Dutch had followed,

Report, by  
Agent  
Browne, of  
the practica-  
bility of trade  
at Japan

Y 2

when





sons, properly qualified to judge of the value of the Japan goods, <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> particularly silver, should be sent from England, otherwise the <sup>1664-65.</sup> Japanese would impose baser metals on strangers, whom they would soon discover to be no judges of their intrinsic value.

In this critical situation of the Company's affairs, Mr. Quarles Browne died, and the project of the Japan trade was necessarily retarded, by the loss of this able and highly informed servant of the Company.<sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Council of Bantam to the Court, 16th July, and 30th and 31st December 1664. — Letter from the Agent and Council of Bantam to the Presidency of Surat, 28th July 1665.



the death of the Earl of Marlborough, who had been formerly sent to Bombay, to take possession of it in the King's name; —that the French had sent military assistance to the Dutch, to enable their armies to resist the forces of the Bishop of Munster, who was the ally of the King, and that this circumstance had brought on a war, between France and England.

CHAP. II.  
1665 - 66.

In 1663-64, it was mentioned, that the Company had taken an alarm, at the equipment of eight armed ships, in France, said to be intended for the East-Indies, though, at that time, the object of this equipment could not be ascertained. In 1664-65, this uncertainty of the Court, respecting the views of France, in the East-Indies, disappeared, on receiving intelligence, that a large Subscription had been raised in France, for the formation of a French East-India Company. It was in this year, that the celebrated Colbert, the French Minister of Finance, procured an Arrêt of Louis XIV. for the establishment of this Company, the limits of which were to be, from the Cape of Good Hope, eastwards, to the farther Indies, and from the Straits of Magellan and Le-Maire, westwards, into the South Seas; that funds were provided to support this trade, and a moiety of them actually paid for the first equipment :—Colbert, at the same time, projected new plans for the French trade, in the West-Indies, and on the Coast of Africa, for each of which French Companies were, this year, instituted :—the London East-India Company, therefore, as well, as the King, viewed these events (more particularly

Establishment of the French East-Indian, West-India, and African Companies.

CHAP. II. 1665-66. larly in a state of war with France) as subjects of anxiety, which rendered them the source of fresh instructions, not only to the new Governor for Bombay, (whose appointment we shall immediately notice,) but to the Company's Presidencies and Agencies in the East-Indies.

Sir Joseph Williamson, at this period Secretary of State, described the constitution of this French Company to be,—that every proprietor, holding 6000 livres stock, was to have a vote in the management of its affairs, which were placed under the patronage of the King, and the administration of twelve Directors, of whom Colbert was the President : they were elected in March 1665-66, and had, subordinate to them, Directors at the principal sea-ports of France.<sup>(1)</sup>

Mr. Cooke's Convention with the Portuguese disavowed by the King, and Sir Gervase Lucas appointed Governor of Bombay.

These public and interesting commercial events evidently influenced the resolution of the King, on receiving intelligence of the manner in which Mr. Cooke had agreed to receive the Island of Bombay from the Viceroy of Goa, to disavow the convention, as contrary to the terms of the treaty between the Crowns of England and Portugal, and to appoint Sir Gervase Lucas to be Governor of Bombay, giving, at the same time, assurances to the Company, that protection would be afforded to their Factories and trade, by his forces occupying the Island.

On

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 15th June and 18th September 1665, and 7th March 1665-66.—Sir Joseph Williamson's MSS. Notes, relative to the French East-India Company, 1665. (East India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 234).—Anderson's History of Commerce, vol. ii, page 148.

On his appointment, Sir Gervase Lucas had the whole of the documents, transmitted by Cooke, laid before him, and re-presented to the King,—that it appeared the fortifications on the Island were in a ruinous condition, and, by no means, suited, either for its defence, or for the security of the troops;—that stores, of every description, would be required, the greater part of those sent with Sir Abraham Shipman being useless, or lost; and that, in his opinion, it would be necessary to embark four hundred men, as a garrison, being the same number Sir Abraham Shipman had under his command;—that the charges, pay, &c. for the garrison would amount to £7,371 per annum, exclusive of artificers and contingencies; and submitted to His Majesty, that eighteen months' stores and provisions, of every kind, must be embarked, and some addition made to the pay of the Governor, at this time only £2 per day, which would not be sufficient to defray the expences that must be incurred on such a distant station.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP: II.  
1665-66.  
Report of Sir  
Gervase Lu-  
cas, on the  
troops and  
stores requir-  
ed for Bom-  
bay.

This report of Sir Gervase Lucas to the King was referred by His Majesty to the Duke of Albemarle (General Monk), Lord Arlington, and Sir William Coventry, Secretaries of State; who reported, that from the uncertainty, whether the Island of Bombay was, at that period, in possession of His

VOL. II.

Z

Majesty,

(1)—Sir Gervase Lucas's observations on the Papers respecting Bombay, 18th January 1665-66. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 232).— Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 7th March 1665-66.— Historical Account of Bombay.



and ingots of gold and silver, estimated at £20,600, to be <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> dispatched as speedily as possible, with an investment for 1665-66. England.<sup>(1)</sup>

The instructions to the Agent and Council of FORT ST. <sup>—to the Agent at Fort St. George.</sup> GEORGE were equally concise, and the equipment limited also to one ship, of three hundred tons :—they were to take every measure for putting the place into a state of security, a proportion of recruits having been embarked on this ship, to enable them to defend the Fort, in the event of any attack, either from a Native or an European enemy :—the ship was to be dispatched immediately to Europe, with an investment of two hundred tons of saltpetre, which, from the superior quality of it, was to be brought, by junks, from Bengal, that Agency being declared to be subordinate to the Fort, and directed to send all their dispatches to it, to be forwarded to England ; —the remaining tonnage was to be filled up with Bengal silks, or Coast callicoës, of the best kinds.<sup>(2)</sup>

The situation of the Agent and Council of BANTAM, from <sup>—to the Agent at Bantam.</sup> the superior power of the Dutch in the Island of Java, had prevented the Court, both in the last and in this year, from dispatching any ship direct from England to that port, and therefore, they ordered the Agent and Council to cultivate, by  

Z 2
every

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 7th March 1665-66.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council of Fort St. George, 18th September and 18th December 1665, and 7th March 1665-66.



CHAP. II. every practicable means, the friendship, and obtain the pro-  
 1665-66. tection of the King of Bantam :—with regard to the invest-  
 ment, they were to purchase pepper, with whatever funds they  
 might possess ; and, in the orders for sending it to England,  
 an expedient was adopted, which we, for the first time, meet  
 in the transactions of the London East-India Company ;—  
 that, if no ships should arrive from the Company's other  
 settlements, the Agent and Council were to take up two  
 country-built ships, and, if proper officers and crews could be  
 found to navigate them, to dispatch them direct for England,  
 with instructions, not to touch at St. Helena, but to make for  
 the first port in England, or Ireland, and there to wait for  
 orders from the Court.<sup>(1)</sup>

Effect of the  
 war in Eu-  
 rope on the  
 Company's  
 trade at Surat,  
 and on the Ma-  
 labar Coast.

The effects which the information of the war in Europe, between the King and the States General, and of the war between England and France, and the rise of the French East-India Company, in 1665-66, produced on the Presidencies, Factories and trade of the London East-India Company, must (as with the domestic transactions of the Court) be viewed as the source of the measures which the foreign settlements were obliged to adopt.

The Presidency of SURAT stated, that they considered the Dutch war in no other respect prejudicial to their interests, than

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 7th March 1665-66.



CHAP. II. open to the Company's ships; but this port would scarcely  
 1665-66. supply the demands of the Portuguese, should they again attempt trade on that part of the coast.

Trade depressed, from the interference of the French Agents.

The information of the large French equipments for the East-India trade, and of the probability of a French war, had reached the Presidency, but, in this season, they had not heard of the establishment of a French East-India Company; though French Agents had arrived, who had come through Persia, had obtained privileges of trade in that kingdom, and had dispatched one of their number, to solicit privileges from the Mogul; which had so much weakened the political and commercial influence of the Presidency of Surat, that the preservation of their rights and trade had become precarious, if not hopeless.<sup>(1)</sup>

The possession of Bombay precarious, from the impositions of the Portuguese, and the jealousy of the Mogul Government.

Having followed the effects which the wars and rivalship of the maritime powers in Europe had on the situation of the Presidency of Surat, in this season, we have to trace the relation between the King's garrison at BOMBAY, and the Company's interests at Surat, and on the Malabar Coast. At the close of the foreign events, in the preceding year, Mr. Cooke, under the Convention with the Viceroy of Goa, had got possession of the Island of Bombay only, but not of its dependencies, or of Salsette, &c.; and a muster had been taken by Mr. Gary, one of Council of Surat, of the troops and ordnance brought from Angedivah,

(1)—Letters from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 16th March 1665-66 and 4th April 1666.

Angedivah, and found at Bombay. The Portuguese, instead CHAP. II.  
of assisting the English or enabling them to render Bombay 1665-66.  
either a retreat for their trade, or a place of defence, had  
made Mr. Cooke, and the garrison, immediately feel, by heavy  
imposts on their boats passing by Caranjah or Tannah, the  
effects of being deprived of the dependencies of the Island,  
which had been ceded to the King, by treaty; for they levied  
from the boats, from ten to twelve per cent. duty on the mer-  
chandize and provisions which they brought from the conti-  
nent, which obliged Mr. Cooke to put soldiers on board the  
boats, to resist this demand.

Sir George Oxinden soon discovered, that the Mogul  
Government had become jealous of the English possessing an  
Island, and forming a garrison on it, in the immediate vicinity  
of Surat, one of the most important sea-ports in the empire;  
but it was his duty to furnish provisions, and every requisite  
aid, to the King's forces, and to advance money to them,  
under the orders of the Court of Directors, to enable them to  
preserve the place, till His Majesty's pleasure should be  
known.

This jealousy of the Mogul Government was heightened  
by Mr. Cooke, who had invited the native merchants to settle  
at Bombay, under the protection of the English garrison:—  
a measure which convinced the Governor of Surat, that the  
whole was a scheme of the President and Council, to re-  
move the factory to Bombay, it being unintelligible, what-

ever



his secretary : this vessel returned to Surat, and, instead of lodging the goods in the Company's warehouse, had in-<sup>CHAP. II.</sup> 1665-66. trusted them to a Native Merchant, whose house and stores had been pillaged by Sevagee :—after Mr. Cooke got possession of Bombay, this Native Merchant made application to the President and Council, to refund the value of these goods, which being refused, after reiterated demands for the amount, Mr. Cooke, in January 1665-66, seized a junk, belonging to the Governor of Surat, that, by stress of weather, had put into Bombay, to reimburse his loss :—The Governor of Surat, on receiving information of this proceeding, threatened the President and Council with the seizure of their Factory, and with imprisonment, unless the junk should be immediately restored, and the offenders against the Mogul's dignity punished :—Sir George Oxinden, in this situation, sent a remonstrance to Mr. Cooke on his conduct, and, in answer, Mr. Cooke stated himself to be possessed of superior power, and that the Company were subordinate to him, and, at the same time, addressed a letter to the Governor of Surat, representing the Company as his dependents :—this irritated the Mogul Governor, who threatened to seize the Company's property, and to punish their servants :—at last, however, in April 1666, Mr. Cooke found it expedient to restore the junk.



silver had sold at a moderate profit, and the corals, being in great demand, with profit, and the price of them still rising: —while the homeward ship was dispatching, the Presidency had also made a considerable purchase of indigo, at cheap rates; and though the Dutch had obstructed direct purchases of pepper, they continued the expedient of employing the Native Merchants, and had embarked a moderate assortment.<sup>(1)</sup>

If the improvident conduct of Mr. Cooke at Bombay, in placing the King's power in opposition to the Company's rights at Surat, had endangered the English interests, the events which took place at **FORT ST. GEORGE**, in the season 1665-66, threatened to subvert the trade of the Company, on the **Coromandel Coast**.

Sir Edward Winter had been appointed chief Agent at **Fort St. George**, and was entrusted with the confidence of the Court of Directors; but doubts had arisen, at home, of his fidelity, or rather that he was engaged in Private Trade for his separate interests, contrary to his duty; and, therefore, under this impression, they had appointed Mr. George Foxcroft to succeed him in the Agency, who arrived at **Fort St. George**, in June 1665.

Sir Edward Winter, before he heard of this appointment, had requested to be recalled, as his term was nearly expired;

2 A 2

but

CHAP. II.  
1665-66.  
Mr. Foxcroft,  
Agent at Fort  
St. George,  
seized and  
imprisoned,  
on a pretend-  
ed accusation  
for sedition,  
and the go-  
vernment of  
the Fort  
usurped by  
Sir Edward  
Winter.

(1)—Letter from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 1st January and 16th March 1665-66, and 4th April 1666.



CHAP. II. but it now appeared, this request had only been made, that  
1665-66. the Court might solicit him to continue in his Agency :—the arrival of Mr. Foxcroft brought out the fact, for Sir Edward Winter, to retain his power, proceeded to acts of violence, which the Court could neither have anticipated, nor prevented : —Mr. Foxcroft, on presenting his commission, was received by Sir Edward Winter with affected respect, and was directed by his instructions to allow him to act as Second in Council, till his departure :—on the 14th September 1665, however, Mr. Foxcroft, his son, and Mr. Sambrooke, were attacked, wounded, and put in confinement, under an accusation of having uttered seditious and treasonable expressions against the King's government, and Mr. Dawes was killed in the conflict :—the government of Fort St. George was then re-assumed by Sir Edward Winter, assisted by Mr. Proby, a merchant, and Mr. Chuseman, the Lieutenant of the troops in garrison :—Sir Edward Winter, to vindicate this conduct, explained to the Court, that he could bring proofs of the disloyalty of Mr. Foxcroft, on the affidavits of the Chaplain, and Mr. Farley, a Factor, who had heard the seditious and traitorous words uttered. The first circumstance which raised suspicion of the truth of this accusation, was Sir Edward Winter's application to Mr. Cooke, at Bombay, for his advice, instead of referring to Sir George Oxinden, the Company's President at Surat; next, his addressing letters to the Archbishop of Canterbury, and to the King, professing loyalty, as the motive of his conduct,

duct, without allowing those letters to pass through the Company, at home, whose servant he was, or reflecting that the effect of such letters might be, the exciting, in the King's Government, suspicions of the loyalty of the servants, with whom the Court had entrusted their Factories. CHAP. II.  
1665-66.

Mr. Foxcroft, during his confinement, applied, by letters, for assistance and advice, to the Agent at the subordinate Factory of Masulipatam, and, through him, to the President at Surat, for his interposition; and so fully were both satisfied of the unfounded pretext, upon which Mr. Foxcroft had been excluded from his Agency, and made a prisoner, that they remonstrated with the persons who had assisted Sir Edward Winter in this violence, and informed them that the result probably would be, either that the Fort would fall into the hands of the Moors, and the Company's property and rights be lost, or that it would become an easy acquisition to the Dutch, or the Viceroy of Goa, who, since the disputes respecting Bombay, had been inimical to the English. <sup>(1)</sup>

In this state of the Company's affairs at Fort St. George, Sir Edward Winter gave assurances to the Court, that efforts would Sir Edward Winter's statement of this event to the Court;

(1)—Letter of Sir Edward Winter and his Council to the Court, 30th September 1665.— Letter of Sir Edward Winter to the Governor of Bombay, 29th September 1665.— Letter of Sir Edward Winter to the Archbishop of Canterbury, 28th September 1665.— Letter of Agent Foxcroft to the Court, 30th September 1665.— Letters from the Factory of Masulipatam to the Presidency of Surat, 1st and 2d November 1665.— Letter from the Presidency of Surat to Mr. Proby and Mr. Chuseman, at Fort St. George, 13th December 1665.— Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Factory of Masulipatam, 12th December 1665.

CHAP. II. would be made by him, to preserve their rights, and provide  
 1665-66. investments for their shipping;—that the meditated attack on  
 the Fort, by Yecknam Khan, had been prevented, by his forces  
 being called off by the King of Golcondah, on other service;  
 —that the influence of the Agency had declined at Golcondah,  
 from his not having the authority of the Court, either to send  
 envoys there, or to make presents to the King, or to his mi-  
 nisters;—that the orders to withdraw the Out-agencies (Ma-  
 sulipatam excepted), though obedience should be given to  
 them, would abridge the Company in their influence and  
 trade, for the Natives would contrast such proceedings with  
 those of the Dutch, who took every opportunity to add to  
 their Out-agencies, and who were establishing Factories in  
 every country, at which there was the prospect, either of  
 profitable purchases, or sales.

and his com-  
 plaint against  
 the Agent in  
 Bengal, for  
 disobedience  
 of orders.

Sir Edward Winter next represented, that the withdraw-  
 ing the Out-agencies in BENGAL would produce similar evils,  
 and, therefore, he had left this measure to the discretion of the  
 Agent and Council at Hughly, as he could not lay down rules  
 for them, which it might be contrary to the Company's inte-  
 rests to carry into execution;—that the orders for maintaining  
 the Company's Fort, against the Native Powers, or an Eu-  
 ropean enemy, should be fully obeyed, but, in so far as re-  
 garded the Country Powers, who were formidable by land,  
 he could only defend himself by having two or more armed  
 vessels, to act against the trade of the Natives, which would  
 have

have a greater effect in promoting the Company's influence, CHAP. II.  
 than either the strength of the Fort itself, or of several forts; 1665-66.  
 —that the trade, however, could not proceed on the small  
 stock in the treasury, to provide investments, it being imprac-  
 ticable to borrow £10,000, either at Madras or Masulipatam;  
 —and that the ships, besides, could not be filled, in the short  
 time prescribed, with Coast goods, or with saltpetre, or Ben-  
 gal goods, from the numerous ships of the Dutch, ready to  
 seize on those of the Company, bringing Bengal produce to  
 Madras. <sup>(1)</sup>

BANTAM, in the season 1665-66, was in a perilous situa-  
 tion, both from the Dutch, who were, every day, acquiring  
 an ascendancy in that quarter of the Indies, and from neither  
 the funds nor the force, which the Agent and Council  
 possessed, being sufficient to maintain the influence and trade  
 of this Establishment;—hence the Company's servants were  
 left without either instructions or support:—in illustration,  
 they added, that the influence of the Dutch, at Jambee, had  
 enabled them to purchase the whole produce;—that the low  
 state of the English stock had prevented the procuring of  
 pepper at Bantam, which had been offered to them, and, on  
 their refusal, given to the Dutch;—that they had been unable  
 to afford assistance to the settlers at Polaroon, which the  
 Dutch had re-possessed, and now asserted their exclusive right

Polaroon re-  
 occupied by  
 the Dutch,  
 and the trade  
 at Bantam on  
 the decline.

to

Sir Edward Winter and his Council at Fort St. George to the  
 5-66.



## 1666-67.

It will be necessary, in this season (1666-67), to refer to public events, as they regarded the war in Europe, to enable us to ascertain the sources of the measures, which the Court of Directors adopted, and the instructions which they sent to their foreign Presidencies, particularly to SURAT, in its relation to the King's Island of BOMBAY.

CHAP. II.  
1666-67.  
Court's detail  
of the events  
of the war  
with Holland.

The Court continued the account of the events of the war, from the period when their details of the preceding year concluded;—specified the captures which had been made of the Dutch merchant fleets, particularly the convoy which had taken shelter at Bergen, in Norway, and the intercepted convoy on the Dutch coast;—adverted to the circumstances which required a division of the English fleet, under Prince Rupert, to be stationed off Rochelle, and the advantage the Dutch took of this circumstance, which led to the memorable conflict off Ostend; and, lastly, mentioned the successful attack, under Sir Robert Holmes, on the Dutch shipping in the Vlee, with the incredible loss (as they described it) which they had suffered, from that well executed enterprize.

## CHAP. II.

1666-67.

Loss sustained by the Company at the Fire of London.

During these public events, the Fire of London made a deep impression on the proceedings of the Court of Directors, for, by this calamity, they lost their saltpetre warehouses, and the pepper in their vaults under the Royal Exchange, though their other warehouses escaped the conflagration.

The consultations of the Court, from these circumstances were suspended for some months, but in April, on the arrival of their shipping, they altered the destinations of the outward vessels.

Court makes an application to the King, to issue orders to Sir Gervase Lucas, to disavow the proceedings of Mr. Cooke at Bombay.

On receiving information of Mr. Cooke's proceedings at Bombay, and of Sir Edward Winter's at Fort St. George, the Court adopted strong measures to restore their affairs, both on the Malabar and Coromandel Coasts. To remedy the evils on the Malabar Coast, they applied to the King, for orders to Sir Gervase Lucas, to disavow Mr. Cooke's conduct, in capturing the junk belonging to the Governor of Surat, and, for its restoration; also to afford his assistance and protection to the Presidency of Surat, in preserving the rights and trade of the Company; in return, this Presidency was authorised to advance £1000 to Sir Gervase Lucas, at the exchange of five shillings and sixpence per rial of eight.

As no information, at this time, would have been received by the King, of the measures taken for preserving Bombay, in the preceding year, it would appear, that Government relied on their proving effectual; the Court, therefore, in this season,

consigned

consigned one vessel only to Surat, with a cargo estimated at **CHAP. II.**  
 £16,000, and ordered the investment to consist of a pro- **1666-67.**  
 portion of saltpetre, and the remainder of the tonnage to  
 be filled up with indigo, and different kinds of calicoes;  
 and though, for some years, the trade to PERSIA had been lost  
 sight of, it appears, under this narrow state of affairs at Su-  
 rat, that this Presidency was instructed, if possible, to obtain  
 from Persia a quantity of Caramania wool.<sup>(1)</sup>

When information arrived of the proceedings of Sir  
 Edward Winter, at FORT ST. GEORGE, the Court, on con-  
 sultation, applied to the King, to interpose his authority,  
 and appointed Mr. Clavell, who was vested with special  
 powers by the King and by the Company, to proceed directly  
 on a ship consigned to Surat:—he was to consult with Sir  
 George Oxinden, and if Sir Edward Winter should be in  
 possession of the Fort, he was to proceed to Masulipatam,  
 and, by a messenger from thence, to intimate to him, the  
 powers and authority with which he was vested, demand  
 the release of Mr. Foxcroft, and that this Agency, and the  
 Company's concerns on the Coast, might be delivered over to  
 his administration.

Address the  
 King and  
 Council to  
 issue a pro-  
 clamnation  
 against Sir  
 Edward Win-  
 ter and his  
 adherents.

With the object of recovering Fort St. George from  
 the hazardous state in which it was placed, the Court re-  
 ferred the whole subject to the King and Council, and obtain-

2 B 2

ed

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 31st August, 14th  
 September, and 5th October 1666.



CHAP. II. ed His Majesty's pardon to Sir Edward Winter and his adhe-  
 1666-67. rents, on condition of their returning to their duty, and reia-  
 stating Mr. Foxcroft in the Agency; they, farther, addressed  
 separate letters to Sir Edward Winter, intimating to him  
 the King's pardon, and their positive order, that Mr. Fox-  
 croft should be immediately vested with the government;  
 a moderation which evinces, that they considered this set-  
 tlement, and the trade on the Coromandel Coast, to be in  
 great hazard, if Sir Edward Winter should persevere in  
 resisting their authority.

The ship, which had been intended for Madras, and or-  
 dered to touch, on her outward passage, at St. Helena, with  
 recruits for that Island, was countermanded, and directed to  
 proceed to Surat, to receive information of the actual state of  
 affairs on the Coromandel Coast, and to deliver the twenty  
 recruits, intended for Madras, as a supply to the King's  
 garrison at Bombay:—if information should be obtained at  
 Surat, that Madras was open, and Mr. Foxcroft in the pos-  
 session of the Agency, the ship was to take in, as an investment,  
 Bengal saltpetre with the Coast goods, and directions were  
 given, that three hundred tons of saltpetre should be annually  
 provided at Hughly, to meet the ships on their arrival.<sup>(1)</sup>

It

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 31st  
 August, 14th September, and 28th December 1666, 31st January 1666-67, and 10th  
 April 1667.— (Duplicate.) Pardon from His Majesty to Sir Edward Winter and his

It does not appear, from the Company's records, that any <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> dispatches were sent to the Agent and Council at BANTAM, 1666-67. during the season 1666-67.

---

Before advertig to the effects which the war between the maritime States of Europe produced in the East-Indies, in this season (1666-67), it will be expedient to examine, from the letters of Sir Gervase Lucas to Lord Arlington, and of Sir George Oxinden to the Court of Directors, the respective interests of the King's Settlement at BOMBAY and the Company's Presidency of SURAT.

Sir Gervase Lucas protests against the conduct of Mr. Cooke at Bombay.

When Sir Gervase Lucas arrived at Bombay (5th November 1666) and took charge of the government, he began with instituting an enquiry into the proceedings and conduct of Mr. Cooke, and found, that instead of carrying the revenues to His Majesty's account, he had extorted the sum of 12,000 Xeraphins from the inhabitants of the Island, and converted it to his own private use, which was proved by his receipts ; and that he had taken possession of the estate of the late Sir Abraham Shipman, and charged the executrix with fifteen per cent. commission, amounting to the sum of £663, which Sir Gervase Lucas formally demanded of him, and,

Adherents, for usurping the Government of Fort St. George, and imprisoning the Agent, dated 28th January 1666-67. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 240).

CHAP. II. and, by a protest, gave notice of his intention not to suffer  
 1666-67. Mr. Cooke to leave the Island, till he had repaid the money  
 thus fraudulently extorted.<sup>(1)</sup>

Dispute be-  
 tween Sir  
 Gervase Lu-  
 cas and Sir  
 George Ox-  
 inden, rela-  
 tive to issu-  
 ing passes in  
 the King's  
 name.

It would appear, that Sir Gervase Lucas had considered, that, in his administration, it was not his duty to communicate the circumstances which have been detailed, to Sir George Oxinden, or to the Presidency of Surat, who observing Mr. Cooke still resident on the Island, without being able to account for this indulgence, became jealous of the conduct of Sir Gervase Lucas, as if, instead of removing Mr. Cooke, he had taken him into his confidence; and therefore interpreted the demand of a passage for him, for Europe, on a Company's ship, (after having obliged him to give an account of his transactions) as evidence that he had entrusted him with his dispatches to Government, and, for this reason, refused him the passage:—this circumstance irritated Sir Gervase Lucas, and induced him to send his subsequent dispatches by Persia, and created that coolness between him and the Presidency of Surat, which proceeded from jealousy, on the one part, and from reserve, on the other.

Sir Gervase  
 Lucas's re-  
 port on the  
 state of Bom-  
 bay.

The account which Sir Gervase Lucas, subsequently transmitted, not only of the importance and value of the Island of Bombay, but of its exposed situation to the Mogul  
 Power

(1)—Protest by Sir Gervase Lucas, against Mr. Humphrey Cooke, dated Bombay, 15th December 1666. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 239).

Power on the continent, affords evidence of the improvident CHAP. II.  
convention which Cooke had formed, by receiving the Island 1666-67.  
from the Viceroy of Goa, without the King's rights being  
ascertained, or a statement given of the extent of them, as  
transferred to the Crown of England. In his letter to Lord  
Arlington, of the 21st March 1666-67, Sir Gervase Lucas  
stated his apprehension of the jealousy of the Mogul, on ob-  
serving the encreasing strength and prosperity of Bombay,  
and the necessity that existed, of both ships of war and  
merchant vessels being sent, to defend the place, and to  
encrease the trade of the Island;—that he was making every  
effort to encrease the King's revenues on the Island, but,  
from the indefinite conditions on which Cooke had received it,  
it was impracticable to ascertain which of the inhabitants were  
legally possessed of sufficient titles to their estates, no stipu-  
lation having been made, relative to the King's sovereignty of  
the soil;—that Cooke's conduct, in taking bribes from the  
inhabitants, had sullied the King's government, and been  
detrimental to his revenue, as some of the best estates in the  
Island refused to pay rent, and produced titles, which could  
not be disputed, though believed to be fictitious;—that the  
Island, when properly cultivated, and the rights ascertained,  
would be very productive, though it had been reported, that  
the King, on the representations of the East-India Company,  
and their Presidency of Surat, intended to give it up; and  
added, that it was not his intention to send his dispatches to  
Europe,

CHAP. II. Europe, through the Presidency of Surat, as their conduct  
 1666-67. had not met his approbation, but to find a conveyance through Persia:—this last circumstance explains the measure which he adopted, of insisting, that all passes for vessels should be issued by him, in the King's name, and that those of the President of Surat should be discontinued; a proceeding which Sir George Oxinden held to be an infringement on the Company's rights, but, at the same time, advanced the sums which had been ordered by the Court to Sir Gervase Lucas, for which bills had been granted on Lord Southampton, in favour of the Company.<sup>(1)</sup>

It was necessary to refer, in this season, to the events which had occurred at Bombay, to understand the proceedings of the President and Council of Surat, as it appears, that a misunderstanding had prevailed between Sir Gervase Lucas and Sir George Oxinden, which, during the preparations for shipping the investment for Europe, had constantly varied the means to which this Presidency resorted:—these means were partly affected by the war in Europe, and partly by the prevailing wars in Hindostan.

The

(1)—Letter from Sir Gervase Lucas to Lord Arlington, dated Bombay, 21st March 1666-67. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 241).—Letter from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 25th March 1667.—Letter from Sir Gervase Lucas to the President and Council of Surat, and their Answers, 9th, 16th, 22d, and 24th November, 4th and 10th December, and 26th March 1666-67.

The war in Europe afforded to the Dutch (notwithstanding their having a Factory at Surat) a specious reason for blockading the English ships in that harbour, and this blockade obliged the President and Council, notwithstanding the demorage, to detain the ships within the bar, and to observe the like caution with one of the ships which was at Diu; but as it was expected the Dutch fleet would sail with the Monsoon, it was then hoped, the Company's ships might be dispatched to Europe:—these circumstances would explain to the Court the cause of the delay; but, independently of them, the goods which were obtained in the inland provinces (indigo, saltpetre, &c.) could not be ready to be shipped before the months of January or February.

CHAP. II.  
1666-67.  
Company's  
ships at Su-  
rat blockaded  
by the Dutch.

The subsisting wars between the country powers had often rendered it impracticable to dispatch the ships, at the periods ordered by the Court; and a reference to the actual state of the wars, between Sevagee and Aurungzebe, were adduced, to explain to the Court, that obedience to their orders, for the sailing of their ships, frequently exceeded the powers of this Presidency;—Sevagee, who had gone to Delhi, under promises of safety, on discovering the insidious intentions of Aurungzebe, had escaped from that city, and was again at the head of an army, ready to recommence the war against the Mogul:—Aurungzebe, exposed to a war with this formidable opponent, was also threatened with an invasion by the King of Persia, and made the extraordinary demand on the Presi-

The purchase  
of an invest-  
ment diffi-  
cult, from the  
wars between  
Aurungzebe  
and Sevagee.

**CHAP. II.** dency, for Engineers and Artillery-men, [to direct his ordnance  
 666-67. in the sieges to which these wars might lead his armies; a  
 requisition with which they could not comply, unless the Court  
 should send out officers of this description, with authority for  
 them to be employed on such service.

Comparing, therefore, the situation of this Presidency, in their relations with Sevagee, and with the Mogul, the Factory and trade of the Company were equally depressed by both:—Sevagee was menacing an attack on Surat, and the Presidency had not the same number of persons, as formerly, to act as a guard to the Factory:—the Mogul had withdrawn his treasure from Surat, and had become indifferent to the fates of the inhabitants; and yet the English, if they did not resist Sevagee, would be deemed rebels by the Mogul, and lose all the privileges, which, with so much expence, they had purchased.

The Factories subordinate to this Presidency, were, at this juncture, in equal danger; for the Agent at Carwar, foreseeing the probable incursions of Sevagee, had been obliged to call in the articles purchased for the Company's trade, to bring them to sale, and to vest the produce in bills, or to consign the remaining goods to Signor Johan de Prado, the confidential correspondent of the Presidency, at Goa. The Agent at Calicut, who had continued to be protected by the Zamorin, had been obliged to remove the goods from that port, inland, and to make large presents to this Prince, to purchase the continuance of the English trade in his dominions.

The

The Company were, at this time, equally exposed to their European rivals, and enemies :—four, only, of the large Dutch fleet, expected at Swally, had arrived, the remainder having been left blockading Goa, to prevent the sailing of a Portuguese armament, which expected to be joined by some English frigates from Europe. CHAP. II  
1666-6

The French Agents, though they had not been able to obtain privileges from Aurungzebe, had published at Surat their expectations of a large fleet arriving from France, with funds which would give them a superiority in the trade; but, as neither the ships, nor the funds arrived, the expectations of them had a considerable effect on the market :—and as the ships did not appear at the close of the season, the disappointment of the Native Merchants excited, in the government, a contempt for the Europeans in general. <sup>(1)</sup>

Trade also affected, by the exaggerated accounts by the French Agents of the magnitude of their stock and shipping

We can only collect, from indirect evidence, the situation of the Company's establishments, at FORT ST. GEORGE, and BANTAM, during this season. Sir Edward Winter, at the former, still maintained his power, and kept Mr. Foxcroft in confinement; and apprehensions were entertained by the Presidency of Surat, that his object was to deliver up the Fort to the Dutch Governor of Ceylon, who had provided a

2 C 2

vessel

(1)—Letters from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 10th and 25th September, and 24th November 1666, and 26th March 1667.— Letter from the President and Council of Surat to the Factory at Carwar, 17th October 1666.— Letter from the President and Council at Surat to the Factory at Calicut, 20th October 1666.



CHAP. II. vessel for him to make his escape. Affairs at Bantam, at this  
1666-67. time, were equally precarious; for though the Presidency of  
Surat entertained no apprehensions of the fidelity of the Agent  
and Council, they were doubtful, whether they would be able,  
(as no relief could be afforded to them,) to preserve the Fac-  
tory against the influence of the Dutch over the Natives, or  
against their fleets in the Southern Seas, being without any  
English armament to resistt hem. <sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Letter from the President and Council of Surat to the Court, 26th March 1667.

## 1667-68.

---

THE relations between Government and the London East-India Company, in 1667-68, were of such importance, as to produce a change on the system of trade, which the former had hitherto encouraged, and the latter had provided funds to support.

CHAP  
1667.  
The Isl  
of Polai  
and Dat  
ceded to  
Dutch b  
Treaty o  
Breda.

When the conferences for the Treaty of Breda were first held, the long agitated questions, between the Dutch and the London East-India Company, became subjects of discussion; and Mr. Thompson and Mr. Papillon, two of the Directors, were permitted to attend the King's Ambassadors, that they might inform them fully of the Company's claims on the Islands of Polaroon and Damm, and, in general, on their rights, which had been, in every part of the East-Indies, narrowed, if not subverted, by the Dutch; and to insist, that regulations for the two Companies might, under the treaty, be established, to serve as principles to each, for their future participation in the trade.

While affairs were in this train, in June 1667, the Dutch made the unexpected attack at Chatham, which, for a time, suspended the progress of the negotiations, and induced



“ ceded to His Majesty, to be held by the Company of the CHAP. II.  
 “ King, in free and common soccage, as of the manor of East 1667-68.  
 “ Greenwich, on payment of the annual rent of £10, in gold,  
 “ on the 30th September in each year”:—the Company were  
 neither to sell, nor part with the Island:—the King also  
 granted to them, all the stores and arms remaining on the  
 Island, and agreed to pay the troops, till the Island should be  
 taken possession of by the Company, for which purpose a  
 vessel was to be directly dispatched from England:—the Com-  
 pany were empowered, by this Charter, to entertain officers  
 and men, as a garrison for the Island; to appoint and dismiss  
 governors and officers; to make laws for the better govern-  
 ment thereof, and to exercise martial law in it:—all per-  
 sons born in Bombay, were to be accounted natural subjects  
 of England; and the Company were to enjoy all the privileges  
 and powers granted by this Charter, in any place they might  
 purchase or acquire, in or near the said Island.<sup>(1)</sup>

This grant of the Island of Bombay to the Company was  
 intimated to Sir Gervase Lucas, by a letter from the Court of  
 Directors, accompanied with an authenticated copy of the  
 King's grant, empowering him to deliver the Island of Bom-  
 bay to Sir George Oxinden and the Council of Surat:—the  
 Court, at the same time, sent a commission to Sir George  
 Oxinden, to receive the Island, as granted to the Company by  
 the

Court's In-  
 structions to  
 Sir George  
 Oxinden, to  
 receive the  
 Island of  
 Bombay from  
 Sir Gervase  
 Lucas.

(1)—Letters Patent, granting the Island of Bombay to the East-India Company, 27th  
 March 1668. (Printed Collection of East-India Charters, page 80.)

CHAP. II. the King, and to vest one of the Council of Surat with the  
 1667-68. civil and military administration of it :—an estimate of the  
 revenues of the Island, amounting to £2,833 per annum,  
 was also transmitted to Sir George Oxinden, who was autho-  
 rised to give receipts to Sir Gervase Lucas, for the King's  
 stores on the Island :—Sir George Oxinden was farther directed  
 to engage any of the King's troops, who might be disposed to  
 enter into the Company's service, and to call in the guards of  
 the Factory at Bantam, and a proportion of the companies serv-  
 ing at Fort St. George, to fill up the garrison at Bombay ; and,  
 as a farther encouragement, these soldiers were to be allowed  
 half pay, on condition of their becoming settlers on the Island,  
 and affording their labour for the cultivation of it ; and, annu-  
 ally, new settlers were to be sent from England, but twenty  
 soldiers only were to be allowed to return to Europe, in any  
 one year.

With the object, also, of improving the cultivation of  
 Bombay, (that the produce might be equal to the charges of  
 the government), Sir George Oxinden was instructed to  
 invite such of the Natives as might chuse to resort to,  
 and settle on the Island, to encourage them, by taking  
 the most moderate profits on trade, and to endea-  
 vour to open a commerce between Bombay, the Persian  
 Gulf, and the Red Sea, for each of which one small  
 vessel, laden with Company's goods, was to be dispatched,  
 and powers given to the commanders, to offer to the Natives,

at the ports at which they might touch, a free passage to CHAP. II.  
Bombay, and full protection when they should arrive, to 1667-68.  
enable them to carry on their trade.<sup>(1)</sup>

While the Company were disappointed, on the one hand, with the terms of the Treaty of Breda, and encouraged, on the other, by the grant of the Island of Bombay, they adopted a more extensive commercial plan, in this season, than they had done since the restoration of their Charter, and were determined to obtain, by commercial competition with the Dutch, an equality of trade in the East-Indies, and not to be deterred, either by their opposition, or by their subterfuges; but, on the contrary, should they proceed to acts of hostility, to resist them, as far as their means would allow; and, if these should not be sufficient, to take regular protests against any hostilities they might commit, to become the foundation of remonstrances by the King to the States General.

Equipments  
and stock for  
Surat enlarged,  
on account of the  
grant of Bombay.

With these views, early in the season, the Court consigned three ships to Surat, with a stock estimated at £60,000, and, in return, ordered an investment of Surat cloths, indigo, drugs, pepper, and such quantity of the finer spices, as this Presidency could procure; but not to attempt, in future, the purchase of saltpetre, as it had been resolved to bring

VOL. II.

2 D

that

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 27th March. 1668.— Letter from the Court to Sir Gervase Lucas, Governor of Bombay, 27th March 1668.— Commission from the Court to Sir George Oxinden and the Council of Surat, to receive possession of the Island of Bombay, 30th March 1668.



# EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

plundered by Sevagee, conferred on him a gold medal, and a CH remuneration of £200, and sent £400 to be distributed 16 among the Council and subordinate servants, who had been active on that occasion, with the Court's request, that he would remain in the administration of their affairs for three years longer, or till the Company's rights and trade could be re-established.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Court of Directors remained, during the whole of this season, without any information, respecting the actual situation of their affairs at FORT ST. GEORGE, and though, (as will be subsequently specified,) they consigned shipping and stock to the Coromandel Coast, the instructions were framed, rather to connect the joint efforts of the President and Council of Surat, and the Agent at Musulipatam, than as rules for the conduct of Mr. Foxcroft and the Council at Madras. On the presumption, however, that Mr. Foxcroft might be in possession of the Fort, the letters which were addressed to him and to his Council, prefaced the instructions for his conduct with a similar detail of the events in Europe, which had been conveyed to the Presidency of Surat; but these orders were conditional, and suited to the probability of Sir Edward Winter being still in possession of the Fort, or of events having occurred, which had placed Agent Foxcroft in that station. The commanders of the ships were ordered to proceed direct to Masulipatam,

Proc  
to b  
ed b  
Con  
offic  
case  
war  
had  
Fort  
Geo  
the

2 D 2

and

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 26th August and 4th October 1667, and 27th March 1668.



CHAP. II. and if, on reaching that port, they should discover that Sir  
 1667-68. Edward Winter had delivered up the Fort to the Dutch, before  
 the 10th May, which the Treaty of Breda had stated as the  
 day, on which the "*Uti Possidetis*" was to take place, the  
 Agent at Masulipatam was, in that case, to make application  
 to the King of Golcondah, to have the place restored to the  
 English, agreeably to the conditions upon which it had ori-  
 ginally been granted to them; but if Sir Edward Winter had  
 ceded it to the Dutch, subsequently to the 10th May, a pro-  
 test, upon the basis of the treaty, was to be taken, that the  
 Dutch had refused to deliver it up, agreeably to the Treaty of  
 Breda. In the event, however, of Sir Edward Winter remain-  
 ing in possession of the Fort, one or more of the Company's  
 ships, as the service might require, were to be stationed off  
 Madras, and completely to blockade that port, or to prevent  
 the entrance or departure of any ships from it:—if all of these  
 measures should prove unavailing, the Agent at Masulipatam,  
 and the commanders of the Company's ships, were, on consul-  
 tation, to make an application to the King of Golcondah, for  
 the cession of St. Thomé to the Company, and authorised to  
 pay for such grant, to the amount of 5,000 pagodas:—if this  
 place should be obtained, they were to land ordnance and  
 military stores, and to fortify themselves in it, and await the  
 Court's instructions for their future conduct:—if, however,  
 on the arrival of the fleet, the remonstrances of the Company,  
 through the Agent at Masulipatam, to Sir Edward Winter,

#### EAST-INDIA COMP.

to resign the Fort, or the plan to acquire prove ineffectual, the Agent of Masulipat manders of the ships, were, on consultation form an establishment at some other port Coast, at which goods, suited to the Banta of Europe, could be purchased, both to that port, and to form part of the home i

These general orders, applicable to cases, were strengthened by a commission directed to the Captains of the Company the Factors embarked on them (the appointed commodore of the squadron), and seamen into five companies, and to use of ordnance and small-arms, to make Fort, by sea and land; with secret instructions opened till they should reach Madras. For seamen and soldiers, who should be active place to the King's obedience, an establishment if they chose to settle at the Fort, and a promise of pardon and of reward to the sword Winter, who might return to their place to the recovery of the place:—if all of the fail, and the Fort still hold out, and if in consultation, impracticable to reduce it. Employed in this service were to be embarked

CHAP. II. <sup>one or more ships, fully armed, were to keep Madras in a</sup>  
 1667-68. <sup>state of blockade.</sup>

Equipments  
and stock for  
the Coroman-  
del Coast.

This uncertainty of the Court, respecting the situation of their settlements, or of their servants, on the Coast of Coromandel, or whether Mr. Foxcroft, and the Council they had approved of, were in possession of Madras and its dependencies, did not alter their resolution to send a large stock and tonnage for that part of their trade:—five ships were consigned to Fort St. George, under the preceding instructions, with a cargo of British staples, bullion, and a large proportion of quicksilver, estimated at £75,000:—the ships were equipped for war, as well as for trade, and on each was embarked a proportion of soldiers, and also sixteen factors and eight writers, to form a more enlarged civil establishment. The Agent at Masulipatam (should the Fort still be in Sir Edward Winter's possession) was directed to make the largest practicable investment in Coast cloths, and in a new species of cloths, or gingham, specimens of which were sent, as found in one of the Dutch prizes:—two of these ships were to be dispatched for Bengal, with a proportion of stock and money to obtain saltpetre, taffaties, and raw-silk; and one ship was to proceed from the Coromandel Coast to Bantam, with an investment of £10,000, in Coast cloths, &c. to revive the trade at that port and at Maccassar, and under instructions to bring, in return, pepper and the finer spices, and then to go to Acheen, to take in goods at that port, and to engage

was, if possible, to be reduced by force, the goods were, in  
the

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council of Fort St. George, 26th April. 1667, and 24th January 1667-68.— Commission from King Charles II., for reducing the Government of Fort St. George to the obedience of the East-India Company, 31st January 1667-68.— Instructions from the East-India Company (approved by the King) to the Commanders of their Ships, relative to the reducing Fort St. George to obedience, 24th January 1667-68.



enervated the Company, who were determined to renew the CH trade with an increased stock, and with two thousand tons 166 of shipping, to bring to Europe, direct, such accumulation of pepper, as might be in the Company's warehouses, at Bantam, Jambee, and Maccassar, with what might possibly be procured at Sumatra; and, besides, the Court hoped, that a large investment would be provided, comprehending a proportion of gum benjamin, sugar, and sapan-wood:—the trade with Maccassar, and at such other ports as the Agent and Council might deem it expedient, was to be opened:—and any opposition from the Dutch was not to be regarded, unless they proceeded to actual hostility; and should this hostility be experienced, it was to be resisted, as much as the guards and shipping of the Company could effect; but, if a sufficient force could not be collected, protests were to be taken, and authenticated copies of them sent home, to enable the King to apply to the States for redress. (1)

In the progress of the season, five ships were accordingly dispatched for Bantam, with stock, chiefly in silver, a proportion of warlike stores and fire arms, and a small quantity of English cloth, which, with the goods to be forwarded to Bantam from the Coast of Coromandel and Surat, would make up a stock, estimated at £40,000. Mr. Turner was appointed Chief at Bantam, with a Council, and accompanied by Factors, Writers, and Apprentices, and intrusted with a letter

Letter  
King  
to the  
of  
recon  
ing the  
pany  
vanta  
prote

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 4th October 1667:

CHAP. II. from King Charles II. to the King of Bantam, and a present  
 1667-68. of three brass cannon, and accoutrements, valued at £1,500, to request his protection to the East-India Company; and with letters, also, from the Court, expressing their resolution to cultivate his friendship :—these letters were accompanied with a quantity of arms and cloth, either to be sold to the King of Bantam, or, from time to time, given in small presents, to conciliate his favor :—similar letters and presents were sent to the King of Jambee.

This fleet had orders to sail in company, and to endeavour to arrive at Bantam at the same time, that their appearance might make an impression on the Natives, of the large scale upon which the Company intended, in future, to conduct that trade :—the orders to the captains were, to avoid all quarrels with the Dutch ; but if they met with opposition, to make the most vigorous resistance, and, if overpowered by superior force, to take protests, in the manner already specified.

An Agent, also, was this season appointed, with a stock of £10,000, to proceed to Maccassar; but should the wars, between the Dutch and the Natives of the Spice Islands, still subsist, the English were to confine their operations to the protection of their own trade, and not to risk the stock, in situations where such wars might render trade hazardous.

First order of  
 the Court to  
 import teas.

This dispatch furnishes a novel and interesting event, or the first order of East-India Company to their Agent at Bantam, “ to send home, by these ships, 100 lb. waight of  
 “ the

times, become the principal import from China, and the most valuable branch of the Company's trade.<sup>(1)</sup>

The commercial enterprizes of the Company, in this season, were extended, if not to new, at least to ports from which, for many years, the Dutch had excluded them. The Company had formerly attempted trade at Sumatra, and obtained a proportion of pepper, to counteract the monopoly of the Dutch at Java, and they now resolved to revive this trade, and therefore sent the Zant frigate, and a stock of £3,000, under the charge of Mr. Newman, the supercargo, with instructions to re-open the trade at Sumatra, particularly at Priaman and Tekoo; but, in the event of his not being able to obtain pepper at those ports, he was to proceed to Bantam, fill up his tonnage, and return thence direct to England.<sup>(2)</sup>

Trade to be again attempted at Sumatra.

2 E 2

The

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Bantam, 24th January 1667-68.— Letter from the Court to the King of Bantam, 24th January 1667-68.— Letter from King Charles II. to the King of Bantam, 28th January 1667-68.— (Note.) Mr. Wisset, in his "Compendium of East-India Affairs," mentions, that the Court had ordered the Secretary, in August 1664 and in 1666, to obtain small quantities of tea, as a present to His Majesty; but the letter, above quoted, to Bantam, 24th January 1667-68, appears to be the first *public* order from the Court for the importation of tea into England.

(2)—Instructions of the Court to Mr. Thomas Newman, for his voyage to Sumatra, 27th March 1668.— Letter from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Bantam, 27th March 1668.



## CHAP. II.

1667-68.

Death of Sir  
Gervase Lu-  
cas, at Bom-  
bay, commu-  
nicated to the  
Secretary of  
State, by Sir  
George Ox-  
inden.

The transactions of the foreign Settlements of the Company, in 1667-68, furnished only a continuation of the measures which had been adopted in the preceding season. When Sir Gervase Lucas took charge of the Government of Bombay, and when the unhappy misunderstanding prevailed between him and Sir George Oxinden, the Company's President at Surat, the King's and Company's interests were unhappily at variance with each other, and could not be affected by the events which had taken place in Europe, either in consequence of the Treaty of Breda, or of the grant of the Island of Bombay to the Company; the Presidency of Surat, also, could not have learned the resolution of the Company, to revive the trade, by large funds and equipments; hence, in the west of India, we have only to trace the series of events at BOMBAY and at SURAT, as they affected the King's or the Company's interests.

It would appear, that, early in this year, an explanation had taken place, on the subjects in dispute between Sir Gervase Lucas and Sir George Oxinden, and that the efforts of both were directed to promote His Majesty's and the Company's interests:—the death of Sir Gervase Lucas, however, on the 21st May 1667, again involved the Government of Bombay in embarrassing circumstances. Sir Gorge Oxinden communicated to Lord Arlington the circumstance of Sir Gervase Lucas's death, and, at the same time, informed him



CHAP. II. Gervase Lucas. At the time when Mr. Cooke acceded to the  
 667-68. terms, upon which the Viceroy of Goa agreed to cede the Island, either he had not examined the rights to the lands held of the Crown of Portugal by the inhabitants, or he had considered that the ascertaining of those rights would become a source of emolument to himself:—the Jesuits' College at Bundera claimed a considerable extent of land, and of rights, in the Island, which Sir Gervase Lucas refused to admit; on which they had recourse to force:—this, the Governor conceived to be an act of treason against His Majesty's Government, and declared the lands and rights to be forfeited to the King; a decision which explains the reception and encouragement given to Mr. Cooke by the Jesuits of Bundera; Mr. Gary, therefore, proclaimed Mr. Cooke a traitor, and Sir George Oxinden refused to receive or encourage him at the Factory of Surat. The whole of these parties referred the matters in dispute, by letters, to the King, to the Lord Chancellor, and to the Secretary of State; and Mr. Gary determined to maintain his right to the administration of the Island, till the King's pleasure should be known.

Mr. Gary's  
 Report on the  
 revenues of  
 Bombay.

In making these communications to the King and to the Secretary of State, Mr. Gary transmitted a statement of the revenues of the Island, as improved by Sir Gervase Lucas and himself:—this statement is the more interesting, as it ascertains the value of the grant of Bombay, as made by the King to the East-India Company, and is as follows;

Rent







**CHAP. II.**  
**1667-68.** Court, but for rejecting the propositions of the Agent at Masulipatam, founded on the King's commission, requiring the liberation of Mr. Foxcroft, and the vesting him with the administration at Madras. These orders Sir Edward Winter and his Council treated as gross forgeries, intended to betray them into a dereliction of their duty, and instead of entering into any proofs of such forgeries, returned to the charge against Mr. Foxcroft, of treason to the King; and asserted, that the Company must ascribe the failure in the sale of their exports, particularly the lead, (used for the defence of the Fort) to their having listened to the misrepresentations which had been made of Sir Edward Winter's conduct;—and that, to the same cause, they must ascribe the want of an investment from the Fort this season, it being impracticable to provide one, because Sir George Oxinden had withheld both the stock, and the Court's instructions on that subject; proceedings which had compelled him to send, through His Majesty's Governor at Bombay, information of the actual state of the Company's affairs at the Fort. Under all these difficulties, however, Sir Edward Winter expressed his determination to adhere to his loyalty to the King, and to his duty to the Company, and to resist every attempt which the Dutch might make on the garrison, till he should receive His Majesty's commands, and instructions from the Court of Directors.<sup>(1)</sup>

There

(1)—(Copy.) Proclamation of Captain Gary, Governor of Bombay, against Mr.

EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

There does not remain in the Company's records, any <sup>CH/</sup> document, to shew that the Agent and Council of BANTAM 166<sup>6</sup> had received information, either of the Treaty of Breda, of the grant of Bombay by the King to the Company, or (what was of more importance to them) the enlarged equipment and funds upon which it had been resolved to revive the trade at that place, and at Maccassar, and therefore the situation of the Southern settlements of the Company were, during this season, unknown to the Court.

Foxcroft and his Adherents, at Fort St. George, 9th August 1667.—(East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 244).— Letter from Sir Edward Winter, at Fort St. George, to the Court, 29th October 1667.



## 1668-69.

---

### CHAP. II.

1668-69. Memorial of the Court to the Privy Council, requesting explanations of the Treaty of Breda, and decision of the Council on the subject.

THE relations between England and the Maritime Powers were, at this juncture, constantly varying; and these variations had an influence upon the proceedings of the London East-India Company, both at home and abroad.

The Treaty of Breda, (referred to in the preceding season,) having left the Dutch in possession of the Islands of Polaroon and Damm, and the London Company exposed to encroachments on their settlements, and on their trade, gave rise to new questions, which were not distinctly solved in the terms of the Treaty of Commerce, or "Treaty Marine," between England and the States General. Though the terms regarding Europe, were sufficiently explicit, or "that the produce of Germany, passing by rivers through Holland, was to be deemed the produce of Holland," and though commissioners were to be appointed, to judge on all commercial disputes, and neither of the contracting parties (though they might carry on their commerce freely), were to supply the enemies of the other with naval or military stores, this general provision did not sufficiently apply to the relative circumstances of the English and Dutch, in the East-Indies;—the Court of Directors, therefore, presented a memorial to the Lords Committees for Trade,

on







**CHAP. II.** Surat appointed its Governor, and one of the Council, of his  
 1668-69. selection, Deputy Governor, to reside in Bombay, and to take his instructions and orders from Surat, the measures, which the Court annually prescribed to the President and Council must necessarily precede the subordinate orders which were conveyed, through them, to the Deputy Governor of Bombay and his Council.

The Court, in this season (1668-69), signified to the President and Council of Surat, their determination to persevere in enlarging their system of trade on the West of India, and their opinion, that measures should be taken for re-opening the trade to **PERSIA**.

The equipments intended for Surat amounted to twelve hundred tons of shipping, and the stock, in goods and money, was estimated at £70,000:—this tonnage is subsequently explained to be divided among three ships, and the stock to amount to £75,000, of which the proportion of broad-cloths, (the staple of the kingdom,) was considerable, with orders to make every effort to promote the sale of them:—the other articles were tin, to be sold at prime cost, with simple interest, and a considerable quantity of sheet copper; the remainder in bullion:—it was directed, that the investment should consist of Surat cloths, and as large a proportion as could be obtained, of Malabar Pepper, at the ports of which Coast (Carwar, Calicut, Porcat, &c.) Agencies were to be established, as well as at the other ports of the Native Princes











to build a pinnace, to be manned with intelligent seamen, engaged from the Indiamen, who were to be formed into a class of pilots, whose duty it should be to take charge of the Company's ships up and down the river; it having been found, from experience, that the want of pilots, and of proper charts, pointing out the depths and soundings of the river, had not only exposed the ships to hazard, but the Company to great expences for native pilots: it was to be an instruction to these pilots, to examine the currents, soundings, and general navigation of the river Ganges, up to Hughly; and to render this knowledge more perfect, such of the Captains of the Company's ships, as navigated their vessels with safety, in the Ganges, were to receive ten shillings per ton, as a remuneration.<sup>(1)</sup>

It was left to the discretion of the Agent and Council of Fort St. George, to carry into effect the project of establishing a Factory at Acheen, and to allot a proportion of the stock, in presents to the Government of that place, provided it could be ascertained, that two hundred and fifty, or three hundred tons of pepper could annually be collected at that port:—in return, a larger investment was expected, in Coromandel goods, Bengal produce, and pepper from Acheen.<sup>(2)</sup>

Trade to be revived between the Coast of Coromandel and Acheen.

The

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Factor at Hughly, 20th November 1668.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 26th October 1668.

CHAP. II.  
 1668-69.  
 Equipments  
 and Stock for  
 Bantam en-  
 larged.

The instructions, in 1668-69, and the magnitude of the equipments and stock consigned to BANTAM and to its dependencies, evince that the Court were determined to revive this trade, it being of much importance to their home sales;—with this object, besides the ship which was ordered to proceed from Fort St. George, with a stock of £10,000, two ships, of from four to five hundred tons each, were consigned direct from England to Bantam, with a stock, chiefly in bullion, and some necessary stores, estimated at £25,000, with instructions to the Agents and Councils of Bantam and Jambee, to employ every possible means to obtain the protection of the Chiefs at those ports, and to purchase as large a proportion of pepper as might be practicable, not only to fill up their tonnage, but to be in readiness for two thousand tons of shipping, intended to be annually consigned to them, to connect, as much as circumstances would allow, the trade of Maccassar with that of Bantam. Towards the close of this season, the London, an additional ship, was dispatched to Jambee, with a cargo valued at £10,000, to obtain pepper, but the commander was to avoid giving offence to the King of Bantam, least he might become jealous of the intentions of the English, to remove the trade from Bantam to Jambee:—at the same time, he was ordered to prosecute this trade, at whatever ports it might be practicable, and not to be deterred, by the opposition or menaces of the Dutch.

It



CHAP. II. session of the Chinese), might not facilitate the speculation of  
1668-69. a trade to Japan?

These questions the Court, in this season, appear, in part, to have answered, by ordering a Factor, with a small stock, to be sent to Cambodia, to examine the practicability of establishing a trade between this place and Japan, and also a trade to Manilla and to China.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Island of  
St. Helena  
confirmed by  
Charter to  
the Com-  
pany, and  
Captain  
Stringer ap-  
pointed Go-  
vernor.

In reviewing the Annals of the London Company, during the reign of James I., it was ascertained, that one of their captains having touched at Saldanha Bay, for water and refreshments, had taken possession of the Cape of Good Hope, in the King's name, "to be held by whatever title His Majesty might be pleased to give it;" and this event establishes the prior rights of the Crown of England to those of the Dutch, to the great Promontory of Africa. The civil wars, in the reign of Charles I., having depressed equally the Crown and the Company, no measures were adopted to form an English Colony at the Cape, and the prior rights of the Crown were neglected.

The Dutch, having possessed themselves of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, the London East-India Company, about the year 1651, (after the Dutch had relinquished St. HELENA, and carried the colonists to the Cape), took possession of this Island. King Charles II. confirmed the Company's right to St. Helena, by the Charter of the 3d April 1661, by which

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 10th April 1669.



**CHAP. II.** formed; and, it is worth notice, that in the appointment of  
**1668-69.** Captain Stringer, the captains of the ships who were to act as his temporary council, were twenty-two, which ascertains the number of the Company's regular ships at this period.

The Court, in this season, established the following regulations for the colony at St. Helena:—two hundred acres of land were to be held as the exclusive property of the Company, and to be under the management of the Governor; the remaining lands were to be allotted to the settlers, in the proportion of fifteen acres to each family, and the lands for which settlers could not be found, were to be common, on which the inhabitants, in general, were to have the privilege of pasturage for their cattle, till the Court should be able to form the whole into a regular colony. In a few months, subsequently to this arrangement with Captain Stringer, Captain Coney was appointed Governor, and it was then ordered, (without excepting the Governor) that the settlers should derive their subsistence from their lands only, but be allowed a proportion of cattle and slaves, to accelerate the cultivation of them, and not entitled to require supplies from the Company's ships, but to exchange them for fresh provisions; farther, such passengers in the Company's ships, as might be disposed to settle in the Island, were to have lands allotted to them for cultivation.<sup>(1)</sup>

The

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Governor of the Island of St. Helena, 10th February 1668-69 and 9th March 1669-70.— Commission from the Court, for planting





CHAP. II. from that station, Sir George Oxinden deemed it more prudent  
 1668-69. to employ this armed vessel, mounting eight guns, on a service which he considered would be acceptable to the Mogul Government, or sending her as convoy to the Surat vessels, which annually carried Pilgrims to Judda and Mocha, expecting for this service, the continuance, if not the extension, of the Company's privileges at Surat.

On the return of the Bantam Pink from the Red Sea, the President, the more effectually to meet the Court's orders, dispatched this vessel to the Malabar Coast, as far as Carwar, to take in what pepper and Malabar produce had been collected, to be reladen on board the Company's Europe ships, at Swally.

— with  
 Acheen ;

The Presidency of Surat, having received the Court's orders to establish a Factory at Acheen, to encrease their pepper investment, sent Mr. Matthew Gray, one of their number, to negotiate a treaty with the Queen, on the principle, that if a preference should be given to the English trade at that port, at Tekoo, and at Priaman, he might agree, on the part of the Company, to afford the assistance of the English, in protecting Acheen against the depredations of the Orankayes, or superiors of districts ; and, was ordered to remain twelve months at Acheen, to observe, and report on the practicability of this trade ;—the Pink, however, was to return to Surat, with such quantities of pepper, benjamin, &c., as could be procured, to make part of the investment for Enrope.

The

The Bantam Pink was accompanied to Acheen by the ship Charles, which was to proceed from this port to Quedah, on the Coast of Malacca, and, with the assistance of Mr. Davies, who was appointed Agent at Quedah, to endeavour to obtain tin, for which he was to barter Surat produce: if he could establish a trade at that port, he was to engage, that the Company's ships should annually resort to it:—but if he should find this project impracticable, he was to proceed with the ship Charles to Johore, in the Straits of Singapore, and to try a similar barter in that country.

CHAP. II.  
1668-69.  
—and with  
Quedah.

The transactions, thus, of the Surat Presidency, as far as they regarded the extension of the Company's trade, were confined to expedients only, preparatory to the arrival of their large stock and equipments.<sup>(1)</sup>

The important event of the cession, under the King's Warrant, of the Island of Bombay to the London East-India Company, to be held by them, under the tenure specified in the Letters Patent, took place on the 23d September 1668, Sir George Oxinden having sent a deputation from the Council of Surat to Bombay, to complete this transaction.

Sir George  
Oxinden  
takes possession of Bom-  
bay, in the  
name of the  
Company.

Mr.

(1)—Letter from the President and Council of Surat to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 24th February 1668-69.—Commission from the President and Council of Surat to Mr. Gray, for attempting trade with Acheen, dated 19th April 1669.—Commission from the President and Council of Surat to Mr. Davies, to open trade at Quedah, in Malacca, 25th April 1669.

## CHAP. II.

1668-69. Statements of Governor Gary and the Commissioners from Surat, of the revenues and disbursements of Bombay.

Mr. Gary, on this occasion, delivered over to the Commissioners, a statement, or “account general of His Majesty’s receipt, revenue, and disbursement, of His Island of Bombaim, from the 22d day of May 1667 (the day Mr. Gary took possession of the government, on the death of Sir Gervase Lucas) “to the 23d September 1668, the day it was “transferred to the Honorable East-India Company;” of which the following is an abstract:—

By this statement, Mr. Gary acknowledged to have received, during the time he held the government, for the farms of cocoa-nuts, customs, excise, and tobacco, and the rents of the towns in the Island, the sum of £9,402. 12s. 8½d., which, with the sum of £536. 15s. 1d., recovered from the executor of Sir Gervase Lucas, on the King’s account, and the value of the shipping, houses, cattle, jewels, plate, and ready money, estimated at £1,631. 4s. 0½d., made the whole receipt, during his administration, amount to the sum of £11,570. 11s. 10d.

The disbursements, during the same period, on the King’s account, for pay of the troops, fortifications, repairs of houses, provisions, stable-charges, and contingencies, amounted to the sum of £6,691. 4s. 9d., and there was delivered to the Commissioners, on account of the East-India Company, on the 23d September 1668, shipping, houses, cattle, jewels, plate, and ready money, to the amount of £4,879. 7s. 6d., making

#### EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

making together the sum of £11,570. 11s. 10  
Gary acknowledged to have received.<sup>(1)</sup>

This account of the transfer of the Island from the Crown to the East-India Company, created by a letter from Mr. Gary to Sir Joseph Secretary of State, dated the 5th October 1668, Gary stated, that he had received the King's W<sup>arrant</sup> of cession, on the 21st September 1668, with which he complied, and, on the 23d September, gave the Island to the East-India Company's Council, and added, "that though this unexpected change troubled him," he hoped that Lord Arundell Joseph Williamson "would make the Governor and Council of the East-India Company, sensible of his services, and that he was deserving of remuneration."<sup>(2)</sup>

The account which the Presidency of Surat Court of Directors, of the events and circumstances which had attended the cession of the Island of Bombay to the East-India Company, was, in substance, as follows.

Mr. Goodier, Mr. Master, and Mr. Cote were present at the Council at Surat, and Captain Young, appointed by the Governor of Bombay, were the Commissioners.

(1)—Account of the Receipts and Disbursements of the Island of Bombay, from 1st May 1667, to 3d October 1668. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 258.)

(2)—Letter from Mr. Gary to Sir Joseph Williamson, dated 5th October 1668. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 258.)

CHAP. II. George Oxinden, to require from Mr. Gary, who had suc-  
 1668-69. ceeded Sir Gervase Lucas, the transfer of the Island to the  
 Company:—on their arrival, on the 21st September 1668,  
 these Commissioners addressed a letter to Mr. Gary, in-  
 forming him, that they had to present to him the King's  
 orders, under the Privy Seal, and the Company's commis-  
 sion, for taking possession of the Island:—Mr. Gary fixed  
 the following day for the ceremony:—on the Commissioners  
 landing, the troops were drawn up to receive them with  
 military honors, and then ordered to ground their arms;  
 the King's orders were next read, and Mr. Gary surren-  
 dered the Island, in form:—the troops were then invited  
 to enter into the Company's service, with the same rank and  
 pay, but with permission to such of them as might decline it,  
 to return to England:—the officers and soldiers, in general, ac-  
 cepted the proposition, and became the Company's first military  
 establishment at Bombay:—they consisted of two companies,  
 commanded by captains; the first company comprehended two  
 commissioned officers, sixty-six non-commissioned officers and  
 privates, and twenty-eight topasses; the second, three commis-  
 sioned officers, seventy-three non-commissioned officers and  
 privates, and twenty-six topasses:—the ordnance amounted to  
 twenty-one pieces of cannon, with proportionate stores; but no  
 part of the military were particularly attached to this service,  
 except two gunners. This force, on the first inspection by the  
 Commissioners, was deemed inadequate; for, in their refe-  
 rence





the civil government of it, and to form a code of military regulations for the garrison :—these regulations are prolix in their divisions, but suited to the new circumstances in which Bombay was placed :—they prescribed the duties of the commanding officer, who was the senior captain ; they specified, also, the military duties of the subordinate officers on garrison duty ; and enacted strict discipline, under severe penalties ;—they defined the duties required of the soldiers, both in garrison and in quarters, and those keeping stations and guards ;—they specified the duties of the muster-master, who was to inspect the strength of the corps ; and enjoined a general obedience to all orders proceeding from the civil government. It is remarkable, that in these regulations, the neglect or breach of duty, in the inferior officers, and in the soldiers, was declared to be punishable with death ; and in the superior officers, with deprivation of rank, only.

These regulations were founded on the powers vested in the Company by their Charter, for levying, embodying, and entertaining a military force for the defence of their Factories, or Settlements ; and we shall find their military establishments proceeded upon them, for a long series of years, till King's troops were sent to India, and started the question, how far the Company's troops were competent to hold courts martial, or exercise martial law ?<sup>(1)</sup>

2 I 2

After

(1)—Letter from Mr. Goodier to Sir George Oxinden, 5th January 1668-69. —Laws of War for governing the Company's Militia, 1668-69, (Sarat Letter-Book, vol. lviii. page 91.)



CHAP. II.  
1668-69. After the residence of a month, Sir George Oxinden returned to Surat, leaving the Deputy Governor and his Council to carry into execution the measures which he had devised, and with orders for the sale of lands by proclamation; for completing the fortifications of the castle; letting the tobacco farms and customs, and for establishing, as far as might be practicable, an intercourse with the ports of Sevagee, to obtain timber and chunam (lime) to complete the works.

The Island was next declared to be an asylum to all merchants and manufacturers who might be disposed to place themselves under the English protection:—but this protection could not be given to the weavers, who had come from Chaul to Bombay, till houses could be erected to accommodate them; a street, therefore, was ordered to be built, stretching from the Custom-house to the Fort, the rents of which, it was expected, would soon defray the expences.

The trade of Bombay had been so much exposed to captures by the Malabar pirates, or, in any dispute with Sevagee, by his armed boats, that the Council of Bombay intimated to the Court, it would be necessary to construct three small armed ships, to protect the trade coming to, or going from the Island, and to serve as temporary convoys to the trade to and from the Gulfs of Persia and Arabia.<sup>(1)</sup>

As

(1)—Letters to the President and Council of Surat, 17th and 20th March 1668-69, and 1669. (Surat Letter-Book, vol. lviii. pages 107, 110, 117.)

#### EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

As a preliminary explanation of the events which took place on the COROMANDEL COAST, in the season 1668, it is necessary to state, that the Court had continued the impression, that Sir Edward Winter was still in FORT ST. GEORGE, and that Mr. Foxcroft was a prisoner;—it is also necessary to refer to the conduct of the Agent at Masulipatam, who had persevered in his fidelity to the Company, though he had not been able to induce Sir Edward Winter to return to his duty;—he recollected, that a commission had been issued by Clavell, strengthened by an order from the Council, and a corresponding order from the Court, on his arrival at St. George, to intimate to Sir Edward Winter the orders with which he was vested, and under these, to demand the surrender of the Fort, and to deliver it to the authority.

On the 21st May 1668, the Rainbow and the Rainbow's child arrived in Madras Roads, and, on their arrival, Mr. Proby and Mr. Locke came on board:—on this occasion it was thought expedient to detain them prisoners, and to require Mr. Proby to inform Sir Edward Winter, that he had seen the King's commission, and the orders, to surrender the Fort to the Commissioners, who had arrived to take possession of it, in His Majesty's name, and that three of them would come on shore to receive the answer. Alarmed and embarrassed at this

**CHAP. II.** Edward Winter required, that, previously to any discussion 1668-69. on these orders, Mr. Proby should be set at liberty :—this occasioned delays, demands of personal safety, and protection of property, before he would examine the authority which required him to give up the place. On consultation by the Commissioners, on board, it was agreed to accede to his terms :—they, accordingly, went on shore, and on the 22d August 1668, took possession of the Fort, released Mr. Foxcroft from the imprisonment, in which he had continued from September 1666 to August 1668, and reinstated him as the Company's Agent at Fort St. George.<sup>(1)</sup>

Mr. Foxcroft's report to the Court on this occasion.

Mr. Foxcroft, on his being put in possession of the Fort, acted with a moderation, which must be ascribed rather to a sense of duty, than to his own feelings, after the harsh treatment he had experienced from Sir Edward Winter and his adherents; explaining, that such moderation was necessary to bring back to Madras the native merchants and manufacturers, whom Sir Edward Winter's severities and schemes of private trade had expelled from it. On consultation, Mr. Foxcroft dismissed Mr. Proby from the Company's service, without instituting any prosecution against him, because such a suit might have the effect of alarming those who had been forced into Sir Edward Winter's plans, and induce them to desert their homes and families, or deprive them of the means of subsistence :

(1)—Letter from Mr. Hall, Agent at Manipatam, to the Court, dated 8th December 1668.

subsistence:—Mr. Foxcroft, on consultation, also, stated to CHAP. II.  
the Court, the narrow stock with which Mr. Chuseman had 1668-69.  
come to India, and the large sums which he had amassed, by  
setting up manufactures; and left it to his superiors to take  
decided measures against him on his arrival in England, for  
which he allowed him a passage, along with Smythes, the  
priest, who had been an active instrument in Sir Edward  
Winter's projects.<sup>(1)</sup>

Sir Edward Winter, after delivering up the Fort, went to  
Pullicat, where suspicions were entertained of his connexions  
with the Dutch;—these, with his former violence, made it expe-  
dient, on his return to Madras, to oblige him to reside without  
the Fort, to prevent his again disturbing the tranquillity of the  
garrison:—subsequently, he went to Masulipatam, at which he  
intimated to Mr. Foxcroft his resolution to remain, till he  
should receive advices from England of the reception which  
Chuseman and Smythes might experience, and, of course,  
whether he was to be permitted to return, or be made respon-  
sible for his proceedings.

The investment intended for England, principally Coast  
cloths, was considerable, and the goods and stock required for  
Fort St. George, next season, nearly the same as in the pre-  
ceding years, with the exception of quicksilver and vermillion,  
for which there was little demand; but to re-establish the  
Company's

(1)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Fort St. George to the Court, 12th  
November 1668.

CHAP. II. Company's influence, a stock would be required of £100,000,  
 1668-69. both to render Madras the seat of their trade on the Coromandel Coast, and to recall the native weavers to live under the English protection.

Mr. Foxcroft farther stated to the Court, that the writers and apprentices which had been appointed, were youths, who, from having received a good education at Christ's Hospital, promised, from their industry and morals, to become useful servants.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Agent at  
 Hugly re-  
 commends a  
 direct trade  
 between Ben-  
 gal and Eng-  
 land.

The circumstances of the Factories in BENGAL, and their subordination to Fort St. George, had occasioned difficulties in executing the commercial orders, partly arising from the stock in the Bay not being equal to the investment of salt-petre, silks, &c., expected from it, and partly from the Agents not being able to obtain credit for £10,000, by drafts on the Court, and, from the time required by the Company's ships to come from the Bay to Masulipatam, to complete their cargoes, the Agent at Hugly suggested, that the investments in Bengal should be sent direct to Europe,—a plan which could not be complied with, unless the Court should furnish enlarged stock and shipping.<sup>(2)</sup>

The

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Council at Madras to the Court, 23d and 29th January 1668-69.

(2)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Madras to the Court, 13th April 1669.

The Company's affairs at BANTAM, in 1668-69, had been affected by the capture of Maccassar by the Dutch, which had rendered it impracticable for the Agent and Council to carry the Court's order, for extending the trade, into execution ;—for, on the one hand, the King of Bantam, under religious prejudices, considered it to be his duty to go to war with the Christians once in ten years, and had commenced hostilities against the Dutch ;—and, on the other hand, the President and Council of Bantam explained, that those hostilities had prevented their obtaining new privileges for the English trade ; but that they had purchased a large assortment of pepper, though not of the best kind, to fill up whatever tonnage might arrive from England, in the subsequent season.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.

1668-69.

State of trade  
at Bantam

(1)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Bantam to the Court, 14th November 1668.

## 1669-70.

---

### CHAP. II.

1669-70. Company present a memorial to the Council, on the Dutch evasions of the Treaty of Breda.

THE decision of the King and Privy Council, of the 15th July 1668, on the explanations required in the Treaty Marine with Holland, it was mentioned, had been communicated to the States General by Sir William Temple, who had proceeded to Holland as the King's Ambassador; it appears, however, that great difficulties had been thrown in the way of an arrangement by the States General, and by the Pensionary De Witt:—the communications, therefore, from Sir William Temple to the King, were transmitted to the Court of Directors, for their information. After taking the subject into consideration, the Court addressed a memorial, on the 2d July 1669, to Lord Arlington and Mr. Trevor, the Principal Secretaries of State, in which they submitted, that, after an attentive perusal of Sir William Temple's dispatches, they had great reason to doubt the intentions of the Dutch in this negotiation; for, notwithstanding the arguments which had been urged, on behalf of the London East-India Company, the Dutch still adhered to their old system of engrossing the whole commerce of the Indies; and, notwithstanding the explanation which the States General had given, of the manner in which trade was to be carried on,

on, in a town "besieged, blocked up, or invested," yet both De Witt and Van Beuninghen affirmed, that a general article, to that effect, in the treaty, could not be expected, unless it contained restrictions, that it should not prejudice any acquisitions the Dutch had made, or might make, in the Indies; which would leave the dispute as open as before, and afford pretences to the Dutch continually to interrupt the English trade;—therefore that, under all circumstances, the East-India Company could not recommend to His Majesty to accept of any terms, which would deprive the English of the trade to India, and that the only expedient they could devise, was again strongly to press for the confirmation of the articles formerly transmitted by Lord Arlington to Sir William Temple, the greater part of which had been agreed to by the States General, though objected to by De Witt and the Chamber of Amsterdam.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1669-70.

The long continued opposition of the Dutch to the progress of the London East-India Company, and to their trade, could not, notwithstanding the interference of the King with the States, be brought to a fair and liberal system, and the Company could not but be shackled, in their proceedings, by the experience of the subterfuges and violence of a rival, whose fixed object it had been to exclude, not only

System of administration at Surat new modelled.

2 K 2

the

(1)—Memorial of the East-India Company to Lord Arlington and Mr. Secretary Trevor, relative to the negotiations with the Dutch, dated 2d July 1669. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 260.)



CHAP. II. the English, but the maritime powers in general, from a par-  
 1669-70. ticipation in the trade to the East-Indies:—The Court, in  
 this year, however, (though they had not received the re-  
 turns they expected, from the large stock and tonnage which  
 they had dispatched in the preceding season,) were determin-  
 ed to persevere in encreasing the trade, that they might  
 counterbalance the Dutch in the Eastern markets, and pre-  
 occupy them, before the French Company should have an  
 opportunity to establish Factories, or to form connexions with  
 the Native Chiefs or Merchants, sufficient to raise them to  
 become an additional rival.

To give consistency to their Factories and trade, the  
 Court, appear to have had in view the following objects:—  
 the first was, to vest the administration of their affairs in  
 a President and general Council, because, though the great  
 knowledge and experience of Sir George Oxinden was a sufficient  
 security to the Company's interests, it would not be wise, in fu-  
 ture, to depend on the talents of an individual; the Court, there-  
 fore, appointed Sir George Oxinden to be President at SURAT,  
 with a Council of Eight, viz. Mr. Gerald Aungier, Mr. Matthew  
 Gray, Mr. Thomas Rolt, Mr. Henry Young, Mr. Streynsham  
 Master, Mr. Charles James, Mr. Philip Gifford, and Mr.  
 Alexander Grigsby, five of whom were constantly to reside  
 at Surat, particularly Mr. Aungier, Mr. Gray, and Mr. James.  
 This plan merits particular notice, from being the first example  
 of

of a regular constitution, with checks, in the Company's Foreign dependencies.

CHAP. II.  
1669-70.

The Court, in the second place, recommended the opening trade to Manilla, by an application to the Spanish Governor, for permission to English ships to enter the seas of the farther Indies, under licence of a European Maritime Power :—As the Dutch had wrested the Spice Islands from Spain, while Portugal was annexed to that Crown, it was hoped that, independently of the imports to and exports from them, the Manillas would afford the English an opportunity of extending their trade to those distant seas :—the Court, by this expedient, preferred a licence of this kind to a general freedom of trade, such freedom being liable to interruption by the Dutch, who would not oppose an order of the King of Spain, for the English to trade to the Spanish settlements.

Commercial instructions to Surat, on the Persian and Southern markets.

The Court also countermanded the provision of the cargo for Bantam, and required that the Surat articles intended for it, should be sent to Europe

Alarmed, on hearing of the magnitude of the French exports on three ships that had arrived in India, and that eight more were to be sent this season, the Court gave instructions to the Presidency of Surat, to avoid disputes with them, but not to give encouragement to the establishment of a trade, which might involve the Company in difficult political and commercial discussions.

The Court then took into consideration the intercourse  
with

CHAP. II. with PERSIA, which they ordered should be kept open, and  
 1669-70. desired the opinions of the Presidency on the naval force that would be necessary, to protect the Persian trade, or to compel that power to the observance of treaties; but recommended, that in the employment of this force, care should be taken, not to interfere with the ships of the Indian Powers, in whose dominions the Company had Factories, because, however trivial the subjects of complaint, it might be difficult and expensive to adjust them.

Regulations  
 of the Court,  
 for the ma-  
 rine and mi-  
 litary esta-  
 blishments at  
 Bombay.

When the Court of Directors took into consideration the report of the Presidency of Surat, of the events which had attended the taking possession of the Island of BOMBAY, and the appointment of Captain Young to be the Deputy Governor, they came to the following resolutions on this subject :—With respect to the building of vessels for the defence of the Island, they appointed Mr. Warwick Pett to proceed to Bombay, and to construct two vessels, for which equipments and stores would be sent on the ships of the season, explaining, that their reason for appointing Mr. Pett was his practical knowledge of ship-building, in which he could instruct the settlers, to the advantage of the Island.<sup>(1)</sup> They next appointed Captain Smith and Captain Tolderey, two of the officers commanding the military at Bombay to act as engineers,

(1)—(Note.) It is probable, that this Mr. Warwick Pett was a descendant of Sir Phineas Pett, celebrated for his extraordinary talents in marine architecture, in the reigns of Elizabeth and James I.



**CHAP. II.** brought from the neighbouring continent, and, if possible, to  
 1669-70. render such cloths a fabric of the Island:—the inhabitants were to be allowed a moderate toleration; but the claims of the Jesuits, though admissible by the Portuguese usages, were not to be held valid in an English settlement.<sup>(1)</sup>

Equipments  
and stock for  
Surat.

The equipments for Surat and its dependencies, in this season, amounted to 1500 tons of shipping, and the stock, including goods and money, was estimated at £100,000;—the goods expected in return, were large quantities of Surat cloths, indigo, &c., ordered to be in store for the ships on their arrival:—A ship of three hundred tons was, at the beginning of the season, intended to be sent to Surat, with a stock, to provide goods for the Bantam market; but, after hearing of the seizure of Maccassar by the Dutch, this destination was altered, and the ship, with the goods intended for Bantam, ordered to proceed direct to Surat.<sup>(2)</sup>


Mr. Foxcroft  
re-appointed  
Agent at  
Fort St.  
George, for  
one year, and  
to be succeed-  
ed by Sir  
William  
Langborne.

The Court, in this season, received intelligence, that **FORT ST. GEORGE** had been delivered to the Commissioners by Sir Edward Winter and his Council, in obedience to the King's, and to the Company's orders. Though they condemned the whole of Sir Edward Winter's conduct, while he retained possession of the Fort, and excluded Mr. Foxcroft from the station to which he had

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 2d August 1669, and 17th February 1669-70,

(2)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 2d August 1669, and 16th February 1669-70.

had been appointed, their opinions appear to have undergone a material change, on receiving fuller information of the case; and this change was also observable in the King and Privy Council :—whether it proceeded from the information given by Mr. Chuseman and Mr. Smythes, on their arrival in England, or whether it originated in the prudent expedient, of removing not only Sir Edward Winter and his partizans, but Mr. Foxcroft and his adherents, to make way for a new Agent and Council, unconnected with either, it is perhaps unnecessary to enquire; but that this was the resolution of the Court, appears from the appointment of Sir William Langhorne, and six other persons, some of whom were already in the service in India, and others sent from Europe, to act as Commissioners for investigating the whole of this transaction :—These Commissioners were to continue Mr. Foxcroft as Agent, at the head of the Council, for one year, after which he was to be succeeded by Sir William Langhorne :—Sir Edward Winter was allowed to remain at Madras, for a short time, to recover his debts, and then to come to Europe ;—Mr. Foxcroft, the younger, was also to be sent home. These measures were in conformity with an order of the Privy Council, confirming the new appointments, and requiring obedience to the persons, nominated Commissioners, who were to transmit the whole evidence respecting this transaction, for the information of the King and of the Court.



views ; and not to interfere in any disputes between them and the Dutch, but always to remain neuter.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1669-70.

The general orders of the Court to the Factory of MASULIPATAM have been, in substance, mentioned, but, in particular, the contract for saltpetre was to be discontinued, as it could be procured of better quality, and cheaper, in Bengal ; and this Agency was to direct its attention to the selection of cloths suited to the Bantam market.

Court's orders to the Agents at Masulipatam, Bengal, and Bantam.

The orders to HUGHLY corresponded with those to the Fort and to Masulipatam :—the Chiefs at Patna and Cossimbuzar were to be of Council, when they were at Hughly, and the Factory at Ballasore was to be kept up.<sup>(2)</sup>

The instructions, in 1669-70, to BANTAM, discover, that the Court, though doubtful of the safety of this Agency, as well as of the returns which might be obtained from it, equipped four ships, with an investment valued at £31,000 ; an amount, which proves that this trade was of great importance, the Court requiring, that as large a quantity as could be procured, both of black and white pepper, and a proportion of ginger and sapan-wood, should form the home investment. Still doubtful of the intentions of the French ships, the Court ordered their own to keep in company, for defence

2 L 2

against

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 7th December 1669, and 16th February 1669-70.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Chiefs and Factors at Masulipatam and Hughly, 7th December 1669:











CHAP. II.  
1669-70. On the reference which the Court had made, for information on the practicability of a trade to Japan and Manilla, the President stated, that himself and Council were as yet unable to collect facts; but that an experiment was making, by Cojah Meenas, who had sent a vessel, partly with Europe produce, to attempt a trade at Manilla, the result of which adventure should be subsequently communicated.

The commercial situation of SURAT, at this juncture, was affected by an unexpected event :—the Mogul had banished the Shroffs and Banians, on account of some religious dispute; this materially injured the Company's trade at that city, because those Shroffs were calling in the money, which it was their practice, on such occasions, to conceal and bury, till better times should enable them to employ it; and because they were the persons who took off the Company's Europe exports, in large quantities, and advanced money to them on interest, when the stock from Europe was not equal to the provision of the investment for the expected shipping: the Council therefore suggested, that should these unfavorable proceedings of the Government continue, it might be for consideration of the Court, whether the Presidency should be removed from Surat to Bombay, to which Island produce and manufactures might be brought from Carwar, Billiapatam, &c., of quality better suited to the Company's demands and circuitous exchanges, than to Surat; but that such change of commercial dealings must be gradual, and acted on with  
much

much caution, lest the alarm it would occasion to the Mogul Government, might produce measures, unfavorable to the existing commercial rights of the Company, in that quarter of their limits.

With these explanations, the Presidency proceeded to state the kinds of Europe goods which they expected would find a sale in the Surat market in the ensuing season, *vis.* broad-cloths of close texture, chiefly red and green; as large a proportion of copper as could be procured; tin, in small pigs, but not in blocks; lead and allum, in considerable quantities; vermilion and quicksilver, a small proportion only, as the market did not answer; and some elephants' teeth of good quality.<sup>(1)</sup>

The circumstances which have been alluded to, respecting the restraints improvidently laid on the Shroffs and Banians, connected with the alarm which soon afterwards took place at Surat, of an attack by Sevagee, were explained to proceed from a supposed union between this Chief and Sultan Mauzim, the Emperor's son, who commanded the Mogul army, intended to act against him;—on this occasion the Dutch and French, as well as the English Factories, were put in a state of defence. It was to this alarm that Mr. Aungier refers the uncertainty under which he and his Council were placed, both in making

Difficulty of procuring Indian produce, from the apprehension of another attack by Sevagee.

VOL. II. 2 M the

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 26th November and 23d December 1689.







CHAP. II. means which could preserve this right to the Company, or  
 1669-70. acquire for them a proportion of the trade.<sup>(1)</sup>

Report of  
 the Deputy  
 Governor of  
 Bombay on  
 the state of  
 the Island.

The Deputy Governor of BOMBAY, during the season 1669-70, reported to the Court, that the fortifications were improved, that the garrison required a supply of recruits, and accommodation for the soldiers and the families of settlers, who had arrived in the ships from Europe ;—that application had been made by the Siddee of Rajahpore (which he described to be an impregnable fortress, unless attacked by sea) for an asylum at Bombay, in case he should be obliged to abandon it to Sevagee :—this application occasioned considerable embarrassment, as, on the one hand, it might offend Sevagee, and, on the other, the Mogul, to whom the Siddee of Rajahpore owed allegiance ; the Deputy Governor, therefore, submitted, that as Rajahpore had formerly been deemed an object of importance to the Company, because, with a small European garrison, it could hold out against any attack, either of Sevagee or the Mogul, it might be prudent, under the present circumstances, to get possession of it, as it would place the Company's trade and shipping in a better situation than they were at Bombay, or even at Surat.<sup>(2)</sup>

Mr.

(1)—Letters from the Agent at Gombroon to the Court, February 1669-70, and 15th June 1670.

(2)—Letters from Bombay to the Presidency of Surat, 4th August, 6th and 16th October, and 2d November 1669. (Surat Letter-Book, vol. lviii., pages 123, 146, 151, 153.)





President Aungier, on his arrival at Bombay, after investigating the accusations against Captain Young, published the Company's regulations for the civil and military administration of the Island, and formed two Courts of Judicature; the inferior court to consist of a Company's civil officer, assisted by native officers, who were to take cognizance of all disputes under the amount of two hundred xeraphins; and the superior court, to consist of the Deputy Governor and Council, to whom appeals were competent from the inferior court, to take cognizance of all civil and criminal cases whatever; and their decisions were to be final, and without appeal, except in cases of the greatest necessity:—these courts were to meet regularly once a week:—he next reduced the military establishment from two to one company, but made provision for the supernumeraries, till this small establishment should be brought into form:—he appointed a supervisor of the fortifications, and an accountant to keep regular books of the expenditure:—the exemption from taxes for five years, recommended by the Court, to encourage the merchants and manufacturers, Governor Aungier, without receding from the principle, modified, by continuing the old customs on the produce of the Island, or cocoa-nuts, and coir used as cordage, and on wine, arrack, opium, and tobacco; but he exempted bullion, and the goods specified in the Court's order, from all customs; and,

to

take charge of the Company's affairs at Surat, during the absence of the President at Bombay, 11th January 1669-70.

CHAP. II.

1669-70.

**CHAP. II.** to cover the loss of revenue, imposed a port-duty of one per  
**1669-70.** cent. The result of this survey was, that the amount of the revenues from the lands had been over-rated, by the large proportion of them claimed and retained by the Jesuits; but the amount of the lesser inland customs had been under-rated, because, when put up to sale, they had produced £200 more in this, than in the preceding year:—with regard to the projected town, the expences incurred in erecting the fort had rendered it a subject for future consideration; and as the claims for rights to lands near the town, had been numerous, he had removed the fishermen to some distance, and intended to build houses on the ground where their huts stood; but it would require time to adjust the foundations of the rights to lands, before houses for the settlers and merchants could be erected.

Mr. Gray appointed Deputy Governor of Bombay.

Having, by these regulations, formed a plan for the administration of Bombay, President Aungier appointed Mr. Matthew Gray, lately returned from Acheen, to be Deputy Governor, with three Members of Council:—Mr. Gray and the three military officers were to constitute a court for administering martial law. Mr. Aungier returned to Surat on the 11th March 1669-70, which he found in great alarm, from a threatened invasion by Sevagee.<sup>(1)</sup>

Fort St. George besieged by the Naig; but

The transactions at **FORT ST. GEORGE**, during the season 1669-70, were few, and limited in their objects. The experiment made,

(1)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 30th March 1670.

made, under the instructions of the Court, to open a communication between Madras and Acheen, in consequence of the invitation of the Queen, had been tried, but the project had been relinquished, because an annual cargo of pepper for a ship of two hundred and fifty tons could not be procured at this port, and because Coast goods, suited to that market, could not be sold but at a loss;—for similar reasons, the project of a Factory and trade at Quedah had been abandoned.

CHAP. II.  
1669-70.  
siege raised,  
on applica-  
tion to the  
Nabob.

The Fort, during this season, had been besieged, in consequence of the refusal of a present to the Naig commanding in the neighbourhood; but, on an application to the Nabob, this Chief had been ordered to withdraw his troops.

From the number of the shipping which had arrived, both in the last and present season, the stock, amounting to £150,000, had been invested in Coast goods at Madras and subordinate Factories, and the ship intended for Bantam and Jambee, dispatched with the requisite funds, and Coast goods, for those markets.<sup>(1)</sup>

State of trade  
at Madras;

The stock which the Agent and Council in BENGAL had received, had enabled them to provide a full proportion of saltpetre, taffaties, &c., for filling up the Coast and Europe investments; and though considerable purchases of these articles had been effected at Patna and Cossimbuzar, it was necessary

VOL. II.

2 N

to

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Council at Fort St. George to the Presidency of Surat, 17th October 1669. (Surat Letter-Book, vol. lviii, page 182); 24th January 1669-70, and 9th July 1670 (Surat Letter-Book, vol. lx, pages 49—101).

CHAP. II. to continue the seat of trade at Hughly, which was better  
 1669-70. situated for the speedy dispatch of the Company's shipping.<sup>(1)</sup>

and at Bantam.

The circumstances of BANTAM varied with the public events in this year :—during the war, the Dutch had engrossed the pepper trade, not only at Bantam, but on the West Coast of Sumatra, and had also, by the war at Maccassar, prevented imports between that place and Macao and Manilla; hence, after the exchanges for Europe, Surat, and Coromandel goods had been checked, the decline of trade at Bantam became inevitable.

When accounts reached Bantam of the peace with the Dutch, and of the increased stock intended for that Agency, the trade again had revived, and measures had been adopted for fulfilling the general agreement of the Company with the King of Bantam, to take off the whole of the pepper which his dominions yielded; but the stock which had been received not being sufficient, the Agent had been obliged to take up money at interest, to purchase this pepper, otherwise it must have been sold to the Dutch:—this credit was indispensable, to counteract an opinion, which would have injured the Company's trade, or that the plan of again enlarging the trade was abandoned; the Agent, therefore, desired the Presidency of Surat to send him a full stock, to uphold the Company's credit in the

(1)—General Letter from the Agent and Factors at Ballasore to the Court, 31st December 1669.

the market, and to enable him to encrease the quantity of pepper required for Europe.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1669-70.

The Dutch continued the war against the Native Powers ; and had subjugated the King of Maccassar, and rendered him, as far as affected trade, their vassal ;—they had made large demands on the King of Jambee, and threatened him also with subjugation, at a time when he was at war with the King of Johore ;—they were negotiating with the Matteram, or Emperor of Java, and, in fact, would acquire the monopoly of the whole South Sea trade, unless a large stock was remitted to the Agent and Council at Bantam, to bear up against these competitors, who had the advantage of a Double Stock, one part of which they employed in the investment of the present, and the other in that of the subsequent year ; and, indeed, without such a stock, it would be impracticable to preserve, even the proportion of the pepper trade which the Company held, more particularly when it should be known to the Court, that the Dutch, in this season (1669-70), expected no less than fifty-two ships from Europe.<sup>(2)</sup>

## 2 N 2

(1)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Bantam to the Presidency of Surat, 30th May 1669. (Surat Letter-Book, vol. lviii, page 133).

(2)—Letter from the Agent and Council of Bantam to the Presidency of Surat, 8th September 1669. (Surat Letter-Book, vol. lx, page 26).





of the French Company, as this might become the source of CHAP. II. disputes, might give them an opportunity of being acquainted 1670-71. with the Company's commercial interests, and enable them to devise expedients, to counteract the resolutions of the Court, and the measures of their servants abroad, for enlarging the trade.

The Court farther directed the Presidency of SURAT to avoid shewing partiality to any of the Country Powers, because this would necessarily expose them to oppressions from the prevailing party:—at the same time, they were to take every measure which they could devise, for conciliating the favor of Sevagee, who, at this time, was understood to be at the head of a powerful army.

As an additional general instruction, the Court ordered that their Presidencies and Agencies should, in future, observe the following plan, in their correspondence with the Court, viz. to treat separately of their commercial or other interests, and, in like manner, of those of each Factory or Station, but not (as had been the practice) to blend the whole of these subjects together, in one general description; farther, that *General Letters*, only, would be received as authentic information, from their principal Settlement, and prohibited individuals, in future, to write to the Court, which tended only to excite jealousies and disputes among their servants.<sup>(1)</sup>

The

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 22d February 1670-71.

## CHAP. II.

1670-71.

Mr. Aungier's provisional appointment, as President, confirmed.

The Court confirmed Mr. Aungier in the rank of President of Surat, and instructed him to relinquish the project of a trade between Surat, Acheen, and Quedah, as they intended to give directions to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, to try what could be done at those ports, by sending small country vessels from the Coromandel Coast, to purchase and collect such produce as they could furnish.<sup>(1)</sup>

Equipments and stock for Surat.

Five ships were this season consigned to Surat and its dependencies, amounting to about two thousand tons:—the cargoes were estimated, in goods and money, at £100,000:—the goods consisted chiefly of broad-cloths, (to be disposed of at such prices, above prime cost, as they would bring,) and of a large proportion of copper, lead, corals, and foreign silver coin, and one valuable chest of gold ducats:—the investment expected in return, was to consist of different kinds of Surat cloths, indigo, and such proportion of goods as might be obtained from the Gulfs of Persia and Arabia.<sup>(2)</sup>

Regulations for settling the Government of Bombay, for increasing the garrison, and erecting a mint.

The Court next took into consideration the information which they had received of the state of their affairs in the ISLAND OF BOMBAY, and expressed their approbation of the conduct of President Aungier, of the Deputy Governor and Council of that Island, and desired, that the plan of government, and civil and military administration, which they had

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 11th August 1670.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 11th August 1670, and 22d February 1670-71.

had established, should be followed up, as much as circumstances would allow; explaining, that care should be taken, that Trial by Jury should be introduced into the Courts of Justice, agreeably to English law, but declined engaging a Judge, versed in the civil law, being apprehensive that such a person might be disposed to promote litigation, and probably might not obey the orders which the President and Council might find it for the interest of the Company to give him; it had, therefore, been resolved to send some persons, who had received education in the law, as civil servants, without making the practice of the law their only object, and if they deserved well, they might be appealed to, as assistants in the Courts of Justice. CHAP. II.  
1670-71.

For the better defence of the Island, Captain Shaxton had been ordered to embark with a company of soldiers, which would make the establishment consist of two companies:—from Captain Shaxton's good character, he was also appointed to be a Factor, that he might combine his military with his civil duties; and if his qualifications should, on trial, recommend him as a fit person, he might afterwards hold the office of Deputy Governor. The Court farther recommended, that a mint should be established at Bombay, for coining gold and silver money, and, subsequently, small copper money; but the impression on such coins must not bear any resemblance to the King's coin, and be such only as would render them current at the places where the Company traded;



tions which might be given to the transit of goods to the Fort CHAP. II.  
1670-71. would cut off the sources of investments, and because the expence of armed vessels, stationed in the Indian Seas, would exceed any influence which might arise from adopting a scheme, that would render ineffectual the grants which had hitherto been obtained by bribes, or mercantile submission.

The equipments intended for Fort St. George, this season, were five ships, amounting to about seventeen hundred tons; Equipments  
and stock for  
Fort St.  
George.—one of them was to be dispatched with a stock to Jambee (the trade with Acheen being relinquished), three were to proceed to Bengal, and one direct from the Coast to England:—the stock on these ships was estimated at about £155,000, consisting chiefly of gold and silver, (without any additional orders respecting coinage), and of broad-cloths, lead, &c. These vessels were to be dispatched to their destination, as soon as they might arrive. (1)

This stock, besides being intended to procure a great investment, was sent to counteract the large imports of the Dutch, and the partial assortments of the French, Danes, and Portuguese, in the Europe market, that the balance of trade might be in favor of the English Company. In the purchase of this investment, the sale of the British exports was to be pushed as far as practicable, even with a moderate profit, the amount of which, with the large propor-

VOL. II.

2 O

tion

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 29th November 1670, and 22d February 1670-71.



the Court were resolved again to attempt it, and intended to dispatch the Advance frigate, in a subsequent period of the season, on this service; this vessel sailed in December following, with orders, if she should be too late in arriving at Japan, that the Factors, and a person versed in the Malay language, should proceed to Formosa, or Cambodia, and there attempt to fix stations; the goods sent were estimated at £5,300, and varied in quality from those which had hitherto been selected, either for India, or for the Islands, and included a stock of about £2,000 in silver, with a small proportion of broad-cloth, and lead, but consisted chiefly of cases of looking-glasses, wax figures, hardware, &c., suited to a traffic with a people, who were to give their produce by barter, for novelties, rather than for value.<sup>(1)</sup>

At the close of this season, four more vessels were dispatched to Bantam, with a stock of about £26,000, and assurances given, that large equipments and stock would be sent in the subsequent season, for which cargoes of pepper, &c., were required to be provided. As the Court had received information of the "disorderly character of the people" at Cambodia, it was recommended, if such information should be justified by facts, rather to attempt the establishment of a trade at Tonquin.<sup>(2)</sup>

Additional  
equipments  
and stock for  
Bantam.

2 O 2

The

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council of Bantam, 4th October and 24th December 1670.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 18th January 1670-71, and 7th April 1671.





of distant nations, by the amount of the sums paid to conciliate their favour:—though the markets of Surat had been favourable for the sales of the Company's cloths and Europe produce, this sale had arisen from the contingency of the French and Dutch ships not having arrived, to produce a competition:—the subordinate Factory of Billiapatam had been productive; but the French had established Factories at Durmapatam, in its neighbourhood, at Rajahpore, and at Mergee, near Carwar.

In this situation of the Company's commercial interests at Surat, Sevagee entered the city, on the 3d October 1670, and pillaged it of immense treasure. Mr. Master, one of the Council, was sent with a party of seamen from Swally, to defend the Company's house at Surat:—the French and Dutch Factories, also, stood on their defence; the former, however, compounded with Sevagee, and furnished his troops with the means of carrying the Persian Factory, though defended by a Tartar Prince (styled the King of Cascar) who had returned, by the way of Surat, from a pilgrimage to Mecca. The Dutch, from their supposed force, remained unattacked:—the English Factory made repeated and successful resistance, which produced conferences with Sevagee, in which he endeavoured to persuade the Agent to return and trade at Rajahpore. Though the Company's house held out, some men and goods in their detached warehouses were lost; but the most valuable part of their property had

CHAP. II.

1670-71.

**CHAP. II.** had been sent to Swally, or put on board the ships, on the  
**1670-71.** first report of Sevagee's approach.

Trade precarious from this event, and from the attempts of the French to establish a Factory.

This event having rendered the trade at Surat precarious, the President and Council inferred, that many of the merchants and Banians would resort to Bombay, as soon as they should be satisfied that the fortifications and garrison were sufficiently strong to protect them and their property, and therefore recommended this object to the immediate attention of the Court. <sup>(1)</sup>

As the season advanced apprehensions were felt of another attack by Sevagee's army, which obliged President Aungier again to postpone his visit to Bombay, because the Governor of Surat had intimated to him his jealousy of the intention of the English to draw the trade to Bombay, and because the French, at this time, were projecting the establishment of a Factory at Surat, at which three ships of that nation had arrived, with a pretended stock of £50,000, and also, because the Dutch might take this opportunity to monopolize the Surat trade.

State of trade at the subordinate stations to Surat.

The Factories dependant on Surat were, in this season, in improving circumstances, particularly Carwar and Cannanore. The Chief, or Prince of Billiapatam, had offered to the President his friendship and the trade of his country; this subject was, therefore, referred to the Court, as well as the expediency

(1)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 20th November 1670, and Postscript, of the 15th December following.— Letter of 19th December 1670.













**CHAP. II.** was stipulated, that the Company should pay annually, in lieu  
**1670-71.** of all duties, 4,000 rials per annum, and that their ships, vessels, and junks, should have, without any duties imposed on them, a free export and import trade, reserving only to the King the established duties on pepper; and that opium should have a free import, but be sold at the custom-house only, and not in the towns, or at any other place, under the penalty of being forfeited: provided that all military stores, imported by the English, should be offered for sale to the King exclusively.<sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Copy of Agreement between Agent Dacres and the Sultan of Bantam, 29th March 1671. (Vol. xxvii, No. 2555).

1671-72.

THE measures of the Directors for their trade, in CHAP. II.  
the season 1671-72, were affected by the preparations of 1671-72.  
France, Holland, and England, which threatened a war in  
Europe:—these appearances necessarily obliged the Court to  
vary their equipments and stock, as they were unable to  
conjecture, either what were the objects of the war, or of the  
maritime alliances or oppositions by which their trade might be  
affected.

*Instructions  
of the Court  
to Surat, on  
the probabili-  
ty of a war in  
Europe, and  
equipments  
and stock li-  
mited; in ex-  
pectation of  
that event.*

At the opening of the season, it was intimated to the Presidency of SURAT, that the Court had resolved to extend their trade, by trying exchanges between India and the countries bordering on the China Seas; and with this view, they had taken up sixteen hundred tons of shipping, exclusive of two vessels, which were to proceed, first to Surat, and then to Bantam, to make an experiment of trade with Tonquin, Formosa, and Japan:—the vessel intended for Japan was to be furnished with a stock, estimated at £14,000, and to take in a part of her assortment at Surat, for the place of her ultimate destination.

After the events in Europe assumed that aspect, which impressed the Court with the opinion, that war was probable,

**CHAP. II.** probable, they limited the equipments to Surat to four ships, 1670-71. with a stock, in goods (chiefly cloths) and bullion, estimated at £85,000, and postponed the plan of dispatching a ship from England, direct to Bantam, and thence to the China Seas, till the relations of the European nations should be positively ascertained, or the war become certain, for it would not have been prudent to detach a vessel, with a valuable stock, from the Surat trade, on a speculation liable to so many hazards. On reviewing, also, the information from Surat, of the relative circumstances of the Mogul and of Sevagee, it was resolved, as the most effectual means of conciliating this Chief, to resettle the Factory at Rajah-pore.<sup>(1)</sup>

Court's regulations for Bombay.

The Court, on examining the report on the plans for rendering the Island of BOMBAY sufficiently strong to resist any enemy, approved of the appointment of Mr. Gyfford to be Deputy Governor, and of Captain Herman Bake to be Engineer and Surveyor General, and instructed the President and Council of Surat to examine and approve of all plans, before they should be carried into execution :—and to strengthen the garrison, one hundred and fifty soldiers had been embarked, and a proportion would annually be engaged. As it had been found difficult to arrange the

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council at Surat, 23d June 1671, and 15th March 1671-72.

the duties and customs exacted at Tannah and Caranjah, with the Crown of Portugal, it was left to the discretion of the President and Council of Surat, to adjust this business, if possible, by offering concessions, on the part of the Company, and requiring reciprocal concessions from the Viceroy of Goa. CHAP. II.  
1671-72.

The Company's four regular ships were to be dispatched as a fleet, with orders not to touch at the Cape of Good Hope, and to be on their guard, on approaching St. Helena, to prevent any risk of capture.<sup>(1)</sup>

From the distracted state of the government of PERSIA, at this juncture, and from the probability of a war with the Dutch, the President and Council of Surat were instructed to limit the trade between Surat and that country, to appearances only, that the Company's rights of trade, which had formerly been granted to them, and their moiety of the Customs at Gombroon, might be preserved; but not to engage in any commercial speculation, or expect profit from this trade.<sup>(2)</sup>

The Court, on reviewing the information on the state of their affairs at FORT ST. GEORGE, and particularly of the strength of the garrison, authorised the Agent and Council to engage Directions  
for encreas-  
ing the gar-  
rison at Fort  
St. George.

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council at Surat, 15th March 1671-72.— Letter from the Court to the Deputy Governor at Bombay, 15th March 1671-72.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Chief and Factors at Gombroon, 23d June 1671, and 15th March 1671-72.



The instructions for the subordinate Factory at MASULIPATAM required, that this trade should be extended, and that one-half of the goods sold at this station should be English woollens; but, in providing accommodation for the Factors, on this encreased scale of trade, the sum, to be annually expended in buildings, should not exceed six hundred pagodas.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1671-72.

The separate instructions to the Factory at HUGHLY ordered that £5,000 should be annually invested in silk, for the Japan trade; but the principal assortment should be of taffaties and Bengal muslins, for the home sales.<sup>(2)</sup>

The Court, on taking into consideration the report which they had received from BANTAM, during the season 1671-72, decided that this port should become the centre of trade for the exports from Europe, from Surat, and from the Coast; and, as such, enable the Company to prosecute schemes of a circuitous trade to Tonquin, Formosa, and Japan, the equipments and stock were therefore formed on a more enlarged scale, and, for the first time, we discover the intentions of the Court to open an indirect, if it should not be practicable to establish a direct trade to CHINA. Excluded from the Spice Islands by the Dutch, and rivalled and frequently borne down by them, in the pepper trade at Java and Sumatra, it was re-

Equipments and stock for Bantam, and instructions to attempt trade at China, Tonquin, Tywan, and Japan.

VOL. II.

2 Q

solved

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Chief and Factors at Masulipatam, December 1671.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Chief and Factors at Hugbly, 26th June and 18th December 1671.



cularly to explain, that the cross on it was not a badge of their being Catholics, but only the characteristic mark of their nation to distinguish English ships, and ought not to excite any alarm in the Japanese, that the English had any scheme for detaching them from their established belief:—should the Agents be permitted to erect houses of trade, all attempts to fortify, or to land guns, were to be avoided; but, if possible, they were to endeavour to evade the ancient requisition, that the guns of the ships should be landed, and the rudders unhung, during the time of their being in a Japanese port:—the Company's Agents were always to wear dresses of English cloth, with gold and silver lace, that their appearance might convey to the Emperor, and to his officers, impressions of their rank. Three vessels were destined for this commercial speculation, with cargoes chiefly consisting of English broad-cloths, and an assortment of glasses, &c. for presents, and such Indian articles as would sell:—the imports expected were gold, silver, and copper, and cabinets of lacquered work, china jars, &c.; and, on the return of the ships, they were to touch at Bantam, the Coast, and at Surat, for goods to fill up their tonnage, that they might come to England with full cargoes. <sup>(1)</sup>

The orders to the Governor of St. HELENA form only a supplement to the annual directions, viz. that the original di-  

2 Q 2

visions

Regulations  
for St. He-  
lena.

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 21st September 1671.





cution in India, as circumstances might render obedience practicable. CHAP. II.  
1671-72.

The events at Surat, during the season 1671-72, required prudence and firmness in those to whom the Company's interests were entrusted, who were obliged to accommodate their conduct to circumstances, and to the habits or prejudices of the Natives;—for those habits could neither be opposed by European opinions, nor resisted by notions of national dignity:—and the following incident is a memorable example of the application of local knowledge, and temperate manners, in restoring tranquillity, and preserving the English rights at Surat, which an opposite conduct might have endangered or overset.

In July 1671, some Dutch seamen, who had been intoxicated, insulted the attendants of Aga Jaffier, a chief officer in Surat, and after a disorderly conflict, took refuge in the English Factory:—the Governor of Surat, alarmed at what was represented to him to be a combination of the three Christian Nations (English, French, and Dutch), ordered the Moors to discontinue their services to the Europeans, and to put them to death, with impunity, if found with arms: the Company's servants, on this occasion, were, therefore, obliged to keep within their house, and business was at a stand. The President, who was at Swally, received information of this circumstance in his way to Surat, and returned to Swally, where he was met by the Dutch and French "Directores," who had



or Madagascar:—the French, with their usual gasconade, <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> published, that another fleet might be expected from Europe: 1671-72. —this excited an immediate alarm in the Governor of Surat, from a jealousy of the French intentions; but the commercial evil to the English trade was, that the French, by extravagant presents and imprudent purchases, lowered the price of the Europe cargoes, and raised that of Indian produce:—this fluctuation the President considered to be rather alarming in appearance, than in fact, because he judged that this variation in prices must, in a short time, terminate in the ruin of the French; an opinion which was soon justified by the conduct of the Natives, who received the French with deference, but had no confidence in a trade, which they held, from the folly of the traders, to be temporary and precarious

The French, with their national arrogance, expected, on this occasion, that the Company's ships at Swally would pay their fleet the honors of the flag, because they bore the flag of a Sovereign, and not that of a commercial Company;—the President, however, with becoming spirit, resisted this pretension, both from a sense of the Company's flag being authorized by the King, and from the distinction between the King's and Company's flags being unintelligible to the Native Governors or Princes.

It was at this juncture, that the Presidency formed a treaty with Sevagee, on the basis of which the Company's Factory at Rajahpore was proposed to be re-established. The public

An English Agent sent to Sevagee, to solicit payment of the



After the late peace, the Dutch affected friendship, but in this season, they resumed their ancient animosities, for, by leagues with the Country Powers, and by their superior naval force, their designs against the English settlements at Carwar and Billiapatam, became apparent:—cargoes, however, were provided for the Company's shipping, and instructions given to the Captains, from the doubtful appearance of affairs in Europe, to keep together, and resist whatever enemy might assail them:—the investments consisted of a considerable quantity of pepper, and of a small proportion of Lahore indigo.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1671-72.  
Dutch again  
interfere with  
the Compa-  
ny's trade.

The exertions of this Presidency were liable to constant interruption, from events affecting the sovereignty of the country to which the trade was extended; a victory by Sevagee over the Mogul army, exposed Surat (then in a defenceless state) to invasion, while the exactions and the rapacity of a new Governor, under the pretext that the President intended to retire from Surat to Bombay, were excessive; for at one time he took possession of the English Factory, but soon quitted it, leaving them in uncertainty, either how to provide investments for Europe, in this, or for the subsequent season.<sup>(2)</sup>

Apprehensi-  
ons at Surat  
of another  
attack from  
Sevagee.

The events at BOMBAY, during the season 1671-72, related

VOL. II.

2 R.

only

Measures at  
Bombay for

(1)—General Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 10th January 1671-72.

(2)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 3d February 1671-72, and 6th and 23d April 1672;

CHAP. II.  
1671-72.  
defending the  
Island.

only to the progress of the manufacture of cotton, and to the means employed to bring the inhabitants under a regular subordination :—the Governor and Council reported, that they trusted the fortifications would be completed in the course of another year, and that they had divided the old soldiers among the two companies, that their example might have an effect on the discipline of the recruits, and habituate them to the service of the Island ; but that it would be expedient, from the great mortality among the soldiers, to send an annual supply of fifty men ; and that the principle of seniority must be observed, in adjusting the rank of the officers :—the shipping, however, of the island, as well as of Surat, had been exposed to captures by the Malabar pirates, and therefore it was necessary to build and equip some small armed vessels, for the protection of the trade of the Island.<sup>(1)</sup>

Judging, however, from the circumstance of the President being, a second time, prevented from visiting Bombay, to revise the regulations for its administration, it had become a question, whether it might not be wise to remove the Presidency from Surat to Bombay, leaving a Chief and Council at Surat, to carry on the trade and maintain the privileges ; because the local situation of this city made it dependant,

and

(1)—General Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 7th November 1671.  
— Letter from the Governor and Council of Bombay to the Court, 18th November 1671.

and exposed to constant alarms from Sevagee and the Mogul, and the Company to losses, from the extortions of both.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.

1671-72.

Sir William Langhorne assumes the Government of Fort St. George, and Mr. Foxcroft and Sir Edward Winter return to England.

The events at FORT ST. GEORGE and at its dependencies, in the season 1671-72, consisted chiefly in the final adjustment of the disputes, between Sir Edward Winter, Mr. Foxcroft, and Mr. Jearsey, the Agent at Masulipatam, and refer, in general, to the Company's interests and trade. In the whole of the dispute, from its commencement to its becoming a subject of enquiry for Commissioners, the intemperance of Sir Edward Winter, and the imprudence of Mr. Foxcroft and his adherents, rendered it expedient to recall both, and to bring the subject under the cognizance of the Court; each party, however, was permitted to bring home such evidence as he might deem necessary for his vindication. Mr. Foxcroft embarked in January 1671-72, leaving Sir William Langhorne, Agent at Fort St. George, and Sir Edward Winter sailed, at the same time, on another vessel, for England.

In this season, a Cowl, or Phirmaund, was obtained from the King of Golcondah, granting new privileges to the Company, at Fort St. George, of which the Agent and Council were availing themselves, to prevent future disputes about customs, and were of opinion, that though the expences incurred

Phirmaund, conferring additional privileges on the English, obtained from the King of Golcondah.

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 10th January and 23d February 1671-72, and 6th and 23d April 1672.





been procured, in sufficient quantity to meet the orders of the Court, and to fill up the tonnage of the expected fleet. This import would materially affect the profits of the sales in England:—the Agent and Council, in illustration, stated, that the probability of wars between the King of Java and Coxsin, the Chief of Formosa, who controlled the Kings of Jambee, Johore, &c., would have the effect on the trade at those ports, of rendering the price of imports and exports uncertain, and commercial speculation difficult:—it was farther explained, that the quantity of Coast and Surat cloths, brought by the French and Danes, and the non-arrival of those articles, which the Court's letter had estimated at £12,000, would compel this Agency to apply almost their whole stock of money to provide goods for the expected tonnage, leaving sufficient room for the imports expected from Tywan and Japan; circumstances which had diminished their means of providing investments for the large tonnage which the Court proposed for the following season.<sup>(1)</sup>

The imports from Japan and Tywan not being hitherto brought into the trade, the report on this subject could only be expected, in the advices of the following season.<sup>(2)</sup>

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Council at Bantam to the Court, November and 29th December 1671.

(2)—Letter from Mr. W. Baron to the Court, dated Bantam 4th June 1671.



of lowering the pretensions of the States, in any treaty in which the war might terminate. CHAP. II.  
1672-73.

It appears, that, during the war, secret negotiations were carrying on, with the object of conciliation, between the King and the States General, and that the Court were aware Ambassadors were about to proceed to the French camp, to frame, and, if possible, to settle preliminaries of peace.

The Court, therefore, in June 1672, presented a memorial to the King, praying, that the Ambassadors might be instructed to propose, that mutual reparation should be made by the Dutch and English East-India Companies, for any damages done to either, since the last peace, or the breaking out of the existing war, or, at least, from the date of the memorial; and, in case the negotiation should be proceeded in, that the Company might be allowed to represent to the King, what would be indispensable for the better carrying on the trade, in future: but, should it be impracticable to accomplish this, in the treaty then pending, they trusted, that there would be a general article inserted, referring to a treaty, to be subsequently formed, for settling the East-India trade.<sup>(1)</sup>

Court's memorial to the King, praying their affairs might be taken into consideration, in any negotiation with the Dutch.

These circumstances explain the source of the general instructions which the Court framed, for the conduct of their Foreign Settlements; or, that they were to follow the orders which

General instructions to the foreign Settlements, in consequence of the war.

(1)—Memorial of the East-India Company to the King, respecting the negotiations with Holland. (East-India Papers in the State Paper Office, No. 261.)



at St. Helena, a report having reached England, that this Island had been captured by the Dutch.

CHAP. II.  
1672-73.

The particular orders to President Aungier specified, that the intentions of the Court were to keep open the trade at the different ports subservient to the Presidency of SURAT, for which a stock, estimated at £90,000, had been sent; and though discretionary powers were given to the President, in case of any unforeseen emergency, to remove the Company's Factory to Bombay, this was to be avoided, if possible, till the re-establishment of peace in Europe:—and, in consideration of Mr. Aungier's services, his salary was increased to £300 per annum, with a gratuity of £500, and a proportionate addition allowed to the subordinate servants.

Particular orders to President Aungier, whose salary was augmented.

Under the prospect of peace, the Court desired information of the kinds of goods which would be required in the Persian market, and for Quedah and Siam, should it become advisable again to attempt trade at those ports. <sup>(1)</sup>

The general instructions were repeated by the Court to the Agent and Council of FORT ST. GEORGE, which have been detailed, as transmitted to Surat, the only separate order being, to endeavour to place the Fort in a state of defence against any enemy;—in return for the stock consigned to this branch of the trade, estimated at £87,700, a large proportion of Coast cloths were to be laden on the

Instructions to place Fort St. George in a state of defence.

VOL. II.

2 S

shipping,

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 5th July, 9th August, and 13th December 1672, 10th January 1672-73, and 28th April 1673.



therefore could only be settled by an application of the King to the Crown of Portugal, requiring the performance of the stipulations in the original Treaty of Cession. On consultation, it was deemed expedient to postpone any treaty with Sevagee, till the result of the war between this Chief and the Mogul should ascertain his submission to, or his independence on that power:—the President and Council of Surat, however, did not reject his offers of privileges of trade, but evaded any treaty, by demanding, as a preliminary, a sum, in compensation for past losses, the payment of which was to become the basis upon which any treaty with him could proceed:—by this delay, an opportunity was afforded to keep up the Company's relations with the Mogul Government, that, at the close of the war between these Native Powers, it might be ascertained, what Factories could be held as safe in the dominions of either.

The naval war between what was, at this time, termed the *Malabar* fleet, and the Siddees, or Mogul fleet, (for both were at sea,) it was expected would, in the course of the year, be decisive; and this uncertainty rendered it indispensable, that some armed vessels should be built and equipped at Bombay, for the protection of the trade, and to maintain the English naval character, the Native Powers and merchants making constant comparisons between it and that of the Dutch, and, recently, of the French, in the Indian Seas: unless, therefore, the English Factories and trade should be protected by





provide for the investment of the next season; a large stock, <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> therefore, would be requisite to keep up the trade, in any <sup>1672-73</sup> degree of equality with that of the other European nations; and this stock, it was submitted, ought to be sent chiefly in bullion.<sup>(1)</sup>

Resuming the account of affairs at Surat and Bombay, as detailed at the close of the preceding season, it appears, that the question, whether it would be expedient to remove the Presidency from Surat to Bombay, had been postponed till the contending interests of the European Maritime Powers could be adjusted, or their proportions of the East-India trade settled; the President and Council of Surat, therefore, informed the Court, that Mr. Aungier had gone to Bombay, in May 1672, where his experience and authority were employed, in putting that Island in a state of defence, against any attack which might be meditated by the Dutch, or any other enemy; that he had strengthened the fortifications, and, by strict discipline, prepared the troops for action;—that the inhabitants were formed into a militia, to act with the garrison;—that the fortifications, as originally designed by Captain Smith, were upon too narrow a scale for the defence of the Island;—that the revenue from customs could not be estimated at more than 20,000 xeraphins per annum;—that

Measures of President Aungier and the Deputy Governor, for putting Bombay into a state of defence, under the plan of transferring to it, the Seat of Government.

the

(1)—Letters from the Deputy President and Council at Surat, (the President being at Bombay), 22d October and 10th December 1672, 10th and 17th January and 25th February 1672-73, and 4th April 1673.



incurred, in building the fort, but that it was not more than half completed, and would require additional stock, for two years, to finish it.<sup>(1)</sup> CHAP. II.  
1672-73.

The Presidency of Surat suggested, in this season, the expediency of erecting courts of law, and establishing a police at Bombay; measures which, though expensive, they trusted would add to the confidence which the Natives were beginning to feel, that the English would protect them, and, in the event of peace, would render the Island a considerable commercial resort.

If these preparations promised a vigorous defence, in the event of any attack, it was found, on the appearance of a Dutch fleet, in February 1672-73, under Rickloff Van Goens, the Dutch Governor General of India, that the greatest alarm was created, the inhabitants having fled to the Portuguese Settlements for safety. The Dutch fleet hovered, for some time, between Bombay and Surat; and, in this crisis, the the Governor had applied for the assistance of five hundred Rajpoots; but before they could arrive, the enemy disappeared, probably on discovering the number of the militia and garrison, and that an attack would be vigorously resisted.<sup>(2)</sup> Appearance  
of a Dutch  
fleet off Bom-  
bay.

At Fort St. George, in 1672-73, the investment was greater than could have been expected, during hostilities with the Dutch. French Fac-  
tories esta-  
blished at  
Trincomalé  
and at St.  
Thomé.

The

(1)—Letter from Captain Shaxton to the Court, 3d January 1672-73.

(2)—Letters from President Aungier and the Council of Bombay to the Court, 6th and 11th January, and 18th and 28th March 1672-73.

CHAP. II.  
1672-73. The unnatural alliance, between England and France, to depress the Dutch in Europe, had induced the French to send Monsieur De la Haye to the East-Indies, with a considerable armament. On its first appearance, it lowered the power, and pretensions of the Dutch, to exclusive trade, but, in the sequel, by introducing the French to a participation of trade, formed a dangerous rival to the English company:—De la Haye first attempted to establish the French at Trincomalé, in the Island of Ceylon, from which the Dutch force was unable to remove them;—From Trincomalé they sailed to the Coromandel Coast, and unexpectedly landed three hundred men, and some guns, at St. Thomé, which they took by storm; in July 1672, and resisted the numerous forces of the Natives, which could not expel them. Sir William Langhorne's conduct at Fort St. George, on this occasion, discovered great prudence and foresight:—as allies of the King, he could not oppose the French, but he considered their settlement in the vicinity of the Fort (should they retain possession of it) as leading to consequences that would embarrass trade, and, in any future war with France, place two garrisons in a distant country, in the immediate vicinity of each other, under circumstances which must be destructive, either to the one, or to the other. This event is the more memorable, from its being the first appearance of the French on the Coromandel Coast,—on which, towards the middle of the subsequent century, the wars  
arose

arose, which ultimately led to the acquisition of the British territorial power in Hindostan.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1672-73.

The relative circumstances in BENGAL, with those of the Coast, and of Surat, during the season 1672-73, were affected by the arrival of the French fleet in the Indian Seas, to participate in the trade in the Ganges, and by a dispute between the Dutch and the Nabob of Dacca, which exposed the English to contingencies, that prevented the full provision of the Bengal investment:—the apprehension of this evil (though three of the Company's ships had arrived in the Bay,) obliged the Agent to fill them up with such goods as he had in store, and to dispatch them to the Coast, to complete their cargoes at Madras.<sup>(2)</sup>

Investment in Bengal limited, from disputes between the Dutch and the Nabob of Dacca.

The Agent and Council at BANTAM, during the season 1672-73, were obliged to adopt temporary commercial expedients:—of the ships dispatched to Tywan, two vessels had been lost, and the success of a third was uncertain:—some of the Company's ships had been taken in the Straits of Banca by the Dutch, and the sales at Bantam obstructed:—several French ships had also arrived, laden with cloths, which, in colours and patterns, were more marketable than those which the Presidency of Surat had sent for the Bantam sales:—the

Trade at Bantam depressed by the war with the Dutch, but a Factory established at Tonquin.

VOL. II.

2 T

result

(1)—Letter from Fort St. George to the Court, 16th December 1672.— Letter from Sir William Langhorne, Agent at Fort St. George, to the Court, 1st January 1672-73.

(2)—Letter from the Agent and Factors at Hughly to the President and Council at Surat, 23d August 1672.







(considered to be superior to that of Japan) were to be obtained at that port, and then specified the Europe, Surat, Coast, and Bantam porduce, viz. English cloth, lead, warlike stores, saltpetre,

saltpetre, Surat and Coast cloths, and pepper, which would <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> find a sale at Tonquin, and, in return, bring articles to form 1672-73. part of the assortments for the Company's Factories in India, or for their sales in Europe.<sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Letter from the Factors at Tonquin to the Court, 7th December 1672.

## 1673-74.

---

CHAP. II.  
 1673-74. Events of the war in Europe, and appearances of negotiation at Cologne.

THE proceedings of the Court of Directors, in the year 1673-74, were, at the commencement, necessarily influenced by the state of the war, and towards the close of the season, by the Treaty of Westminster, between the King and the States General. After referring to the indecisive naval actions of the fleets, commanded by the Duke of York and Prince Rupert, to the progress of the French armies, in reducing Maestricht, and to the first appearances of negotiation at Cologne, the Court adverted to the opposite views of the German Princes, regarding France and the States General:—In the Southern Circles, the Sovereigns and Princes favoured the projects of France, while, in the Northern Circles, they were disposed rather to support, than to depress the States General.

At this juncture, information was received, that the Island of St. Helena had been captured by the Dutch, and retaken, on the 4th May 1673, by Captain Munden; but, notwithstanding this recapture, the Directors considered the occupation of the Island, by the English, to be temporary and precarious.<sup>(1)</sup>

Under

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 11th, 23d, and 25th August 1673.

Under these circumstances, the Court expressed their apprehensions to the Presidency of Surat, for the safety of <sup>CHAP II.</sup> 1673-74. Bombay, as intelligence had been received from Holland, that the Dutch were equipping a large armament, the object of which, it was conjectured, was to invade that Island.

These events induced the Court to abridge the equipments and stock, intended for Surat, more particularly, after receiving intelligence of the state of the markets at that port, and at its dependencies, which were so overstocked, that neither British produce, nor foreign merchandize, could find a profitable sale:—hence, only a small proportion of Surat cloths, with a quantity of Lahore indigo, were ordered for the investment of the following year, that the trade might continue on a limited scale, till the restoration of peace.<sup>(1)</sup> Equipments and stock to Surat diminished.

A short time, however, had only elapsed, when these measures of precaution, and of abridged trade, became unnecessary, from the restoration of peace, between England and the States General, by the Treaty of Westminster, concluded on the 17th of February 1673-74; the conditions of which, in so far as regarded the English East-India trade and possessions, were specified in the Introduction to this Chapter. Treaty of Westminster, between England and Holland, and its effects on the Company's equipments.

The Court, in consequence of this Treaty, instead of narrowing

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 29th September 1673.

ment of Bom-  
bay prohibit-  
ed from en-  
tering into  
any treaty  
with the Por-  
tuguese.

the regulations which had been sent home for approbation, did not appear to be of that description which the Court could authorize, and therefore they required, that rules, better accommodated to local circumstances, might be framed, to which they could assent:—in the mean time, any new attempts to negotiate with the Viceroy of Goa, were prohibited, because the Company,

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 13th March 1673-74, and 3d April 1674.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 3d April 1674.

Company, though authorized by their Charter to form treaties with the Native Princes or States, were not empowered to enter into engagements with the officers of the European Maritime powers, having settlements or trade in the East-Indies, as such agreements might lead to questions between their respective Sovereigns, with whose political relations it would be unwise for the Company to interfere, particularly as such treaties might lead to Conventions for mutual support, against the Native Powers, which would be hazardous in themselves, and productive of commercial embarrassments in the sale or purchase of goods :—the Court, therefore, ordered the Bombay Government to take all its directions from the Presidency of Surat ; to confine itself to the encouragement of arts and trade among the settlers ; and, as recruits had been embarked, to attend to their discipline, and always to place the Island in a state of defence, notwithstanding the present return of peace.

An interruption had taken place in the trade to PERSIA, probably on account of the war in Europe, as well as of the political embarrassments in that kingdom ; the Court, on peace being restored, resolved, as a letter had been obtained from His Majesty to the King of Persia, and a collection of former Phirmaunds had been made by the Agent, that translations should be sent home, for their information ; and that a new Phirmaund, if possible, should be solicited, for confirmation of privileges, but would not come to any positive resolution,

CHAP. II.

1673-74.

Measures for  
reviving the  
Persian trade.

with

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Gombroon, 8th May, 7th July, and 7th April 1674.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 7th July, 29th September, 1st November, and 24th December 1673.

with the Natives, both in the vicinity of Fort St. George and in Bengal, as it would be hazardous and expensive to solicit new Phirmaunds from the King of Golcondah, or the Mogul, experience having shewn, that, even when such grants were obtained, the oppressions of the Nabobs, or Naigs, were seldom diminished.

Three ships, amounting to thirteen hundred and fifty tons, with cargoes estimated at £87,000, were to be dispatched, this season, for Coast and Bay :—the cargoes consisted chiefly of money, with a very small quantity of goods, (broad-cloths, &c.) in compliance with the opinion of the Agent and Council :—the investment for Europe was ordered to consist chiefly of Coast cloths, of the denominations frequently specified, and of ten thousand pieces of taffaties, and three hundred tons of saltpetre from Bengal :—the value of £10,000 in goods, was to be forwarded to Bantam, to enable that Agency to resume its trade ;—and a new set of regulations was transmitted for the management of the warehouses at Fort St. George, and the subsistence of the Factors and Writers at a public table.<sup>(1)</sup>

From HUGHLY being subordinate to the Fort, and receiving from thence the detail of the measures which the Court had adopted, both during the war, and after peace had placed trade on better ground, local directions only appear, viz. to

2 U 2

select

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 18th March 1673-74, and 3d April 1674.

CHAP. II.  
1673-74.

Equipments  
and stock for  
Fort St.  
George.

Commercial  
instructions  
to the Agent  
in Bengal.



a conjecture which the capture of three of their ships, last season, fully justified :—this misfortune the Court attributed to the misconduct of the Agent at Bantam, who had detained the ships, particularly the vessel intended for Tywan, after the monsoon had set in, which had obliged the Court to dispatch a small vessel to Bantam, with a cargo of £1,200, under orders

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Hughly, 7th July and 31st October 1673, and 13th and 16th March 1673-74.

orders to return direct to England with pepper, and with CHAP. II.  
instructions to the Agents always to have a considerable 1673-74.  
quantity of this article in readiness to meet the large equip-  
ment and stock to be consigned to them, as soon as the peace  
with the Dutch should be ratified. <sup>(1)</sup>

When this event took place, in February 1673-74, the destination of the small ship was changed, and the Company's ship *Eagle*, with a stock estimated at £11,000, was consigned to Bantam, with information that seventeen hundred and sixty tons of shipping would be dispatched in the course of the season, and a stock estimated at £30,000; the Agency therefore, were to provide a large proportion of pepper, and of benjamin, sugar, and ginger:—one of the ships was to proceed to Jambee, and the whole were to sail for Europe without delay.

The restoration of peace again gave the Company an opportunity to attempt trade at Tywan, Formosa, and Japan, and as it was also the wish of the Court to obtain a proportion of the trade in the finer spices, they desired the Agent to transmit the fullest information on those subjects, that they might proceed in framing instructions for the subsequent season, when it was intended to send out near three thousand tons of shipping to Bantam. <sup>(2)</sup>

The

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 2d. August and 2d October 1673.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 13th March 1673-74, and 3d April, and 1st and 6th May 1674.



of the Island of St. Helena were to be deemed natural-born subjects of England. <sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1673-74.

The Court, on receiving this grant, appointed Captain Field to be Governor, with a salary and allowance of £100 per annum; and Captain Beale to be Deputy Governor, with a salary of £50 per annum; and to have under them a storekeeper, artificers, &c.; they were to re-occupy and settle the Island, with one hundred persons (including their families), and had powers to repair and enlarge the fortifications:—the garrison was to consist of two companies, under the command of the Governor and Deputy Governor:—the lands belonging to the old proprietors were to be restored to them; and twenty acres, and two cows, allotted to each of the new settlers, with an allowance of provisions for nine months free, and afterwards at specified rates:—three boats were to be built, and given to the inhabitants, for fishing, that they might add to their means of subsistence; and a market was to be established for provisions.<sup>(2)</sup>

Appoint-  
ments and  
salaries of  
officers, and  
Court's regu-  
lations for St.  
Helena, on  
receiving this  
Charter.

---

Connecting the accounts of the situation of the Presidency of SURAT and its dependencies, with the events which occurred

Another Eng-  
lish Agent  
sent to nego-  
tiate a treaty  
with Sevages.

(1)—Letters Patent, granting the Island of St. Helena to the London East-India Company, 16th December 1673. (Printed Collection of Charters, page 96).

(2)—Commission and Instructions to the Governor and Council of St. Helena, 19th December 1678.

asked, or the protection promised; the Envoy had, therefore,

..

fore, only to report progress on his return to the Presidency.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1673-74.

Under these political difficulties regarding the Mogul, Sevagee, and the inferior Chiefs who had power over their Factories on the Malabar Coast, the President and Council entered into a comparison of the amount of tonnage and stock which the Court of Directors had sent out, and expected to be filled, and the amount of purchases required for the investments for Europe, with the means within their reach, even in the time of peace. After forming an estimate of the charges of Bombay, they concluded, that as the prices of goods had advanced, during the war, and as obstructions in the markets were daily multiplying, by opposition from the Dutch, an investment for sixteen hundred, instead of four thousand tons, would be all they could collect in this season;—that the stock of £90,000, sent to them by the Court (large as it might arithmetically appear), was unequal to their orders, and that the attempt to invest it, would terminate in disappointment:—besides, considering the arrears they had to liquidate, and the daily charges of Bombay, there would not remain a sum to purchase investments for this large tonnage, or to meet the Company's instructions to make provision for the subsequent year:—under such difficulties, the Council at Surat had referred the whole subject to the judgement of President Aungier, at

The Court's orders for provision of a large investment at Surat impracticable, from the low state of funds.

VOL. II.

2 X

this

(1)—Surat Consultations, 24th May 1672.— Mr. Nichols's Report of his negotiation with Sevagee Rajah, in May and June 1673. (Vol. xxix, 1673, No. 2729).



pepper and cloth for the investment expected by the Court, CHAP. II:  
 with such additional quantities of other goods, as could be 1673-74.  
 brought from Carwar, Batticolo, &c. :—he next recommended  
 to the Council at Surat, to make the greatest exertion their  
 means could allow, to meet the expectation of the Court,  
 admitting, at the same time, the obstacles from the opposition  
 of the Dutch, and their influence over all the ports to which  
 the Company's ships resorted ;—he conceded also, that how-  
 ever plausible the instructions of the Court might be, that  
 plausibility was done away, by the deficiency in the amount of  
 stock, and by the power of the enemies (European and Native)  
 with which their servants had to contend.<sup>(1)</sup>

In the progress of this season, appearances, rather than  
 events, in the wars between Sevagee and the Mogul, continued  
 to render political, as well as commercial transactions, as  
 difficult to devise as to execute ; for it was at this juncture,  
 that Sevagee was endeavouring, partly by promises, and partly  
 by threats, to bring over the Kings of Visiapore and Golcon-  
 dah to his interest :—this situation of the Native Powers  
 obstructed the purchases at Carwar, and by the menacing  
 station his army had taken near Surat, exposed that city to  
 contributions, to compensate for the losses he had sustained by  
 the irregular invasions of the Siddee's fleet, of different towns  
 on his part of the Coast ; hence there was a strong pro-  
 bability,

Measures of  
 President  
 Aungier for  
 defence of  
 Bombay, if  
 attacked by  
 the fleets of  
 the Mogul or  
 of Sevagee.

2 X 2

(1)—Letter from President Aungier at Bombay to the Deputy and Council at Surat,  
 21st August 1673.







which formerly constituted the principal part of the Surat investment.<sup>(1)</sup>

Under all these circumstances, however, this able officer of the Company collected an investment for Europe, from the  
Presidency

(1)—Letter from President Aungier and the Council at Bombay to the Court, 18th December 1673.

Presidency of Surat, amounting, for this season, to the sum of **CHAP. II.**  
**£104,000.<sup>(1)</sup>** **1673-74.**

The subsequent events in this season were, first, the alarms of the Presidency of an attack on Bombay or Surat, by the Dutch fleet, under Van Goens; for they reasoned, that should he succeed in capturing St. Thomé from the French, his force would next be brought against Bombay;—secondly, the arrival of four large Dutch ships, laden with spices, which had given them a commanding hold on the trade of Surat; and, lastly, the revival of the Portuguese commerce, and the oppressive proceedings of the Viceroy of Goa, which would endanger the continuance of the English trade; and concluded with a request to the Court, for instructions regarding the conduct he should observe towards those European maritime allies or enemies.<sup>(2)</sup>

The separate information from BOMBAY, during the season 1673-74, consisted of what would, in modern times, be termed a statistical account of the Island, specifying the division of it into the districts of Bombay and Mahim, with an account of its inhabitants, European and Native;—the extent and magnitude of the fortifications, upon which one hundred pieces of cannon had already been mounted;—the strength.

Apprehension of an attack on Bombay, by the Dutch fleet.

State of the trade and garrison of Bombay.

(1)—General Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 12th January 1673-74.

(2)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat and the Council at Bombay to the Court, 15th and 20th March 1673-74, and 1st April 1674.

**Thomé.**     probable enemy of the English Settlement. The events of this season (1673-74), at Fort St. George, are rather to be viewed as the result of the improvident relation with France, than

(1)—Account of the Island of Bombay, by President Aungier and the Council, 15th December 1673.— Letter from the Council of Bombay to the Court, 19th January 1673-74.

than as a part of the Dutch opposition to the English interests, CHAP. II.  
it being obvious, that whether the French should continue 1673-74.  
in, or be dislodged from St. Thomé, a strong hold in the  
neighbourhood of Madras, in possession of an European rival,  
would be the source of great danger ; and it is memorable, at  
this early period, that Sir William Langhorne, the Governor  
of Fort St. George, should describe the French to be a more  
dangerous neighbour than the Dutch, and that they were in-  
triguing in the extreme with the Native Chiefs. Matters, at  
Fort St. George, were in this situation, when the Dutch  
besieged the French in St. Thomé, and their fleet on this  
service, consisting of fourteen sail, met the Company's  
homeward-bound ships, consisting of ten sail, off Pettipolee,  
on the 22d August 1673 ; and after a running engagement, took  
two of the ships and sunk one ; the remainder retired to  
Madras, and after being repaired, sailed with an investment  
for Europe, estimated at 156,000 pagodas.<sup>(1)</sup>

As the Dutch forces and fleet made no impression on St.  
Thomé, their influence with the King of Golcondah was  
affected by their want of success in this enterprize ; but, till  
the close of this season, a kind of neutrality was observed, with  
respect to Madras.

VOL. II.

2 Y

The

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Council at Fort St. George to the Presidency of  
Surat, 2d and 10th September 1673.— Letter from the Agent and Council at Fort St.  
George to the Court, 20th September 1673.— Letter from Sir William Langhorne to  
the Court, 12th September 1673.

Unsuccessful  
result of the  
project for  
opening a  
trade with  
Tywan.

The projected trade to Tywan, in Formosa, for which the ship Experiment had been dispatched from Bantam, was found, on trial, to be impracticable, and the information on which

(1)—Letter from the Factory at Masulipatam to the Court, 25th August 1673.

(2)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Bantam to the Presidency of Surat, 22d September 1673.











## 1674-75.

THE proceedings of the Court of Directors, in the season 1674-75, were influenced by the indirect attacks of the Private Traders, or Interlopers, by the political and commercial difficulties in the Peninsula of India, and by the military defence of Bombay, on which President Aungier had made his report.

CHAP. II.  
1674-75.  
Statement of the Company's exports of bullion, and general view of their trade published, to counteract the schemes of the Interlopers.

From the period at which the Council of State (during the Interregnum) had decided, that the trade between England and the East-Indies could only proceed on a Joint Stock, with exclusive privileges, and, in a greater degree, from the Restoration of the Company's Charter by King Charles II., the interference of the Private Traders, or Interlopers, as individuals, or as associations, had disappeared; and the transfer of the Island of Bombay to the Company, by the Crown, had satisfied them, that any direct attack on the Company's privileges would be discouraged:—this impression, if it had checked, had not altogether extinguished their projects, and they were watching any incident which might again give plausibility to their speculations.

It

CHAP. II.  
1674-75.

It had been the practice of the Company to export, annually, under the licence of the Crown, considerable quantities of bullion and of foreign coins, as stock, for purchasing investments:—this practice, the Interlopers represented to be prejudicial to the interest of the Kingdom, and injurious to commercial credit. The Court, aware that these assertions might, in the first instance, prejudice the public, and subsequently the Government, against them, as a body, with exclusive privileges, and again bring up questions and opinions, that might facilitate the projects of their domestic opponents, adopted the decided measure of placing before the Government, a statement of facts, regarding their exports of bullion and foreign coins, that they might prove, by the large sums which the Company's trade paid to the revenue, and the outlets which it afforded to the staples and merchandize of the Kingdom, that, instead of being prejudicial to the general commerce of the Kingdom, or, in any degree, detrimental to commercial credit, it had eminently contributed to the support of both.

The following statement of the Company's affairs, at this juncture, will afford an interesting view of the value of the East-India trade, on a Joint Stock, to the navigation and commerce of the Kingdom.

“ A particular of all bullion (gold, silver, and pieces of  
“ eight) shipt out by the Company, since the year 1667-68,  
“ to this present year, 1674.

“ In

	£.	s.	d.	CHAP. II. 1674-75.
“ In the year 1667-68 . . . . .	128,605	17	5	
1668-69 . . . . .	162,394	9	10	
1669-70 . . . . .	187,458	3	8	
1670-71 . . . . .	186,149	10	11	
1671-72 . . . . .	186,420	8	3	
1672-73 . . . . .	131,300	5	11	
1673-74 . . . . .	182,983	0	6	

“ In lieu whereof, and of several sorts of manufactures  
 “ sent out by the Comp<sup>a</sup>, there had been paid unto His  
 “ Ma<sup>y</sup> for custom, yearly (*communibus annis*) the sum of  
 “ about £35,000 per annum.

“ And for encreasing the navigation and strength of  
 “ this kingdom, there hath been built, within that time, and  
 “ are now in building, twenty-four sail of ships, from three  
 “ hundred and fifty, to six hundred tons burden, and they  
 “ have paid for freight and wages, yearly, to the amount of  
 “ £100,000 per annum.

“ And have furnished His Majesty’s kingdoms of Eng-  
 “ land, Scotland, and Ireland, with all sorts of East-India  
 “ commodities (excepting cinnamon, cloves, nutts, and  
 “ mace), which, had they not done, would have cost the  
 “ kingdom farr greater rates to have been supplied from other  
 “ nations.

“ And, besides which, there is exported East-India  
 “ goods to other countries (by moderate estimate) double the







slender military force on the Island, to maintain the pass between Tannah and Caranjah, and Bombay, forgetting that this was the immediate source of dispute with that nation.

Equipments  
and stock for  
Surat en-  
creased to pay  
off debts.

The equipments for this season, for the Presidency of Surat, consisted of five ships, or two thousand one hundred tons :—four of these ships were to proceed to the Factories on the

the Malabar Coast, to take in the goods provided at the Out-  
stations, and to complete their lading at Surat and Bombay; CHAP. II.  
1674-75.  
and one was to be dispatched, with a suitable assortment  
of Europe and Surat goods, to Bantam. The stock on those  
vessels was estimated at £189,000, chiefly in bullion, with a  
proportion of broad-cloths, lead, tin, and quicksilver, under  
a general order to dispose of the goods, at such prices as they  
would bring in the market, and to apply the proceeds to the  
discharge of the debts at interest, and the balance (whatever  
it might be), to the provision of an investment for the subse-  
quent season; in particular, to dispose of the cochineal at a  
low price, to prevent this article being brought from India, by  
the traders to the Persian Gulf:—in return, the investment  
was to consist of Surat piece goods, for which, however, a  
lower price must be paid, as these articles had not so ready  
a sale in England as the Coromandel cloths; that a less  
quantity of Lahore indigo should be sent than formerly, be-  
cause the importations from the West-Indies, of this article,  
had lowered the demand for that of Lahore;—and that a  
less quantity of lac would be required, because the demand  
for that article had decreased, from the new practice of using  
wafers, instead of wax, for sealing letters.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Court, on the subject of the fortifications and  
strength of the garrison at BOMBAY, which had, for several  
years, Seamen not  
to be allowed  
to settle as  
colonists at  
Bombay.

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 5th March  
1674-75.







greater care, than formerly, must be observed, in selecting these cloths, both in their fineness and breadths.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1674-75.

From the large stock remitted to BENGAL, a proportionate investment was expected in silks and saltpetre, that country affording those articles of a superior kind, and, therefore, they were not to be purchased, in future, on the Coromandel Coast, on the Company's account.

The Factors in Bengal were authorised, besides the £65,000 of stock, to take up £20,000 at interest; and such proportion of this large sum as might remain, after purchasing silks and taffaties of a finer quality, (the black and green silks to be under the inspection of the English dyers) and six hundred tons of the best saltpetre, was to be invested in white sugar, cotton-yarn, turmeric, and bee's-wax, to fill up any spare tonnage in the ships, when they came round from Masulipatam to Hughly, to take in their cargoes.<sup>(2)</sup>

It might have been expected, that the Court, after the full information which they had received of the commercial circumstances of the Agency of BANTAM; of the subordinate stations of Jambee, Tonquin, and Tywan; of the ineffectual attempt to open an intercourse with Japan, and of the experi-

Equipments-  
and stock for  
Bantam en-  
creased, to  
renew the at-  
tempt of  
trade at Ja-  
pan

VOL. II.

3 A

relinquishing

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 17th August and 22d December 1674.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Hughly, 27th August and 23d December 1674.



landmen, or seamen, as offered to become settlers, on their agreeing to assist in its defence, which, it was hoped, would enable him to reduce the garrison from seventy-five to fifty men :—he was also to encourage fishing, and always to have in store dried provisions, to prevent scarcity: and though civility and assistance were to be shewn to such ships as might touch at the Island, the crews were not to be permitted to land, to whatever nation they might belong.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Foreign transactions at the Presidency of SURAT, and in the Island of BOMBAY, during the season 1674-75, open with the deliberations and proceedings of the President and Council, to meet the difficulties, which they were experiencing from Aurungzebe, and from Sevagee, not only at Surat, but on the coast opposite to Bombay, and in the countries in the vicinity of those ports on the Malabar Coast, at which the Company's trade had, hitherto, been carried on. From having neither force nor authority to take a decided part in favor of any of those Princes, nor specific instructions to direct their commercial relations with them, it remained, on the one hand, to negotiate with Sevagee, for liberty and privileges of trade,

CHAP. II.  
1674-75.  
Mr. Henry Oxinden sent as Envoy to Sevagee, and a treaty concluded between this Chief and the Company.

3 A 2

and

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Governor and Council of St. Helena, 18th December 1674.



known the Company's requests, he was permitted to attend the coronation of Sevagee, which exhibited all the Eastern magnificence:—this event ascertains the period when the sovereignty of the Hindoos, or Mahrattas, was established, and refers to the Asiatic customs, which must be observed, in soliciting, or receiving, the protection of an Eastern Sovereign.

By the prudent management of Mr. Oxinden, a grant was obtained from Sevagee, on the 12th June 1674, conferring privileges of trade on the Company; with an explanation, that

that if their money should be of sufficient fineness, there could be no difficulty in its passing current in the Hindoo dominions, without being the subject of a separate article in the grant.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1674-75.

This treaty with Sevagee was approved of by President Aungier and his Council, and transmitted to the Court, accompanied with an explanation of the measures which he proposed to adopt, for extending the trade.

The war between the Moguls and Patans continued to disturb the northern frontier provinces of the empire, and (as noticed in the abstract of his reign) Aurungzebe had proceeded, in person, to repel, rather than to subdue, that powerful people.

The trade with PERSIA having this year failed, on account of a number of vessels belonging to Surat having been lost, President Aungier attempted to revive the English interests in that kingdom, by sending Mr. Henry Oxinden as Envoy, and to act as second to the Agent at Gombroon.<sup>(2)</sup>

Mr. Oxinden  
sent to Persia.

Though the accounts of the peace in Europe had reached Surat, in the course of the season, the sales of the Company's exports was heavy, from the influx of similar articles by the other European traders, and the purchase of Surat goods, at the prices

Trade at Su-  
rat impeded,  
by the com-  
petitions of  
the Euro-  
peans and the  
inland wars.

(1)—Instructions from the President and Council at Bombay to Mr. Henry Oxinden, to negotiate with Sevagee Rajah, 11th May 1674.— Mr. Oxinden's Narrative of his Negotiations with Sevagee, 13th May to 13th June 1674, (vol. xxxi. No. 2879)

(2)—Letter from President Aungier and the Council at Bombay to the Court, 20th August 1674.

- (1)—Letter from the Deputy President and Council at Surat, 12th October 1674.
- (2)—Letter from the Deputy President and Council at Surat to Bombay, 4th November 1674.
- (3)—General Letter from the Government at Bombay to the Court, 12th November 1674.

ment of the fortifications had been postponed, from the want of money to defray the charges, and from the detection and punishment of a dangerous mutiny, in Captain Shaxton's company of infantry. This officer, it will be recollected, had been appointed by the Court, under the strongest recommendations, to take charge of the military defence of the Island, and, in the event of the President's absence, to act as Deputy Governor ; but he and his subalterns had encouraged disorderly proceedings among the soldiers, who resolved to lay down their arms, unless their demand for a month's pay, (which they affirmed had been promised to them by the Court), should be paid, and unless their discharge (as their term of three years had expired) should be granted to them. On discovering this mutiny, President Aungier acted with equal prudence and firmness : prudence, in consenting to grant the demands ; and firmness, in bringing the principal ringleaders to trial before a court

-----  
Aungier for  
improving  
the revenues  
of Bombay.

(1)—General Letter from the Government of Bombay to the Court, 20th March 1674-75.— General Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 9th and 11th January 1674-75, and 25th March 1675.

the King's and Company's service.

President Aungier's attention was next directed to improve the revenues of the Island, by the establishment of a mint, by farming the customs, and by taking measures for the introduction

(1)—Letter from President Aungier and Council at Bombay to the Deputy President, &c. at Surat, 20th August and 23d October 1674.— General Letter from Surat to the Court, 16th December 1674.





cations were sufficiently strong to have made a vigorous resistance, yet, estimating the strength of the French forces at <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> 1674-75. thirteen hundred Europeans and eight hundred natives, the Dutch at four thousand Europeans, and the King of Golcondah's troops, acting in that quarter, at twelve thousand horse and foot, there was every reason to apprehend an attack on the garrison, amounting only to two hundred and fifty men, exclusive of Peons; the Agent and Council, therefore, submitted to the Court, the necessity of augmenting this force, to enable them to resist either European or Native enemies:—considering, besides, the difficulties which, during the war, they had experienced, and the caution and reserve required towards the French, though allies, yet dangerous neighbours, and the equal caution towards the Dutch, who, notwithstanding the restoration of peace in Europe, were enemies in India; and supported by a superior force by land, and sea, the Fort ought to be strengthened, and the garrison rendered effective.

From the whole of the French and Dutch transactions, this season, it appeared, that though alternately allies to the English, both were real enemies; and that the Portuguese, during the wars of the European Maritime States, having been relieved from the oppressions of the Dutch, were making exertions to re-establish their maritime and commercial intercourse with the natives:—the burden thus fell on the English, who, with heavy charges, had to hold out against their Euro-







## 1675-76.

---

CHAP. II.  
1675-76. New plan of  
administrati-  
on formed for  
Surat and  
Bombay.

FOR several years, the measures devised by the Court of Directors, and those which their Foreign Presidencies found practicable, have been discovered to be at variance. This opposition could only be explained by the different circumstances in which each was placed :—to remedy these evils, the Court, this season, directed its attention to the formation of a more regular system of administration at SURAT and at BOMBAY, by fixing the rank of their servants on the principle of *Seniority*, as the rule of succession to offices of trust, and next, by connecting the civil and military service in such a manner, as to place the chief authority in the former, but to render the duties of the latter subservient to the preservation of the settlements, and promotion of trade.

With the view of preventing disputes about succession, the Court framed the following regulations :—“ For the  
“ advancement of our Apprentices, we direct that, after they  
“ have served the first five yeares, they shall have £10 per  
“ annum, for the two last yeares ; and having served those  
“ two yeares, to be entertayned, one yeare longer, as Wri-  
“ ters, and have Writers’ sallary ; and having served that  
“ yeare, to enter into y<sup>e</sup> degree of Factors, which otherwise  
“ would

“ would have been ten years. And knowing, that a dis- CHAP. II.  
 “ tinction of titles is, in many respects, necessary, we do 1675-76.  
 “ order, that when the Apprentices have served their times,  
 “ they be stiled *Writers*; and when the Writers have served  
 “ their times, they be stiled *Factors*; and Factors, having  
 “ served their times, to be stiled *Merchants*; and Merchants,  
 “ having served their times, to be stiled *Senior Merchants*.”

With the object of connecting the civil and military service, and vesting the authority in the former, it was ordered, that though Captain Langford, who had been chief military officer at Bombay, had been admitted to a seat in the Council, this, in the case of a vacancy, was not to be founded on as a precedent; and that the civil servants were to apply themselves to acquire a knowledge of military discipline, that, in the event, either of any sudden attack, or of being found better qualified for military, than for civil duties, they might receive commissions, and have the pay of military officers, till the pleasure of the Court should be known. <sup>(1)</sup>

The shipping taken up for this Presidency amounted to <sup>Equipments, stock, and commercial instructions to Surat and Bombay.</sup> five sail, or two thousand three hundred and fifty tons, and the stock, in goods and money, was estimated at £96,500: —this sum was, in the first instance, to be applied to discharge the debts at interest, which had been contracted for the investment of the preceding year; the residue, under

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 12th July 1675, and 6th March 1675-76.



per cent. for the fortifications, on the general produce of the Island exported, they referred it to the consideration of Pre-<sup>CHAP. II.</sup> 1675-76. sident Aungier, and the Council of Surat, to report (as this duty might press on trade) whether it might not be preferable to levy a moderate tax on provisions of all kinds:—The Court, before coming to any positive resolutions on this subject, desired, also, that a report might be sent, on the method by which the Dutch levied the duties of customs at Batavia, it having been productive, and equal to the maintenance of that great establishment. <sup>(1)</sup>

The Court next took into their consideration, the report which they had received on the trade to PERSIA, which, in substance, was,—that unless this trade could be protected by armed ships, neither the privileges which had formerly been acquired, could be acted on, nor the moiety of the customs at Gombroon recovered; and, therefore, ordered, that two of the ships, which had been consigned to Surat, and sufficiently armed for service in the Gulf of Persia, and on which broad-cloths, tin, &c. had been sent, to facilitate exchanges at Gombroon, should proceed to that port, to which directions had been given to provide Persian silks, Caramania wool, &c. and to enforce the payment of the customs. <sup>(2)</sup>

VOL. II.

3 C

A similar

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 12th July 1675, and 8th March 1675-76.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 8th March 1675-76.— Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Gombroon, 16th September 1675, and 11th March 1675-76.



them, in their future instructions, to issue positive and precise orders.

CHAP. II.  
1675-76.

The equipments consigned to Fort St. George, this season, consisted of five ships, or two thousand one hundred and forty tons, and the stock, in bullion and goods, was estimated at £235,000, of which the appropriations were,—£15,000 in goods, and £105,000 in bullion, for Fort St. George; £30,000 in bullion, and £23,000 in goods, for Masulipatam; and £67,000 in bullion, for the Bay of Bengal:—it was farther required, that the Europe goods sent to Madras should be disposed of, at such rates, as would have the effect of diminishing the price of Coast goods intended for Surat or for Europe, and that a preference should be given to the cloths obtained at Masulipatam, which were in request at the home sales; but the small proportion of Coast cloths intended for Bantam, should be of the kinds in demand at that port. <sup>(1)</sup>

Equipments  
and stock for  
the Coroman-  
del Coast and  
Bengal.

The orders to BENGAL, in 1675-76, were in substance:—that the Factors were to form a collection of the Phirmaunds under which they had enjoyed privileges of trade;—that they were to establish the same gradations of rank among their servants, as at Fort St. George and Surat; and that they were to draw on the Court for £20,000, in addition to

3 C 2

the

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 17th August, and 24th December 1675.—Commission and Instructions to Mr. Streysham Master, 16th December 1675.







CHAP. II.  
1675-76. armies, in the war against the Patans, it might have been expected, would have enabled President Aungier to extend the Company's trade; but circumstances rendered it impracticable to realize his well-concerted plans :—Sevagee still continued in the field, and was threatening Surat, and the Mogul armies had not returned, to protect that city, or the district in which it was situated; the countries, also, in the vicinity of the ports, on the Malabar Coast, at which the Company had Factories, were, at the same time, exposed to devastations, by the detachments of Sevagee's army, employed in overawing the petty Chiefs, and though the Rajahs, or Chiefs of the districts, near Carnapoly and Porcat, had offered to furnish several hundred tons of pepper for the Company's investment, it was on condition of a force being sent to support them against the violence of the Dutch.

Under circumstances so unfavourable to trade, it was with much difficulty, notwithstanding the large stock sent from Europe, that the President and Council of Surat could provide cargoes for the four ships which had arrived from England ;—the proportion of pepper and cloths, expected from Carwar, could not be received, because the neighbouring districts had been laid waste by a body of Sevagee's troops :—the Factors at Calicut had been obstructed in the purchase of those articles by the Dutch ; and the rainy season had prevented the arrival of the caravans, which brought the indigo, and other goods, from Agra : causes which had obliged the President  
and

and Council to fill up the tonnage with such articles as they CHAP. II.  
 could draw from Ahmedabad and Cambaya, or purchase from 1675-76.  
 the Dutch, at advanced prices. This unfavourable state of  
 the Indian market was also rendered worse, by competi-  
 tions in the sale of Europe produce, occasioned by the arrival  
 of three ships of the French Company, and four Dutch ships,  
 the cargoes of which had brought the prices lower than prime  
 cost.

On reviewing these circumstances, President Aungier,  
 and the Council of Surat, framed a report on the state of the  
 Company's trade, in the countries, and at the ports, more im-  
 mediately under their administration, which, in substance,  
 stated;—that it was impossible not to divide the Company's  
 stock into small portions, because the goods were to be col-  
 lected from various points ;—that it was not less impossible to  
 derive profit, to the amount expected by the Court, from the  
 sale of Europe goods ;—that it was with the greatest difficulty,  
 money could be borrowed, from the convulsed state of the coun-  
 try having almost ruined the trade of the native merchants ;  
 and, therefore, that commerce had declined, from causes which  
 could not be controlled by the Directors at home, or by their  
 servants abroad :—to obviate these evils, there appeared to be  
 one practicable remedy, only ; or the reducing the tonnage, or  
 exports and imports, for a few years, till the goods in the  
 warehouses, both at Surat and in England, could be sold off :  
 this would have the effect of reviving demands for Europe  
 goods,

President  
 Aungier's re-  
 port on the  
 trade at Surat  
 and its depen-  
 dencies.

CHAP. II.  
1675-76. goods, and of lowering the prices of Indian produce, and would bring back the trade to the principle of quick exchanges, upon which all commercial profits must rest:—this opinion was illustrated, by a comparison of the rates of purchases, at Surat, on the Coromandel Coast, and at Bantam:—at Surat, the Dutch, French, Danes, Armenians, and Arabians, participated in the trade; on the Coromandel Coast, and at Bantam, though the weight of the Dutch influence, and the amount of their funds, gave them a preponderance, the Company, particularly on the Coromandel Coast, had a less divided share in the market.

From these causes, the investment, this season, was less considerable than the Court might have expected; but the utmost exertions would be used, at Surat and at its dependencies, to provide a fuller investment for the subsequent year.<sup>(1)</sup>

Report on the civil and military administration required for Bombay.

The unsettled state of the government in the Island of BOMBAY had, for almost three years, obliged President Aungier to reside on that Island, and to leave the management of the Company's interests at Surat, to the Council. On his return to Surat, in September 1675, the instructions which he framed, and left with the Deputy Governor and his Council, afford a distinct view of the situation of affairs at Bombay. After the President had suppressed the mutiny, and introduced

(1)—Letters from the President and Council at Surat to the Court, 10th and 26th October, 17th November, and 6th December 1675, and 17th and 26th January, and 2d February 1675-76.

duced regularity into the administration, he placed before <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> the Court an account of the inhabitants of the Island, 1675-76. consisting of the following classes;—the English garrison and settlers; the Portuguese, who had remained after the cession; and a mixed assemblage of Hindoo, Mahomedan, and Parsee inhabitants:—he next took a view of the great object of the Company, or the rendering Bombay an emporium of trade, and recommended, that the regulations which had been established for the garrison and for the English settlers, should be the general rule of the government; but, as it would be difficult to reduce the mixed classes of the other inhabitants under these regulations, it would be proper to form them into something like the English incorporations, and to direct them to elect five persons, who were to become their representatives, to hear and prepare their different claims for the consideration of the Governor and Council; and these persons to be responsible for all tumults, or disorderly conduct, of the classes of inhabitants whom they represented:—by this expedient, President Aungier trusted, that a general confidence would be created in the Company's government. With the object of encouraging the trade of the Island, he recommended that forbearance and moderation should be observed, in levying the duties of customs, rents, licences, &c., but calculated, that the revenue would amount to 107,000 xeraphins per annum:—he, also, recommended, that while the most firm conduct was required, in resisting the obstructions of

...and the Presidency of Surat, for several years, whether the trade with PERSIA could be most effectually revived, by the employment of force, or by treaty; and, in the transactions of the Court this season, we found that two of the ships consigned to Surat had been armed for service in the Persian Gulf, and had taken in goods suited to that market;—the Presidency, therefore, took into consideration the expediency of adopting

(1)—Letters from the President and Council of Surat to the Governor and Council at Bombay, 15th and 28th June 1675.— Letter from the Governor and Council at Bombay to the President and Council at Surat, 4th June 1675.— Instructions from President Aungier to the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay, 28th September 1675. (Vol. xxxi, No. 2958).— Letters from the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay to the Court, 26th November 1675, and 8th January 1675-76.

adopting either forcible or pacific measures; and reported to the Court, that the propriety of hostilities rested on the kind of warfare which was practicable, and on that warfare being in the name of the King, not in that of the Company;—that hostilities could consist only in the blockade of the Persian ports, particularly Gombroon, the Company not being provided with any military force to make an impression on shore;—that, even this limited warfare, must be proceeded in with caution, to avoid giving offence to the Mogul and to his subjects, or advantage being taken of it by the Portuguese, who were uniformly obstructing the English trade, or by the Dutch, who would prosecute the trade to Gombroon, and endeavour to engross it;—that the other expedient, of treaty, might be attempted, upon the principle of recovering the moiety of the customs at Gombroon, or by proposing to the King of Persia, either that he should allow three thousand tomands, or £9,000 sterling, per annum, in lieu thereof; (in which case, the Company's ships were to be subjected, as well as others, to the port duties;) or that the customs on all goods belonging to, or freighted by the English, should be wholly appropriated to the Company:—the Presidency having these views, recommended to the Court the attempt at negotiation, rather than hostilities; and preferred the first alternative, or the annual receipt of three thousand tomands, which would be a certain sum in peace or war, to the appropriation of the customs, which,









## 1676-77.

THE information which reached the Court of Directors, on the state of the war between the Mogul and Sevagee, and on the difficulties under which the trade had been placed, induced them to recede from the large scale of commerce, which they had adopted for several years, and to revert to the ancient system, of accommodating their commercial speculations to the prices at which the purchases for the investment could be effected abroad, and to the prices, which their imports brought at the home sales:—in this way, they hoped to clear their warehouses at Surat, and in England, and to improve their general credit.

CHAP. II.

1676-77.

Equipment and stock to Surat limited, from the convulsed state of the countries in its vicinity.

On this contracted plan, they ordered the President and Council of SURAT to purchase the most marketable goods only;—to reduce the number of their servants, particularly at the stations of Carnapoly and Carwar, and always to employ the smallest possible number of soldiers, as guards to their houses of trade; though the precarious circumstances in the countries in which these houses were situated, rendered a small guard indispensable.

The

CHAP. II.  
 1676-77. The equipments and stock for the season 1676-77, consisted of three ships, or fourteen hundred and eighty tons, and the estimated stock at £97,000 only, of which the proportion in goods was £69,500, and in bullion £27,500.<sup>(1)</sup>

Charter obtained from the King, for establishing a mint at Bombay.

The measures adopted for the Government of BOMBAY, during this season, were:—that the charges were to be abridged, as their amount had exceeded even that of the improved revenues;—that the aggressions of the Portuguese, at Tannah and Caranjah, having been represented to the King in Council, letters from His Majesty, on the basis of the resolutions of the Privy Council, had been transmitted to the Prince Royal of Portugal, and to the Viceroy of Goa, requiring forbearance from exactions of this description; and the Presidency of Surat were authorized, by such means as they could employ, to resist the payment of them:—the King's authority had also been granted to the Company, by His Letters Patent, dated 5th October 1676, (28th of Charles II.), to establish a mint at Bombay, at which they were empowered to coin “rupees, pice, and budgrooks,” which were to pass current, not only on the Island, but in all the dependencies of the Company in the East-Indies. Forty additional recruits had been embarked on the ships of the season, to render the garrison efficient.<sup>(2)</sup>

After

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 28th June and 25th August 1676, and 7th March 1676-77.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council at Surat, 7th March 1676-77.

After considering the reasons for war, or negotiation, with PERSIA, detailed in the Surat report of last season, the Court preferred the expedient of negotiation to hostilities; and explained, that, under treaty, they would be satisfied with obtaining one thousand tomunds per annum, as the moiety of the customs at Gombroon; and, should the Portuguese continue to refuse passes to the native junks going to that port, the Presidency of Surat were to refuse their passes to native vessels going to the Portuguese port of Cong, in the Persian Gulf, a resolution which the Presidency were to intimate to the Governor of Surat.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1676-77.  
Orders for entering into negotiations with Persia, for recovering the arrears of customs.

The instructions to the Agency of FORT ST. GEORGE proceeded, in this season, on the same limited scale of trade, which had been adopted for Surat; considerable difficulty, however, was experienced, in framing instructions, from the want of information, or any report from the Commissioners sent to examine the state of the Company's affairs at Masulipatam and in Bengal, and from not being possessed of the result of the applications which had been made to the

Commercial instructions, equipments, and stock, for Fort St. George.

VOL. II.

3 E

King

1676-77.— (Copy). Letter from King Charles to the Viceroy of Goa, 10th March

1676-77.— Report of the Lords of Trade on the Petition of the East-India Company, relative to Bombay, 23d February 1676-77.— Letters Patent granted to the East-India Company, for establishing a Mint at Bombay, 5th October 1676, (erroneously printed 1677,) — (Printed Collection of Charters, page 108.)

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Surat, 7th March 1676-77.— Letter from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Gombroon, 7th March 1676-77. Minute of Council, 12th February 1676-77.

















behaved with sobriety and regularity, it was recommended to the Court, that a proportion of them, being Protestants, should annually be embarked. The fatigue of marching infantry, in a hot climate, having cut off numbers, it was resolved to raise a small troop of horse, and to give the command of it to Captain Keigwin, the former Governor of St. Helena :—it was also in contemplation, to establish a militia, for the better defence of the Island ; but it would require time, and much prudence, to reconcile the inhabitants to this institution.<sup>(1)</sup> In the course of the season, however, this expedient had been tried, and six hundred men embodied, the charges of which would be defrayed by about one hundred of the principal land-owners on the Island.<sup>(2)</sup>

Two armed ships had been sent to protect the trade in the Persian Gulf, and at the port of GOMBRON ; it being explained to the King of Persia, that the Company's right to the customs had been granted for their former services at Ormus, and that the charges of those ships must be paid, in addition to the amount of customs then due, otherwise the protection of the port, by the English, would be withdrawn :—any refusal of this demand, on the part of the King of Persia, would be considered as equivalent to a declaration of hostilities.<sup>(3)</sup>

VOL. II.

3 F

The

(1)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 22d and 23d January 1676-77.

(2)—Letters from the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay to the Court, 24th January and 19th March 1676-77.

(3)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 22d September 1676.





























CHAP. II. season) to be provided for the investment of the subsequent  
 1677-78. year.<sup>(1)</sup>

Garrison of  
 St. Helena  
 formed into  
 two compa-  
 nies.

The Governor of ST. HELENA was ordered to form the garrison into two companies, and to continue his exertions for training the inhabitants to arms, for the defence of the Island; the alienation of lands was prohibited, unless after seven years possession.<sup>(2)</sup>

Death of Pre-  
 sident Aun-  
 gier, and suc-  
 cession of  
 Mr. Rolt to  
 the Presiden-  
 cy.

The summary of foreign events, under the administration of the Presidency of SURAT, for the season 1677-78, furnishes scarcely any commercial information, and only one great political event. In so far as regarded the European opponents of the Company, the President stated, that there had not been any arrivals of French ships, the credit of that people having declined;—that the Dutch shipping and trade, either from Europe, or from the Eastward, though considerable, had not materially affected the sales or purchases;—that difficulties still continued, in providing the investments along the Malabar Coast (Carwar, Calicut, &c.) and that the provision of the cargoes ordered from Surat for Bantam and the Eastward, had been injured, by the arrival of the King of Bantam's

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 23d January, and 15th March 1677-78.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Governor of St. Helena, 15th March 1677-78.

Bantam's ships with produce at Surat, and carrying thence goods, to rival the Company's sales at Bantam;—that the trade between Surat and the Gulf of Persia had rather worn a better aspect, the imports and exports, to and from Gombroon, having turned out more profitable than in the preceding season; and that the purchases at Ahmedabad, Broach, &c., had been provided with less interruption than usual. CHAP. II.  
1677-78.

The conquests of Sevagee, in this season, had been chiefly in the Carnatic, which had diverted his army from Surat; but his generals continued at Rairee, in such force, as to lead to an opinion that his power would soon extend from Surat to Cape Comorin.

These dispatches expressed the regrets of the Presidency for the death of Mr. Aungier, on the 30th June 1677, the loss of whose talents and integrity the remaining Members of Council at Surat (two only) considered to be a public calamity; for to him they ascribed, amid a succession of difficulties, the merit of having preserved the English trade for the last sixteen years. The administration of the Presidency devolved on Mr. Rolt, the Agent at Gombroon, agreeably to the Court's appointment, and the Government of Bombay on Mr. Henry Oxinden.<sup>(1)</sup>

The:

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, March to 31st August, 31st December 1667, 19th January, 6th February, 18th March 1677-78, and 3d April 1678.







## 1678-79.

THE resolutions upon which the Court founded their instructions to their Foreign Settlements, in the season 1678-79, were partly drawn from the political relations of England, with the Maritime Powers in Europe, (detailed in a preceding part of this Chapter,) and partly from the disappointment the Company had experienced in the returns for the large stock which had been sent to Surat, a considerable proportion of which had been required for the fortifications at Bombay, that this Island might not be endangered by any attack of European, or of Indian enemies.

The instructions to SURAT, drawn from the relative circumstances of the European powers, went to one point only, or to postpone large investments, till authentic information should reach them, that the Treaty of Nimeguen had been ratified, and, in the mean time, to order the homeward-bound ships to observe the same precautions, as during an actual war.

The resolutions, regarding Surat and Bombay, appear have arisen from a review of the Company's affairs at Surat, during the sixteen years of Sir George Oxinden's, and of President Aungier's administrations.

CHAP. II.  
1678-79.  
Instructions to the foreign Settlements suspended, till the result of the conferences at Nimeguen.

Presidency of Surat reduced to an Agency, and the Salaries of the civil servants diminished.



CHAP. II.  
1678-79. On a retrospect of these Annals, it will be found, that, on the first transfer of Bombay, by the Crown, to the Company, the equipments and stock had been augmented, and the trade placed on a large scale, and that the proceedings of Mr. Aungier, and the Council of Surat, had annually received the approbation of the Court ;—that it had been specifically enjoined, that Bombay should be made a seat of government and of trade, impregnable against any attacks of the Native Powers or States, and, by its fortifications, put in a situation, to resist any European enemy. On the same retrospect it will be found, that the wars between the Mogul and Sevagee, during the whole of this period, had continued, and though the Surat trade, by the exertions of President Aungier and his Council, had been preserved, both at its seat, and, in general, in its dependencies on the Malabar Coast, yet that both had been exposed to frequent interruptions, and to heavy losses ; and that these interruptions and losses, whether occasioned by the wars between the Maritime Powers in Europe, or those between the Native Powers, had rendered the charges for fortifying Bombay unavoidable, and the investments frequently precarious, by the sales of Europe produce being uncertain, and the prices of Indian articles fluctuating.

These facts do not appear, however, to have had their full weight on the resolutions of the Court in this season, because the returns from the large stock had not, as yet, been received,  
and











to be sent to Amoy and Tywan; fifty thousand dollars, in bullion, and twenty thousand, in goods, to Tonquin; and twenty thousand dollars, in bullion, and fifteen thousand, in goods, to Siam. From the disturbed state of the government at Tywan and Amoy, on account of the wars between the Tartars and Chinese, the Agents were ordered rather to hire houses for the accommodation of trade, than to build Factories:—another experiment might be made, of trade to Siam and Tonquin, to ascertain whether Europe goods would sell, or investments be procured, that would yield a profit; but, in this speculation, the Agent and Council were vested with discretionary powers to withdraw that trade, according to circumstances.

Trade to be  
attempted at  
Canton, in  
consequence

The Viceroy of CANTON having, by letters, offered the English at Bantam admission to trade, the Court ordered that  
a respectful







which the investments had hitherto been drawn, or even a detachment to protect Surat;—hence the stores of Europe goods, and the produce provided for investments, had been removed to Swally, that they might be more easily put on board the ships:—Struggling, thus, for the Company's interest, the Agent and Council of Surat complained of the hardship of the reduction of their rank as a Presidency, after it had, for so many years, and under so many dangers, been held up, as the principal seat of the Company's government and trade in the East-Indies.<sup>(1)</sup>

The information from BOMBAY was not less alarming:—the weavers were so poor, that, without some advances, manufactures could not proceed:—the diamond merchants could not be persuaded to settle at Bombay, while Sevagee occupied the countries on the neighbouring continent:—deaths among the soldiery were frequent, and few arrivals of recruits to fill up the vacancies:—the garrison was disheartened at the reduction of rank; and the Portuguese continued to obstruct the passes at Tannah and Caranjah.<sup>(2)</sup>

Difficulty of  
trade at Bom-  
bay and in  
Persia.

The trade to PERSIA, in this year, was equally unpromising, it being impracticable, from a scarcity in the country,  
and

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 24th September, 19th October, and 7th December 1678, 21st January and 17th February 1678-79, and 5th April 1679.

(2)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat, and the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay to the Court, 21st January 1678-79.







1679-80.

THE Restoration of Peace on the continent of Europe, CHAP. II.  
 in 1679-80, having removed the necessity of those precautions, 1679-80.  
 which the Court had ordered to be observed by their home-ward-bound ships, it might have been expected, that the contracted system, upon which the equipments and stock of the preceding year had been formed, would have been relinquished, lest the public should complain of the East-India trade not being carried on with those advantages, which the Joint Stock of the Company had promised:—the Court, however, adhered to the same limited system, as in the last season, expecting that, by reducing their civil and military establishments at Surat and Bombay, they would be able, from the savings, to discharge the debts which had been incurred by losses in trade at Surat, and by the military charges at Bombay.

Court alarmed at a new class of English Interlopers fitting out ships for the East-Indies, at Cadiz.

It was, therefore, resolved, to continue the reduced establishment at SURAT, which was, henceforward, to have, instead of the rank of a *Presidency*, that of an *Agency*;—the Agent was to have only £300 per annum; and a proportionate diminution was to take place in the salaries of the



It will immediately appear, however, from the different CHAP. II. amounts of equipments and stock consigned to Surat, and to 1679-80. Fort St. George, that the Court had received information of the views of these Interlopers being directed, chiefly to the trade on the Coromandel Coast, and the Bay of Bengal.

The equipments for SURAT and BOMBAY, in this season, Equipments and stock for Surat. consisted of three ships, or sixteen hundred tons, and the stock was estimated at £123,000, of which the large proportion of £99,600 was in bullion :—the investment expected was to be of the usual articles, sent from the West Coast of India, and from the Gulf of Persia, with the exception only of a small quantity of Surat goods, of a finer kind, amounting to £2,000, which was ordered to be purchased at Surat, and sent to Bantam.<sup>(1)</sup>

In the directions of the Court, for the administration Orders for continuing the retrenchments at Bombay, and for increasing the revenues. of BOMBAY, in this season, we discover a doubt of the practicability of carrying the orders of the preceding year into execution; but, at the same time, an adherence to the plan of retrenchment :—these orders had specified, that the rank of the military officers of the garrison should be lowered, and that the militia should be disembodied :—afraid, on reflection, that if this plan should be adopted, the Island might be left defenceless, the Court now directed, that two companies of auxiliary forces should be raised, composed of the principal

3 K 2

inhabitants

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council at Surat, 14th July and 29th September 1679, and 19th March 1679-80.









packages, that the goods might not be cut or damaged:—as CHAP. II.  
 the cloths which had been provided at Masulipatam had an- 1679-80.  
 swered at the sales at home, that Factory was ordered to  
 receive farther encouragement, which was also extended to  
 the new station at Madapollam. <sup>(1)</sup>

The instructions of the Court, in this season, to BENGAL, approved of Mr. Vincent's exertions, in obtaining the Nishân from the Prince, referred to last season; authorized the establishment of a Factory at Ballasore; and recommended the observance of the regulations, for keeping the books, consultations, &c.; and that all accounts should be signed by the Chief and Second in Council. <sup>(2)</sup>

The equipments for BANTAM, in 1679-80, consisted of three ships, or sixteen hundred tons, with a stock of  $\text{£}69,000$ , consisting of bullion, with a small proportion of broad-cloth:—the instructions required, that a good understanding should be cultivated with the King of Bantam, between whom, and the Dutch, a war was apprehended, in which the Agents were not to interfere, but, to rest on the articles of the late peace between England and the States General, and to avoid any

Orders to the Agent at Bantam, to improve the trade at Amoy, but to lessen the expences at Siam, Tonquin, and Tywan.

(1)—Letter from the King to [the Company's Agents and Councils on the Coast of Coromandel and Bay of Bengal, 2d December 1679.—— Commission from the Company to their Agents and Councils at the Coast of Coromandel and Bay of Bengal, 3d December 1679.—— Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council of Fort St. George, 3d and 31st December 1679.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Hughly, 3d and 31st December 1679.

and from which a communication might perhaps be opened with Japan; but the Factories at TYWAN, TONQUIN, and SIAM, were to be kept open on a limited scale, though the produce of those places had not sold in England, but with loss: one servant, only, was, therefore, to be left at each, to recover debts, and wind up the Company's concerns.<sup>(1)</sup>

144-  
St. In the season 1679-80, the Court took a review of their affairs at the Island of ST. HELENA, and established a code of regulations for the future management of the Island. The substance of these regulations was, that twenty acres of land, and two cows, should be allotted to each English family, and ten acres, and one cow, to each unmarried settler;—that the soldiers should be admitted, when their term of service expired, to these proportions of land, and that, in common with the other settlers, military service should be required of them, in guarding the Island; that is, that every proprietor of twenty acres of land should furnish a man, to be regularly trained

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 26th November 1679, 4th February and 19th March 1679-80, and 14th April 1680.



gee, and the Mogul Admiral, or Siddee, having respectively occupied the Islands of Hendry and Kenery.

of Sevagee:—the dissolving the Factory at Carwar was, in like manner, impracticable this season, because it might offend that Chief, and because the collecting of the Company's debts must be a previous step. What rendered the situation, both of Surat and Bombay, at this crisis, peculiarly embarrassing, was, the occupation, in October 1679, of the Island of Kendry, or Kenery, situated at the mouth of the harbour of Bombay, by the troops of Sevagee:—this unforeseen occurrence could not be prevented, because the Deputy Governor could only employ armed boats, to oblige the invader's troops to withdraw:—he was, therefore, compelled, from the want of force, to admit the right of Sevagee to occupy this Island, on his granting permission to the Company's Factors at Rajahpore, to return to Surat.

This event was followed by one equally menacing, or the seizure of the Island of Hendry, or Hendry, by the Siddee or Mogul Admiral, who assigned, among other reasons for this measure, that the Mogul had been offended at the treaty made by the English with Sevagee.

**BOMBAY**





CHAP. II.  
1679-80. On comparing the letter of the Deputy Governor and Council of Bombay, to the President at Surat, with his general letters to the Court during the season 1679-80, it appears, that however hard the condition to which the Company's servants, civil and military, were reduced, by the diminution of their numbers, rank, and allowances, they had complied with the orders of the Court, except in the allowances for table-money, the civil charges of the court of justice, and the military charges of the soldiers and marines; and to account for this deviation from their instructions, they furnished the Court with an estimate of the lowest possible scale to which the charges could be brought, even in a time of peace, explaining, that this estimate could not apply to existing circumstances, or to the constant alarm in which they were kept for the safety of the Island; and concluded, that they held it to be inconsistent with the trust reposed in them, to come under any obligations, not to exceed the amount which had been specified, when such excess, on consultation, should appear unavoidable; nor could they promise, that the revenues would improve, while the Island was so imminently exposed to the Native Powers, nor would it be prudent to discontinue the fortifications, because the workmen, who had received wages under this head, having no other subsistence, would necessarily leave the Island, and the cultivation of the land, of course, cease.<sup>(1)</sup>

The

(1)—Letters from the Deputy Governor and Council at Bombay to the Presidency of Surat, and to the Court, 7th and 31st December 1679.







vessel, by arms, as well as by time ; on every future occasion, therefore, it was ordered, that such service should be required of them ; but, it was explained, that like the Dutch, the Governor of Bombay ought to avoid interferences in all wars between the great Indian Powers, the Company having no adequate force for such a service, and that their ships and soldiers were to act only in insular situations.

Captain Keigwin, and seventy soldiers, sent as a re-inforcement for Bombay.

For the greater security of the Island of Bombay, the Court, this season, engaged Captain Keigwin, with the rank of Captain Lieutenant, and to be third in Council (no military officer being to rise above that rank) to proceed to Bombay, and to have the pay of six shillings per day, but no allowance for diet and lodging :—he was to bring with him a reinforcement of seventy English soldiers, eighteen pieces of small ordnance, and a proportion of ammunition, and to command the whole of the military force and militia ; but, to balance this additional charge, on the death, or coming away of either of the Lieutenants, no successor was to be appointed ; and, in the event of peace, a number of the Portuguese soldiers were to be discharged, proportioned to the re-inforcement now embarked, and the garrison reduced to a fixed establishment :



CHAP. II. kept in check the measures of this Agent and Council, by  
 1680 -81. correspondence with the Court, restored to his situation, the Court declaring to the Government of Fort St. George, "that they would rather dismiss the whole of their other Agents, than that Mr. Charnock should not be the Chief of Cossimbuzar."

On this occasion, Mr. William Gyfford was appointed to be Agent and Governor of Fort St. George, and a Council, consisting of five members, who were to be responsible to the Court, only; the succession, in the event of death, or removal, to be regular in those five, till the pleasure of the Court should be known:—the Agents, or Factors, at Masulipatam, and at the different stations in Bengal, were to remain fixed in their situations, unless, upon evidence of misbehaviour, supercessions should be deemed necessary by the Governor and Council at Madras, the reasons for which were to be entered on the consultations, and reported in their general letters; but no new appointment to a seat in the Council (except in case of death) was allowed, without the approbation of the Court, and, even in this case, to be provisionally, only, till such approbation should be signified. These changes proceeded from the frequent disobedience to orders, and from the indecorous letters addressed to the Court by their servants abroad.

On reviewing the commission to Mr. Gyfford, and the instructions under which he was to act, it appears, that he  
 was







# EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

The BENGAL Agents, this season, were ordered to transmit copies of all journals and consultations; to obtain full quantities of silks and taffaties; to send equal proportions of stock to Dacca and Malda; to make Ballasore a buying, as well as a shipping Factory, with a stock of £20,000, and not to interrupt the silk investments, by their private trade; to pay particular attention to the packing and sorting of goods; to dispatch the ships early for Europe; and whatever Phirmaunds, Nishâns, or Perwannahs, they might hereafter procure, were to be in the name of the London East-India Company, only. <sup>(1)</sup>

The same regular plan, as ordered for the government and trade of Fort St. George, was, this season, transmitted to BANTAM and its dependencies. Mr. Bowyer, with six Members of Council, were vested with the administration, and their salaries specified:—an allowance was fixed for the Factors at Amoy, Tonquin, &c. and regularity in keeping accounts and journals to be observed, copies of which were to be annually transmitted to England.

The equipments for Bantam consisted of three ships, with a stock estimated at £68,000, of which fifty thousand dollars were to be sent to Amoy, and fifty thousand to Tonquin; the remainder to be invested in pepper and ginger, at Bantam. The Factories at Siam and Jambee were again ordered to be dissolved; but, notwithstanding the direction for withdrawing the

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Hugly, 5th January 1680-81.

**CHAP. II.** the Factory at Tonquin, in the preceding year, another experi-  
**1680-81.** ment was to be made, to obtain silks, and a Mr. Blundel, a person particularly skilful in this article, sent from England, to examine whether that trade could be turned to more advantage, than it hitherto had been, or, by any expedient, connected with that of Japan :—the Factory at Amoy was supplied with goods and stock, to purchase silks, musk, &c., and if possible, to extend from that port the sale of English produce.

It does not appear, that, as yet, teas were in any estimation, not being mentioned in the orders of this season ; or that the Court had any farther idea of the CHINA trade, than that, through so extensive an Empire, the sale of English produce might be augmented, and silks procured ; but they repeated, that, in return to the invitation of the Viceroy of Canton, the Agent was to inform him, that as soon as the wars in China should be over, the English would readily make an experiment of trading to that port.<sup>(1)</sup>

More fa-  
vourable  
prospects of  
trade, from

The foreign Annals of the Company, beginning with those of SURAT, in the season 1680-81, open with the important

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 25th August 1680, and 5th January 1680-81.— Letters from the Court to the Factors at Amoy and Tonquin, 25th August 1680.



**CHAP. II.** French ship, with broad-cloth, and other goods fitted for the  
**1680-81.** market, that the ships might be fully laden.

Order of Aurungzebe to augment the customs at Surat from two to three and a half per cent.

This prospect, however, was obstructed, by an order from Aurungzebe to impose a heavy contribution on all his subjects, and, among others, on the European Factories at Surat:—on compliance being refused, as being contrary to grants and privileges, an order arrived to re-establish the ancient duty of three and a half per cent. customs, instead of two per cent.:—this order obliged the Presidency to offer, in conjunction with the French and Dutch, a present to the Governor, of thirty thousand rupees, provided, by his interest, the former rate of two per cent. customs should be allowed to continue. <sup>(1)</sup>

It does not appear, from the subsequent dispatches, that a grant to this effect, was obtained, the rebellion of Sultan Acbar, the third son of Aurungzebe, supported by the Rajpoots, having prevented all negotiation.

The investment for Europe considerable.

The large investment which had been put on board the Company's ships for Europe, amounting, in cloths and pepper, to 9,73,000 rupees, the Presidency explained to have been obtained, partly from their having received a small quantity of cloth, and other Europe commodities, only, by which means they had disposed of the articles remaining in store, to much greater advantage than could have been anticipated, but chiefly

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council at Surat, 18th October 1680.



**CHAP. II.** and Council, acquiescing in those Chiefs' retaining these 1680-81. stations, the trade had neither decreased, nor the number of inhabitants in Bombay been diminished; for the revenues, which had been farmed, produced more than in former seasons, and the garrison had been reinforced by the guard from Surat, and the arrival of twenty-eight recruits. <sup>(1)</sup>

Phirmaund obtained from the King of Persia, for payment of part of the arrears of customs at Gombroon.

In PERSIA, the sales and purchases at Gombroon had been depressed, although Mr. Pettit, the Agent, had obtained a Phirmaund from the King of Persia, for the payment of a thousand tomands, or above £3,000 sterling, as the moiety of customs, for the preceding season; and he was in expectation of receiving another thousand tomands, as the moiety for the current year. <sup>(2)</sup>

The accounts of the proceedings of the Government of FORT ST. GEORGE, on the new constitution which had been promulgated, did not reach England this season, and the commercial measures adopted for providing the investment at the Fort, and at the Factories in BENGAL, are the only facts detailed in the Company's records. <sup>(3)</sup>

It does not appear, that any communication was received, this season, from BANTAM.

(1)—Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 24th January 1680-81, and 11th April 1681.

(2)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 24th January 1680-81, and 11th April 1681.

(3)—Letter from the Agency of Fort St. George to the Factories in Bengal, 12th August 1680.





trade, as far as possible, to all the countries within their limits, that they might obviate a prejudice, which was beginning to prevail in England, that they had not fulfilled the intentions of the King, in granting them exclusive privileges, or that they ought not, for the public good, to prevent private merchants from sending ships and stock to ports, and to countries, in which the British trade had not, hitherto, been introduced.

The

The application of the large stock of the preceding year, CHAP. II.  
to discharge the debt at interest, and the carrying the 1681-82.  
balance of £30,000 to the account of the investment for the  
subsequent year, was approved of; but, in future, it was  
ordered, that money should not be taken up in India, at a  
higher interest than six per cent. <sup>(1)</sup>

On comparing the instructions to Surat, regarding the  
Island of BOMBAY, with the orders to the Deputy Go-  
vernor, we find, that the Court approved of the measures  
which had been adopted, for averting the dangers with which  
the Island had been threatened, by the occupation of the  
Islands of Henery and Kenery, by the forces of Sevagee and  
the Siddee; and though they admitted, in so difficult a case,  
that it might be often hazardous to carry the instructions for  
retrenchment into effect, or to raise a sum in the Island, equal  
to the charges, yet they limited the expences to 72,000 xera-  
phins per annum, and appointed Captain Keigwin to be  
Captain Lieutenant, and to command the garrison, with  
the pay of six shillings per day; but revoked the order for  
his having a seat in Council. <sup>(2)</sup>

Orders for li-  
miting the  
civil and mi-  
litary charges  
of Bombay to  
a fixed sum.

A new plan of trade with PERSIA was next projected, or to  
connect the trade of the two Gulfs, with that of Surat :—and  
with Plan for revi-  
ving the Per-  
sian trade,  
and connect-  
ing it with  
the trade to  
Mocha.

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 10th February 1681-82,  
and 6th April 1682.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Deputy Governor and Council of Bombay, 31st  
January 1681-82.





abroad, they obtained from the King, additional powers, vesting them with authority for these proceedings.

Having unfolded the principles upon which the Court acted, we have to advert to the amount of the tonnage and stock, exceeding in quantity and value (upon the basis of the subscription of the Proprietors which had been called in) the equipment of any former season, and to explain, from the commercial orders for the appropriation of both, the instructions to establish new Factories, at such ports, as it was conjectured the Interlopers might visit; and, farther to strengthen this resolution, discretionary powers were given,

“ to

“ to spare no money in presents to the Native Powers,” to prevent the Interlopers from obtaining protection. CHAP. II.  
1681-82.

The equipments for the season 1681-82, to Fort St. George, alone, consisted of six ships, or three thousand eight hundred tons, with a stock in goods and bullion, estimated at £530,000:—£60,000 was to be appropriated to the purchase of diamonds; £150,000 to remain at the Fort, for the cloth investments; £90,000 for Masulipatam and Madapolam, and £230,000 for the Bay of Bengal. It was explained, that this very large stock was intended to counteract the Dutch, who were now imitating the English, for instead of sending, as formerly, all their goods to their grand dépôt at Batavia, thence to be shipped for Europe, they had ordered their ships to proceed direct to Holland, from the ports at which the cargoes were procured:—for this purpose they had, in this season, fitted out no less than twenty sail:—from subsequent information, it was discovered that the Dutch intended to establish their exclusive monopoly rather by force of arms, (three thousand troops being embarked in this fleet) than by the weight of their stock, reported to be about £140,000, which the Court were of opinion, could not commercially preponderate against the very large stock of the Company, sent to Fort St. George, and its dependencies.

A Factory was ordered to be established at Porto Novo, to which place it was apprehended the Interlopers might resort, and every expedient which the Agent and Council

Bengal constituted a distinct Agency from Fort St. George, and Mr. Hedges, one of the Directors, appointed Agent at Hugly, and Governor of the Company's Settlements in Bengal.

The trade to BENGAL, both in its origin and progress, had, hitherto, been subservient to that of the Coromandel Coast, and under the control of the Agent and Council at Fort St. George: this control, however, had been irregularly exercised, probably from the circumstance of the Agent at Hugly, and not unfrequently at the lesser Factories, having an eventual title to succession, sometimes to the Government, and, often, to a seat in the Council of Fort St. George; it frequently occurred, also, that this control was evaded, by the expectation of succeeding to the Government of the Fort, at which an opportunity would be given to justify proceedings

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 20th May 22d July, 18th and 30th November, and 30th December 1681.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 9th and 13th February, and 10th March 1681-82.

ceedings, improper in themselves, and sometimes the foundation of blame by the Court. These removals of Agents and Factors, managing the Company's interests on the Coast, or in Bengal, had produced irregularities; the last, and most striking instance of which was the dismissal of Mr. Master, at Fort St. George, and the confirmation of Mr. Job Charnock, as Chief of Cossimbuzar:—it was, therefore, determined, on taking into consideration the evils resulting from the dependency of the Bengal Factories on the Fort, to constitute the Agency at Hughly, a distinct and separate Factory from Fort St George; but that, in an affair of such importance, they might act with certain knowledge, the Court appointed Mr. Hedges, a Member of their Committees (or what, in modern times, would be termed a Director of the East-India Company) with special powers to be Agent, and Governor of their affairs in the Bay of Bengal, and of the Factories subordinate to it, or Cossimbuzar, Patna, Ballasore, Malda, and Dacca; and directed that the stock of £230,000, appropriated for Bengal, should be distributed as follows; £140,000 to be sent to Cossimbuzar, £14,500 to Patna, £32,000 to Ballasore, £15,000 to Malda, £16,500 to Dacca, and £12,000 to remain at Hughly. After specifying the silks, cloths, and other articles, expected from each of those Factories, to form the investment of the season, the Court repeated the orders against the Interlopers, already detailed, and directed, that a corporal, of approved

CHAP. II.

1681-82.



was the foundation of the Company's government in Bengal, or what became, in the sequel, the centre of commerce, and the seat of Government in British India.<sup>(1)</sup>

Equipments  
and stock for  
Bantam, and  
instructions  
to resettle the  
Factory at  
Amoy, and  
to extend the  
trade to Can-  
ton.

The Court's orders, during the season 1681-82, to BANTAM, varied, as the information they received of events, rendered the resolutions of the preceding year more or less practicable in their execution:—at the opening of the season, they fitted out four small vessels, and afterwards a fifth, carrying in the whole, eight hundred and ninety tons, with a stock estimated at £32,000, of which £20,000 was for Tonquin, and £12,000 for Amoy, to connect the trade from this port with Bantam, and, of course, with the imports from Surat and the Coast, and the sales at Tonquin and Amoy. At the beginning of this season, the Factories at Siam and Tywan were intended to be withdrawn; but, towards the close of the year, information having been received, that the Tartars had been expelled from Amoy, (though it was uncertain whether they might not repossess themselves of that port,)

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at the Bay of Bengal, 20th May, and 18th and 30th November 1681, and 4th January and 10th March 1681-82.—Commission and Instructions to William Hedges, Esq. to be Agent and Governor at the Bay of Bengal, 14th November 1681.



CHAP. II. take up money, to the amount of £20,000, provided the  
1681-82. interest did not exceed nine per cent. <sup>(1)</sup>

Judicial re-  
gulations for  
St. Helena.

Having, in the preceding seasons, at the close of the instructions of the Court to their Foreign Settlements, sketched out, separately, the orders to the Governor of the Island of ST. HELENA, not annually, but as they assumed new aspects, we discover, at the close of this year, that, after censuring the Governor for the reception he had given to the Interlopers, a new plan of administration, was established, of which the following is the substance :—the Governor to be the sole judge of the Island, and to hold regular courts of justice, once in three months ;—the Sheriffs to be nominated by the Governor, by selecting the most respectable inhabitants, with power to summon juries, which juries were to decide, according to the laws of England, in civil and criminal cases :—capital punishments were to be inflicted, according to their verdict, for the crimes of murder, mutiny, or treason (defined to be “ any plot, “ or scheme to deliver up the Island to foreigners ”) ; all other wrongs or crimes, such as theft, injuries to person or property, and giving false evidence, were to be punished, on conviction, by fine, imprisonment, pillory, or whipping ;—the Governor and Council, however, were always to have the power of suspending, mitigating, or pardoning such crimes or offences :—

Subordinate

(1)—Letters of the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 20th May and 12th and 19th August 1681, and 18th February 1681-82.— Letters of the Court to the Factors at Tonquin and Amoy, 12th August 1681.



**CHAP. II.** After noticing that Mr. Child had been established, 1681-82. agreeably to the Court's orders, this President and his Council informed the Court, that the investment accumulated from the subordinate Factories, of cloths, pepper, cardamoms, and cassia-lignum, had enabled them to load the Company's three ships, and that they estimated the cargoes at 10,63,932 rupees ; —that the purchase of diamonds, to the extent of £20,000, (as at first ordered) had been attempted, through the private merchants, but when they were informed, that the Company had included that article in their trade, these merchants had ceased to deal in them ; the purchases, therefore, could not be effected on the advantageous terms expected, because the number of European and Native competitors in the market, at Golcondah, had raised the prices :—the Factory at Rajahpore had been withdrawn, but that at Carwar continued for another year :—the debt at interest had been cleared off, by the stock sent, and by the proceeds of the sales ; and about £30,000 remained to commence the investment of the subsequent year.<sup>(1)</sup>

Embarrassed  
state of Bom-  
bay from  
Sombagee  
continuing  
the plans of  
Sevagee.

The administration of the Island of BOMBAY, the Presidency of Surat represented (there being no direct communication from the Deputy Governor and Council) had been the most difficult, as well as the most embarrassing part of their duty, on account of the occupation of the barren rocks of Henery and Kenery, by the troops of Sevagee and of the Mogul ; the obstructions

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 27th October 1681, 23d January 1681-82, and 25th March and 10th April 1682.



**CHAP. II.** instructions; but, not being able to obtain a complement of 1681-82. European seamen, he had embarked the Ambassadors, and a suite of twenty-five persons, on the Company's ship *London*, with a letter of recommendation to the Court, and a present of fifty bahars of white pepper. Though the Agent had purchased and shipped cargoes of pepper, benjamin, ginger, &c., the circumstances of the English dependencies on Bantam, during this season, were uncertain, and no intelligence had been received by the Court, relative to the China trade.<sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Letter from the Agent and Council at Bantam to the Court, 19th August 1681.

— Letter from the Pangran, or Chief Minister, at Bantam, to the Court, 22d October 1681.

**EAST-INDIA COMPANY.**



scheme was held to be of such public consequence, that it came under the consideration of the King and Privy Council, in April 1682, who rejected it, and continued that protection which they had afforded to the exclusive privileges of the London East-India Company.

Instructions  
to Surat, to  
re-establish  
the Factory  
at Rajahpore,  
and to form  
an alliance  
with Samba-  
gee.

This event the Court considered to be of so much importance, that they sent overland dispatches to SURAT, to be communicated to all their settlements, and ordered that they should dispose of English produce at low rates, on the principle of vending quantities, rather than obtaining large profits ;—the friendship of Sambagee Rajah was, therefore, ordered to be cultivated, by re-establishing the Factory at Rajahpore ;—fine goods, particularly such as were ornamented with gold and silver, formerly disposed of at the Persian market, and, in general, all new commodities, which they might conceive would add to the assortments at the home sales, were to be introduced into the investments.

A new practice, probably a refinement in policy, was  
this

#### EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

this year introduced, for the Court, instead of specifying the quantity of tonnage, or the amount of stock, as in the preceding seasons, described both to be larger than had hitherto been sent, and, by a subsequent dispatch to Persia, added, that the stock for the whole of their Settlements in India, would amount, in this season, to above *One Million Sterling*:—this concealment was evidently intended to raise the expectations of the King, of the Council, and of the public, that the Company were prosecuting the East-India trade to the utmost extent. <sup>(1)</sup>

It does not appear, that any particular instructions were sent this season to the Government of BOMBAY.

If the trade with PERSIA, for a series of years, had been on the decline, from the superior naval means of the Dutch and Portuguese, and from the hesitation of the Company to attempt any thing but negotiation, the Court, in this season (1682-83) intimated to their Agent at Gombroon, their determination to adopt more spirited measures, and to equip a maritime force, to second respectful applications to the King of Persia for redress of past grievances, and for the renewal of grants and treaties. On this occasion, a letter, or remonstrance, was addressed to the King of Persia, in which the Court stated their claims on his justice, which was proverbially

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 1st and 26th May, 28th August, and 6th and 15th September 1682.

CHAP. II.  
1682-83

bially held in Europe to be unalterable; that, contrary to this justice, his ministers, or officers, at the ports at which the English Factories, were settled, or to which their ships resorted, had obstructed their trade, in direct violation of solemn treaties between the two countries; that, though; with respectful deference, they prayed for relief, yet possessing a naval power, which was unrivalled, if such relief should be withheld by his ministers and officers, they trusted that so great and so just a Prince would, instead of considering that naval force, which they employed for their protection, as disrespectful to his dignity, would view it only as a necessary expedient, for restoring the amicable relations between Persia and England.

Plan of combining the Persian and Mocha trade, and bartering English cloth for Persian silks.

While the Court adopted these vigorous measures to recover their proportion of the customs, and the debts due to the Company in Persia, which they calculated to amount to £1,000,000 sterling, they resolved, at the same time, to send a larger stock, to give new vigour to the circuitous trade, which, in the preceding season, they had opened, or to equip large ships, to proceed directly from England to Mocha, thence to go round and touch at Gombroon, then to proceed to Bussorah, and return to Gombroon, and lastly, to rendezvous at Surat, and there to complete their cargoes, and thence proceed for Europe:—discretionary powers were also secretly given, that if the sales of cargoes could be completed at Mocha,





#### EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

sociation for Indian trade, and the determination of the King and Council to resist this project : and recommended the support of the Factory at Porto Novo, and the establishment of a Factory in the Gingee Country, that, by the magnitude of their purchases, they might, (though with a loss) counteract the schemes of the Interlopers ; and repeated the orders to obstruct their proceedings, and went so far as to enjoin, that if any of the Company's servants should intermarry with the families of the Interlopers, they should be dismissed from their employments, and sent home :—If the Danes were disposed to relinquish Tranquebar, the Agent was empowered to purchase it, at a reasonable rate, for the Company.

The garrison of Madras was this year strengthened with thirty recruits, both for the defence of the Fort, and to furnish a guard to any of the Factories which might be established.<sup>(1)</sup>

The dispatches of the Court, this season, to the Agent and Council at the BAY OF BENGAL, being the first (agreeably to the system explained in the preceding year) addressed to them as an independent Agency, discover, that the Court began to consider this trade as affording the most valuable part of their imports, for besides equipping vessels direct for the

VOL. II.

3 Q

Ganges,

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Fort St. George, 1st and 26th May, 5th July, 28th August, 20th September, 4th and 27th October 1682, and 2d April 1683.

for the first time, twenty duffers of opium :—To strengthen the means of this Agency, they allowed it to take up (at what they termed a Bank) to the amount of £200,000, and calculated that the remains of the stock and credit of the last year, would amount to £350,000 :—The more effectually to promote this trade, the Court engaged to send in the ships of the ensuing season, a stock of £600,000, principally in bullion, that, with this accumulation of credit and stock, the Agents at Hughly, and at the subordinate stations, might have a Double Stock (which, for so many years, had been recommended as essentially requisite) that is, funds to provide the goods ordered at the proper seasons, and at the cheapest rates, and have goods in store sufficient for the subsequent year :—to prevent dead freight, rice was to be sent to the Fort, to fill up the tonnage, which would enable the Agent to dispatch such of the ships as arrived early in the season, that they might reach England in the month of March, in time for the Company's spring sales.

Attempts to  
be made to  
cultivate flax  
in Bengal.

A new speculation was started this season, at Madras and in Bengal, or the erecting a manufactory for sail-cloth and linens :—it was supposed, that in the country round these Set-

tlements

#### EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

elements they might raise flax, fitted for these manufactures, at this time supplied by Holland and Flanders. This plan, if it answered, would encourage industry and navigation, and add to the English resources:—if, however, the heat of the climate should be so great, as to prevent the cultivation of flax, the Court, as a substitute, ordered that one or two hundred bales of linen yarn should be sent home, to be manufactured in England, because this import would have the double advantage of depressing the manufactures of rival nations, and of encouraging the linen trade of England;—the Company, thus, would have the merit of forming a new article of British merchandize, and would encourage industry and navigation, in opposition to rival maritime powers in Europe, and give useful employment to English subjects.

These spirited speculations, towards the close of this season, were checked, by a series of those untoward events, to which commercial enterprizes are subjected, *vis.* the unexpected failure in the monied interest in London, which hitherto had furnished the Company with bullion for their exports; the capture of Bantam by the Dutch; and the loss of one of their outward-bound ships (the *Johanna*) with a cargo of £70,000 in bullion:—these events occasioned a run on the Company's treasury, and produced the resolution, for maintaining their credit, that the money arising from the March Sale, 1683, should be wholly appropriated to the discharge of their debts; that





#### **EAST-INDIA COMPANY.**

such, as to induce them to confine their orders, this season, to the providing of pepper for the ships sent to China and Tonquin, and if exchanges at both should fail, then the trade to Bantam was to consist of the sales of English produce, and returns in pepper.

As the trade at Amoy had been lost, a vessel had been equipped for CANTON, with a letter to the Viceroy, offering to establish a Factory at that port :—the Agent at Tonquin was to forward the sales of English produce, and to procure silks, copper, &c.; and though the Agency at Siam had been directed, in the preceding season, to be withdrawn, a last effort was to be made at that place, to push the sales of English cloths, &c. in exchange for silks and Japan produce, suited to the Surat and Europe markets, and thus, if practicable, to render Bantam, and its dependencies, the centre of trade in the Farther Indies. <sup>(1)</sup>

---

The principal events affecting the Company's trade and Factories, communicated, by the first dispatches of this season, from SURAT, were, that Bantam had been taken by the Dutch,

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bantam, 1st May, 15th July, 20th September, and 2d October 1682.—Letter to the Agent and Factors in China, 11th and 20th December 1682.—Letter to the Agent and Factors at Siam, 20th December 1682.—Letter to the Agent and Factors at Tonquin, 20th September 1682.

CHAP. II.  
1682-83.  
wars between  
Aurangzebe  
and Samba-  
gee, and by the  
Mogul's order  
to encrease  
the customs  
at Surat.

Dutch, on the 30th August 1682, but without any explanation of the effects which this event had on the Company's trade and shipping at that port;—and that Aurungzebe was equipping a fleet, and assembling a large army, to act against his son, Sultan Acbar, who had revolted, and united with Sambagee Rajah. These circumstances materially affected the inland trade, and induced the President and Council to send the greatest part of the Company's goods to Swally, to prevent their falling into the hands of either of these rival powers, should the country round Surat become the theatre of war:—French and Dutch vessels, of large size, and with rich cargoes of Europe goods and bullion, had arrived, which had depressed both the sales and purchases; and the Portuguese at Goa, notwithstanding assurances that they would not receive or encourage Interlopers, had admitted one of their ships to trade at this port, where she had disposed of a rich cargo, and taken in goods for Europe:—the Portuguese had also adjusted their proportion of customs with the King of Persia, and obstructed the Company's trade and shipping in that Gulf:—the Company's ships had, however, successively arrived at Surat, and gone down to bring up goods from Carwar, Batticook, and Onore; and, it was hoped, they would be filled up and dispatched early for Europe. <sup>(1)</sup>

In

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 13th and 18th November, 9th December 1682, and 16th January 1682-83.



not only be unprofitable, but probably attended with considerable loss;—that the trade in diamonds, (the price of which continued rather to increase in India) would, also, ultimately, prove a losing concern, if the sales of them in England were at so low a rate as the Court had described; and yet, notwithstanding these embarrassing circumstances, the Presidency had dispatched six ships for England, at the end of this season, the cargoes of which were invoiced at 14,33,000 rupees.<sup>(1)</sup>

Report on the  
state of the Is-  
land of Bom-  
bay.

In 1682-83, the revenue of BOMBAY had increased, being, this season, calculated to exceed the two preceding years, by  
4,700

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 26th January 1682-83, and 10th April 1683:— Letters from the Agent at Carwar to the Court, 10th December 1682, and 8th January 1682-83.



CHAP. II. was, therefore, made to the Court, for instructions and aid,  
1682-83. under these circumstances.<sup>(1)</sup>

Difficulty of  
procuring  
payment of  
Customs at  
Gombroon,  
and the  
Court's plan  
of combining  
the Persian  
and Mocha  
trade imprac-  
ticable.

The Company's trade, and their right to the customs at GOMBROON, in this season, experienced new difficulty, from the economical plan recommended by the Court, being inconsistent with the orders, that an application should be made to the King of Persia for redress, and for protection of trade : —to obviate this difficulty, the Agent and Factors at Gombroon stated, that the appearance of a small Portuguese force, in the preceding year, had induced the Shahbunder to make payment of customs, to the amount of nine thousand tomands, and to give them a facility of trade ; and that the annual arrival of two large Dutch ships had impressed the Shahbunder with an opinion of their power and wealth, and facilitated their trade ; but that the arrival of the Dragon, a small ship, sent out on a speculation of trade to Mocha, Bussorah, and Gombroon, instead of raising the English character, tended to depress it, and to do away the only means which could be effectually used, to ensure an opinion of the power and wealth of the Company, or to enforce the observance of grants and treaties :—hence, the project of sending the Dragon could not have been founded upon a knowledge of facts, for Mocha was supplied by Armenian merchants, with Europe cloth from Surat ; Bussorah, by cloth from Aleppo,

(1)—Letters from the Deputy Governor and Council of Bombay to the Court, 22d September 1682, and 8th January 1682-83.





CHAP. II. —it appears, however, that Mr. Hedges, the Director, had  
 1682-83. arrived at Hughly, and intimated his commission, and the new  
 plan of commercial administration, with which he was intrust-  
 ed; and that he had found both Hughly, and the subordinate  
 Factories, disturbed, by an order which had come from the  
 Mogul, for levying three and a half per cent. customs:—the  
 Agents at Ballasore, Cossimbuzar, &c., were struggling to be  
 exempted from this tax, and making such purchases as would  
 meet the Company's orders. The progress of Mr. Hedges's  
 measures must be collected from the events of the subsequent  
 season. <sup>(1)</sup>

Bantam taken  
 by the Dutch,  
 as allies of the  
 young King,  
 the old King  
 expelled, and  
 the English  
 Factory  
 obliged to re-  
 tire to Bata-  
 via.

The revolution which had taken place at BANTAM, in Au-  
 gust 1682, accounts for the deficiency of intelligence from that  
 ancient seat of the Company's trade. By a letter from a Mr.  
 Hodges, formerly of the Bantam Council, dated at Tonquin,  
 it appears that the Dutch had drawn the young King into a  
 rebellion against his father, who, with their aid, had been dri-  
 ven, not only from Bantam, but from his other sea-ports; and  
 that when the Dutch became masters of Bantam, the young  
 King had taken possession of the Company's house; hence all  
 that remained to the Agent and Council was, after making in-  
 ventories of the goods in the warehouses, to proceed to Batavia,  
 where an offer was made to them by the Dutch Governor, of  
 shipping to take the Company's property from Bantam, and

to

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Council at Hughly, and the Agents at the subordi-  
 nate Factories in Bengal, 27th May, 14th and 18th July, and 2d September 1682.



## 1683-84.

---

CHAP. II.  
 1683-84. Court's instructions to their Foreign Settlements influenced by the capture of Bantam, and the bankruptcies of several great houses in London.

WHEN information reached England, that Bantam had been captured by the Dutch, the Court determined to abridge the equipments of the season 1683-84; but not having received precise intelligence, respecting the consequences of this outrage, the instructions to their Foreign Settlements were necessarily varied, in the course of the season.

It could not, for some time, be discovered, whether the States General had authorized this proceeding, or whether it originated with the Governor General of Batavia, as an expedient to find resources for maintaining that establishment, and funds for the Dutch trade; but a sudden and considerable fall in the Dutch stocks led to the conjecture, that Bantam had been besieged and taken, in consequence of orders from the Dutch Companies; the effect was precisely the reverse of what they expected, for, from the alarm taken by the Maritime Powers engaged in the East-India trade, many of whose subjects were proprietors of Dutch East-India stock, unexpected demands were made on the Dutch Companies, which still farther depressed the value of their stock; and as a considerable proportion of the money drawn from them,



## CHAP. II.

1683-84.  
Limited  
equipments  
and stock for  
Surat.

In this situation of their affairs the Court resolved to dispatch two ships for Surat, at the opening, and two, towards the close of the season 1683-84.<sup>(1)</sup>

A farther tonnage, however, was ordered, from the following event :—on receiving information that the Dutch funds were so low, that their imports were expected to be inconsiderable, orders were given to increase the investment in cloths, indigo, and pepper, which it was hoped might be done at reasonable rates, because the war between France and England had rendered the interference of the French Company, in the Surat market, less probable than on former occasions.

Court authorized by Charter, to erect Courts of Judicature, and establish Admiralty Jurisdiction in India.

The King, by Letters Patent, dated 9th August 1683, authorized the Company to exercise Admiralty Jurisdiction in the countries within their limits :—the object of this grant was to enable them to seize and condemn the ships of the Interlopers : for this purpose, the President was appointed Judge Advocate, *pro tempore*, to take cognizance of all naval cases ; these powers were given to the President and Council of Surat, to resist encroachments on the Company's privileges, at the time when the ships and cargoes of the Interlopers had been detained in England, and prosecutions instituted against the owners and commanders.<sup>(2)</sup>

This

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 25th May 1683.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 31st May, 20th July, 14th August, 6th September, 16th November, and 12th December 1683, and 7th April 1684.— Letters Patent, granting the Company's authority to exercise Admiralty Jurisdiction, &c., dated 9th August 1683. (Printed Collection of Charters, page 116.)

## EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

This authority to the President and Council of Surat was, however, temporary only, that they might be enabled to seize the goods of the Interlopers, and allow the parties to recover, by suits in Chancery, in England; for, by a commission from the King, dated 6th February 1683-84, and from the Court, dated 7th April 1684, Dr. John St. John was appointed Judge of the Court of Admiralty to be erected in the East-Indies, and to have cognizance of all admiralty cases within the Company's limits. This Court was to be held at Bombay, as being a possession acquired by the Crown, and, by it, vested in the Company, in full property:—it was to consist of the Judge, and two Merchants, Company's servants:—the Judge was to have a salary of £200 per annum, and allowances at the Company's table;—he was to take cognizance of, and to try, examine, and decide on all cases regarding the Interlopers, or private merchants, who might attempt, contrary to the King's orders, and in violation of the Company's exclusive privileges, to trade, or establish Factories, in the countries within their limits:—all the processes were to be in English, and not in Latin, and a table of fees was to be framed, to prevent arbitrary charges on the King's subjects, or the Natives of India.<sup>(1)</sup>

The capture of Bantam by the Dutch, led to the declaration of the Court, that, in future, they would consider

VOL. II.

3 S

BOMBAY

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 7th April 1684.— Commission from the King to Dr. St. John, to be Judge of the Admiralty Court in India, 6th February 1683-84.— Commission from the East-India Company to Dr. St. John, 7th April 1684.

a resolution which was incompatible with the retrenchments, civil and military, ordered in the two last seasons.

Court's directions for increasing the revenues of Bombay.

The revolution at Bantam had induced His Majesty and the Court to send out a naval and military force, the object of which was to oblige the Native Powers to conform to subsisting treaties, and to assist in the restoration of the King of Bantam, who had been dethroned by his son, instigated by the Dutch :—when this service should be effected, the soldiers embarked for that purpose, were to proceed to Bombay, and to form the third company, on the military establishment of that Island. Forty recruits, also, were sent, to complete the two established companies, and the fortifications were ordered to be strengthened ; and to add to the effective force of the garrison, two companies of Rajpoots, of one hundred men each, were to be embodied, and the men selected from the countries not subject to the Mogul, to Sambagee, or to the Portuguese, to be commanded by officers of their own cast, to use their own arms, and to have a weekly pay, half in rice and half in money, and when on duty, to be blended with the regular English troops.

To defray the charges of this enlarged establishment (taking the Dutch at Batavia as an example, and proceeding on the practice at St. Helena) a duty of half a dollar was ordered to be levied on all ships anchoring in the harbour, (the Company's





CHAP. II. was considered, might restore amity and commerce between  
1683-84. the English and Persians.

The armament, for this purpose, coincided with the obligations under which the King and Company were placed, to restore the old King of Bantam, and the Company's trade at that port, and was divided into two squadrons; one, to be under the command of Sir John Wetwang, with instructions to act against Bantam, and the other, under Sir Thomas Grantham, intended for the Persian Gulf. These fleets, in the first instance, were to co-operate for the relief of Bantam, where Sir John Wetwang was to act as Admiral, and Sir Thomas Grantham as Vice Admiral; but, after this service should be effected, Sir Thomas Grantham was to proceed to the Persian Gulf, under orders to demand the payment of the arrears of customs from the King of Persia, that is, to receive thirty thousand tomands, in full satisfaction for the debts due to the Company, and to insist on a Phirmaund for the moiety of the customs, agreeably to the ancient treaty, when the English expelled the Portuguese from the Island of Ormus, and restored Gombroon, and the other Persian ports, to a trade with the coasts of India. As a separate instruction, the goods at Ispahan were to be disposed of, and those at Gombroon, if not sold, placed in safety, whatever might be the issue of this enterprize.

In the progress of the season, an arrangement took place,  
between







**CHAP. II.** which, a town, like Madras, was to be erected, the rents of  
**1683-84.** which might, in time, defray the charges, and an Engineer employed, at £5 per month, for this service:—the lesser vessels of this fleet, with a small stock of goods, were to attempt the formation of Factories at Pegu, Siam, Maccassar, and Johore, and, if possible, one small vessel, with a cargo of Coast goods and skins, was to make another experiment for a trade with Japan; and letters were addressed by the Company to the Emperor of Japan, and the Governor of Nagasaki, praying permission to trade at that port.

The Presidency of Fort St George were farther informed, that the ships of some of the Interlopers had been detained in England, and prosecutions instituted against them; that every expedient abroad, however, must be tried, to obstruct their trade, within the Company's limits;—in particular, that pepper, purchased from the Portuguese, or from Native ships, was to be warehoused at the Fort, to be ready for the Company's regular ships; and that an investment, in diamonds, (from the vicinity of Golcondah to the Fort,) was to be attempted, on the Company's account, to the extent of £20,000 or £30,000.<sup>(1)</sup>

Mr. Hedges,  
 Agent in  
 Bengal, dis-  
 missed, and  
 Mr. Gyfford  
 appointed  
 President of  
 Fort St.  
 George and  
 Bengal.

As Mr. Hedges had been appointed by the Court to be Agent, with a Council, at BENGAL, independently of any subordination to Fort St. George, it is material to look at the proceedings

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Fort St. George, 31st May, 20th July, 14th August, 5th September, 19th and 31st October, and 21st December 1683, and 29th February 1683-84.



CHAP. II. to be Agent at Bengal, with the title of President over both  
1683-84. Settlements.

Measures for  
protecting  
the Coroman-  
del and Ben-  
gal trade.

This change of system is explained, by the impression of the Court, that the Dutch conquest of Bantam, instead of promoting the power or influence of a rival European Company, would enable the English Agents on the Coromandel Coast, and in the Bay of Bengal, to acquire a superiority, of influence and of trade, in both of those countries; conceiving that the Dutch power and commerce, would, in future, be confined to the Spice Islands, and their stock and equipments for the Peninsula of India, diminished, which would afford the English an opportunity of larger sales of Europe goods, and an unrivalled purchase in Indian produce. It was with these objects, that a large vessel, the Charles the Second, mounting seventy-two guns, under Sir Thomas Grantham, was directed to cruize along the Coast of Coromandel and Bay of Bengal, to seize on the Interlopers of every description, and to second the efforts of the Court at home, for suppressing a class of freebooters, acting equally against the exclusive privileges of the Company, and the interest of the nation.

Stock for  
Bengal, and  
instructions  
to obtain a  
fortified sta-  
tion at the  
mouth of the  
Ganges.

Besides the stock sent to Bengal this season, bullion, estimated at £100,000, was ordered to be appropriated to this branch of the trade:—of such consequence, indeed, had the trade to Bengal now become, that a military force was to be employed against the Interlopers, and, if possible, to get possession





**CHAP. II.** the Gulf of Persia, should co-operate with a fleet of six or  
**1683-84.** seven sail, under Sir John Wetwang, who was to command, in the service of relieving the old King of Bantam, and re-establishing the English trade at that port.

Sir Thomas Grantham sailed for his original destination, under the instructions which have been detailed, as addressed to the Presidencies of Surat and of Fort St. George; but after the King's and the Company's commissions had been given to Sir John Wetwang, and the other Captains of his fleet, the explanation took place with the Dutch Government, and orders were sent to the Governor of Batavia, to re-deliver Bantam to the English:—the original object of the Court, therefore, was abandoned, and this officer did not proceed to India; but the ships, intended to be under his command, were dispatched, under Captain Nicholson, first to ascertain that the orders for the re-delivery of Bantam had been carried into execution, and next, to unite with Sir Thomas Grantham's squadron, in the extirpation of the Interlopers, and to second the plan of establishing Factories at Acheen, Siam, &c.:—Captain Nicholson was, subsequently, to touch at the Company's Settlements on the Coromandel and Malabar Coasts, and at Surat, and to take in investments for Europe. These views of the Court were directed, rather to give vigor to the trade within their limits, than to any fixed object; the ultimate orders being, that the commanders were neither to be intimidated by the Dutch, nor to afford them any  
reasonable



CHAP. II. that, from the wars in the inland provinces, and on the coasts  
 1683-84 of the Peninsula, between the Mogul and Sambagee Rajah,  
 and Samba- who had been joined by Sultan Akbar, one of the sons of  
 gee, the want Aurungzebe, the interruptions to the merchants, conveying  
 of sufficient goods to Surat, and to the subordinate Factories on the  
 stock, and Malabar Coast, had been frequent ;—that investments, to the  
 the interfe- extent of the Court's orders, could not be effected ;—that  
 rences of the money continued scarce, from the non-arrival of the Com-  
 French and pany's ships and stock ;—that, on hearing of the loss of  
 Interlopers. Bantam, every exertion had been made at Surat, Calicut, and  
 Carwar, to procure a quantity of pepper, to fill up from one  
 thousand, to fourteen hundred tons ;—that cloths had risen  
 in price, not so much from the actual interferences of  
 the French ships, as from the reports which they had  
 published, of their expectations of a large fleet and stock  
 in the course of the year ;—and that, though they had been  
 hitherto much oppressed by the Portuguese, that nation having  
 offended Sambagee Rajah, Chaul, and even Goa, had been  
 invested by his armies, and, therefore, their means of in-  
 juring the Company's trade, and their connexions with the  
 Native Powers, had diminished.

An unexpected event had, this season, occurred, which,  
 more than any other, embarrassed the trade ;—several ships  
 of the Interlopers had arrived, and been assisted in their  
 projects by Messrs Bowcher and Petit, two of the Company's  
 servants, and Members of Council, who, for this conduct,  
 had







CHAP. II. that, in the sequel, we shall find the crews of the Company's  
1683-84. ships sent, first with Commissioners, and next accompanying President Child to Bombay, to prevail on Captain Keigwin, and his adherents, to return to their duty, instead of being disposed to act offensively against the revolted, caught the prejudices by which they were instigated, and could not be intrusted in the most necessary services, which the Commissioners, and afterwards the President and his Council, thought might be effectual for the restoration of order and legal authority.

Captain Keigwin, and his associates, then addressed letters to His Majesty, and to the Duke of York, expressive of their determination to maintain the Island for the King, till his pleasure should be known, and enumerated the causes which had imposed upon them the necessity of revolt, or to prevent the Island being seized by Sambagee, who was in possession of Caranjah, or by the Siddee, or Admiral of the Mogul, who, with a numerous naval force, lay near it, each having in view to expel equally the King's or the Company's forces from a station, of which both, for a number of years, had been jealous, and each afraid that the other might anticipate him in acquiring.

Captain Keigwin, and the conspirators, next represented to the Court of Committees, that the selfish schemes of Sir Josiah Child, in England, and of his brother, Mr. John Child, the President of Surat, of whom Mr. Ward, the Deputy Governor





CHAP. II. fluence they ascribed, not only the sufferings which had driven  
 1683-84. them to the measures which they had taken, but all the evils of which they, and the greater part of the inhabitants of the Island, complained.

After consultations, which continued till the month of March 1683-84, and after duly reflecting on not having any military force which could reduce the Island to obedience, and that the crews of the ships so far favoured the revolvers, that they would not act offensively against them, it was determined, to dispatch the three Company's ships, with their cargoes, estimated at above one million of rupees, to England, and to station two confidential persons at the Island of Kenery, and two at the Portuguese settlement at Vissavah, by permission of the Siddee, and of the Portuguese Governor, to employ boats, whenever ships might appear in the offing, to direct the captains not to go into Bombay harbour, but to proceed directly to Swally. Under these circumstances, the President and his Council returned to Surat, leaving the Island of Bombay in the possession of the revolvers.

The recovery of Bombay impeded by the Interlopers.

Besides the want of force, military or naval, another not less strong motive, rendered this conduct of the President and his Council indispensable :—the Interlopers had, for years, been encreasing, and, in the present season, had been more numerous than in any former year ; strong apprehensions, therefore, were entertained, either that the revolvers had been



## CHAP. II.

1683-84.

The Agents at Ispahan and Gombroon reported, that the basis of this project, or the sale of English produce at Mocha, Bussorah, &c., had failed, or was impracticable, and that the plan, of course, could not be realized;—farther, they stated, that the orders for Persian goods at Ispahan and Gombroon, could not be complied with, for the exports could not be disposed of, to purchase an investment of silks, Caramania wool, &c., to make part of the homeward cargo; but, if proper Agents, with a sufficient stock, should be employed at Ispahan, these articles might be procured, for the ships of the following season, under the risks of interruption of privileges, and the uncertainty of their being renewed.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Presidency of Fort St. George endeavour to procure an investment, and obstruct the Interlopers.

The events at the Presidency of FORT ST. GEORGE, this season, were few, and regarded only the provision of their investments for Europe, and the plan which they had adopted, for obstructing the trade and projects of the Interlopers. On the first of these subjects, after expressing their disappointment, that sufficient tonnage had not arrived, they specified the amount of the investment, on board the two ships which they had dispatched for Europe, *viz.* 2,53,500 pagodas;—on the second, that by an application to the King of Golcondah and his officers, they had excluded the Interlopers from Porto Novo, and trusted that Alley, the principal of them, would not be

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Factors in Persia, 30th May, 21st September, and 17th December 1683, and 11th January 1683-84.



became unfavorable.—such part of the English manufactures, as remained in their possession, and which were not vendible at Tywan or Batavia, were sent to Fort St. George and Surat.

The late Agent of Bantam, and his Council, left Batavia on the 23d August, and arrived at Surat the 3d November 1683, with money and goods, amounting to thirty-nine thousand pieces of eight, which sum was charged to the Surat account, and the debts of the Factories, formerly subordinate to Bantam (or Siam, Tonquin, Tywan, and Jambee) in like manner, amounting to one hundred and seventy-six thousand pieces of eight.

The seat of the Company's trade, in this part of India, from these events, being lost, the difficulties of continuing commerce or connexions at Siam, Tywan, and the other dependencies on Bantam, followed as necessary consequences :  
—and,



## 1684-85.

CHAP. II.  
 1684-85. Court's plans  
 to check the  
 Interlopers,  
 and lessen  
 the charge of  
 Bombay.

AT the commencement of the season 1684-85, the Court appear to have proceeded on the same plan of obstructing (with the support of the Crown) the Interlopers in Europe, and of abridging the charges at BOMBAY, civil and military.

The Interlopers had, hitherto, clandestinely equipped ships, and taken in cargoes from England, and had proceeded direct to the East-Indies, and, on their arrival, by similar arts, had eluded the restraints which the Presidencies and Agencies had endeavoured to impose on them : in this season, however, they had recourse to an expedient, which, in the sequel, will be found to have been the source of remonstrances, as well as treaties, between the Maritime Powers. The ships, instead of taking in their cargoes at a British port, went to Ostend, and took in Europe produce, on British capital, and thence proceeded to India :—the Court, on discovering this project, applied to the King, who ordered a man of war to intercept them, but two of their vessels escaped ; instructions were, therefore, sent to the Company's Agents, to seize their ships and goods.

The plan of abridging the charges of the officers intrusted with the defence and protection of Bombay, was, unhappily, carried to the extreme of ordering the half allowance, paid  
 for





CHAP. II. to concert such measures, as might be advisable for the reco-  
1684-85. very of the place.

The Secret Committee stated, in a report to the King, dated the 15th August 1684, that, from the period when their Charter and privileges had been renewed, their officers and soldiers had enjoyed encouragements, superior to those which the Dutch granted to their troops;—that the pay and allowances of an English soldier were greater than those of an inferior Dutch officer;—that their President and Governor, so far from cruel and oppressive conduct towards the garrison, had, on all occasions, manifested every indulgence, compatible with the duty of rendering the revenues equal to the charges of the establishment;—that since the Island had been transferred to the Company, they had expended the large sum of £300,000, on fortifications and improvements, had constructed an excellent harbour, to become the resort of the English trade, and, in the preceding season, had embarked seventy soldiers to St. Helena, and two complete companies to Fort St. George;—that they had authorized the President to engage five companies of Native troops, to serve at Bombay, and that the source of the rebellion could be traced to Mr. Petit and Mr. Boucher, two of the Company's civil servants, who had been dismissed, for encouraging the Interlopers, of whom they now had become the leaders, and had made application to the Mogul, to obtain privileges for a Factory at Surat, similar to that of the Company;—that  
these



assembled, to concert measures for acting offensively, and to  
offer rewards for apprehending the principal mutineers, that is,  
four

four thousand rupees for seizing Captain Keigwin, four thousand for Ensign Thornburn, two thousand for Captain Adderton, and two thousand for Lieutenant Fletcher, and eight thousand rupees to be distributed, according to rank, to such persons as might signalize themselves in the service, with assurances to those who might be wounded, of a suitable provision by the Company, or, in the event of their being killed, of an allowance to their families. CHAP. II.  
1684-85.

The instructions, given by the Secret Committee to the President and Council of Surat, in substance were, to try every expedient to induce the revoltors to surrender, and to employ force only, on their obstinately refusing to deliver up the place, still, however, keeping to His Majesty's orders, of excepting the principal mutineers; but, in the event of a general pardon having been granted, before the arrival of those orders, the four ringleaders were to be strictly watched, and, in case of any farther attempts by them, they were to be brought to trial for their first act of rebellion, and if found guilty, to be executed, that an example might be made, to prevent future revolts:—in the event of their resisting, till the orders arrived, they were to be tried, as rebels and traitors.

For the better preservation of the Island, in obedience to the King and to the Company, the seat of the Company's Government was to be removed from Surat to Bombay, where the President and Council were to reside, and a force of three English companies to be maintained, with such number of native

## CHAP. II.

1684-85.

Captain Tyrrel, of the Navy, sent out, to receive the Island from the revolvers, and re-deliver it to the Company.

native troops and militia, as the President might deem it expedient to employ.

The Court, by a subsequent application to the King, obtained an order for Captain Tyrrel, with His Majesty's ship Phoenix, to accompany the fleet, and to command, under the President, in the reduction of the revolvers. If Captain Keigwin should refuse to deliver up the Island to President Child, or to any of the Company's officers, Captain Tyrrel, who commanded the King's ship, was authorized to accept of the surrender, and to re-deliver it to the Company:—this service being performed, he was to continue, in India, with the Phoenix, at the Company's expence, for one season, and to be employed, under the directions of the President and Council, in capturing the vessels of Interlopers, and to receive half of the Company's moiety of such seizures, for his encouragement in the service. <sup>(1)</sup>

Commercial instructions to Surat.

The commercial information to the Presidency of SURAT was, that the tonnage and stock would be considerable, and include one large vessel, similar to that commanded by Sir Thomas Grantham; and, if we may judge from the orders for cloths,

(1)—Order, under the Sign Manual, to Captain Keigwin, to deliver the Island of Bombay to the Company, 23d August 1684.— Commission from the King to the President and Council of Surat and Bombay, for taking possession of the Island of Bombay, 25th August 1684.— Instructions from the Secret Committee of the East-India Company to the Commissioners, 25th August 1684.— Letter from the Secret Committee to the Presidency of Surat, 26th September 1684.— Commission to Captain Tyrrel, of His Majesty's ship Phoenix, 23d October 1684.



























**CHAP. II.** the command of Sir Thomas Grantham, who was also invested  
**1684-85.** with a King's commission, and to have a vote in the Council at Surat, while at that port;—the object of this equipment was, to recover, if possible, the English Factory at Bantam; or, if that should be found impracticable, to proceed to the Gulf of Persia, and there, by the appearance of force, to endeavour to re-establish the Company's rights at Gombroon, &c.

Surrender of  
the Island of  
Bombay to  
Sir Thomas  
Grantham,  
and re-delivery  
to the  
Presidency of  
Surat.

The proceedings of Sir Thomas Grantham, in these services, will be afterwards noticed:—it is here necessary, only, to mention, that the Court were ignorant of the revolt of Bombay, at the time of his leaving England; and that his exertions, at that Island, resulted from consultations with President Child and Dr. St. John, after his arrival at Surat, on the 16th October 1684.

In all the reports on the revolt, the President and Council ascribed it to the instigations of the Interlopers, and to the restless disposition of the soldiery. The first subject of deliberation, after Sir Thomas Grantham's arrival, was, whether they should employ force or persuasion, to induce the commander of the interloping ship, Bristol, to deliver up that vessel and cargo to Sir Thomas Grantham:—as the commander refused, Sir Thomas did not think himself authorized, either by his commission, or his instructions from the Company, to employ force:—Disappointed in this expedient, it was next, on consultation, resolved, that he should proceed

to







**CHAP. II.** stopped the Mogul vessels going to Gombroon, and taken from  
 1684-85. them whatever they deemed to be Persian property:—from  
 this interruption of trade, no part of the Company's customs  
 could, this year, be recovered.

On Sir Thomas Grantham's arrival off Gombroon (and, it will be recollected, he was sent there with a ship of great force, to obtain, either by treaty or by hostilities, the fulfilment, by the Court of Persia, of its engagement with the Company) he found, that the large Dutch fleet off the port, and the Persian troops, would prevent him from trying the expedient of menaces; and, therefore, he took on board such goods as he could obtain on freight, and set sail for Surat, where he arrived, and was serviceable in the reduction of Bombay, as detailed, and was thence dispatched for Europe.

Towards the close of the season, a small quantity of silks and Caramania wool was purchased, and put on board one of the Company's ships, and forwarded to England, with the opinion of the Agency at Gombroon, that the project of sending West-India sugar to the Persian market, from the quantity brought from Bengal, and, in a refined state, from Muscat, would be a hazardous and unproductive speculation.<sup>(1)</sup>

Obstructions  
to the trade  
on the Mala-  
bar Coast.

The trade on the Malabar Coast, during this season, was interrupted, by one of those untoward events, which strongly  
 mark

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Factors at Gombroon to the Court, 28th May 1684, and 30th March 1685.— Letter from Sir Thomas Grantham to the Company, dated Gombroon, 10th September 1684.

mark the necessity of attention to the rights, as well as to the prejudices of the Natives :—two small vessels belonging to the Company (the Mexico Merchant and China Merchant) having gone from Surat to Carwar, to bring off the pepper, &c., collected at that Factory, the crew of one of them stole a cow, and killed it, offending, thus, the rights and religious opinions of the Hindoos ; being resisted, they fired at, and killed two native children of rank ; the irritated Natives stopped the carriages conveying the Company's pepper to the Factory, and the Factors (notwithstanding their expressions of sorrow, and offers of reparation) were in danger of being seized, and the Company's house destroyed, the orders for which were alone suspended by the presence of the Company's shipping, and by the expectation of a general battle between Sambagee and the Mogul, which would decide, whether the country was to belong to the Mogul, or remain to the Hindoos.<sup>(1)</sup>

The events at FORT ST. GEORGE, during the confusions at Bombay, were fortunately favorable to the Company's trade and privileges. This Presidency continued on the most friendly terms with the Subahdar, which facilitated the sale of the Europe goods, and the purchase of the investments, and enabled President Gyfford to go to BENGAL, to establish the

Trade on the  
Coromandel  
Coast more  
favorable.

VOL. II.

4 A

new

(1)—Letter from the Factors at Carwar to Surat, 15th September 1684.

**CHAP. II.** new method of keeping of the Company's accounts, and  
 1684-85. to restore a regular line of trade, between Hughly, and the subordinate Factories of Daeca, Cossimbuzar, and Balasore; as abuses in both, he reported, had arisen, from the innovations of Agent Hedges.

During Mr. Gyfford's absence from Madras, the Factory at Acheen had been confirmed, and the quantity of the pepper expected to be procured at it, was considerable;—a project was formed, for fixing Factories in the King of Pegu's dominions, and at Bamoo, on the coast of China; exertions were, also, made to obtain a lease of the town of Vizagapatam, and permission to coin rupees in the mint at the Fort. The revenue of Madras had encreased, by levying an additional tax of one and a half per cent., but the Council were afraid, (after the example of Agent Masters) to extend the duty beyond this limit.

President  
 Gyfford's re-  
 gulations for  
 extending  
 and improv-  
 ing the trade  
 to Bengal.

In Bengal, the following regulations were introduced by Mr. Gyfford:—by one, distinct entries of purchases and sales were to be made in the Company's books, and general entries of the whole, in the books at Hughly; one copy to remain, and another to be sent to the Fort, and thence transmitted to England:—by another, instead of having one great broker, or merchant, the Native Merchants were to be formed into a Company, on a Joint Stock, consisting of greater or lesser shares, the members of which were to elect





## CHAP. II.

1684-85. President Gyfford left Mr. Beard, Chief at Hughly, re- turned to the Fort, completed the lading of the ships with Coast goods, and dispatched them for Europe.<sup>(1)</sup>

Failure of the  
plan for re-  
settling the  
Company's  
Agency at  
Bantam.

By the resolutions of the Court, in the preceding season, Sir Thomas Grantham was to proceed to BANTAM, with others of the Company's ships, and with Mr. English, one of the former Council at that port ; we have, therefore, to trace Sir Thomas Grantham's progress, previously to his appearance at Surat.

On Sir Thomas Grantham's arrival, (nearly at the same time with Mr. English) on the coast of Java, in May 1684, he took possession of Hippin's Island, in the Streights of Sunda, on which he left an officer and twelve men. From the best information he could collect from an officer of the young King of Bantam, who came on board, he learned, that Bantam was garrisoned by five hundred European, and one hundred native troops, and that there were, though badly manned, twelve sail of Dutch ships in Batavia Roads ;—that the Governor General was under apprehensions of the arrival of a great English fleet, with troops, to recover possession of Bantam, and to reinstate the old King on the throne, and had such fleet  
and

(1)—Letter from the President and Council at Fort St. George to the Court, 9th October 1684. — Letters from President Gyfford and Council at Hughly, to the Chief and Council at Ballasore, 4th September, 2d, 19th, and 31st December 1684, and 13th January 1684-85. — Letter from the President and Council at Fort St. George to the Agent and Council at Hughly, 5th March 1684-85.







CHAP. II.  
1685-86.  
King's au-  
thority, Cap-  
tain General  
and Admiral  
of the Com-  
pany's Settle-  
ments in In-  
dia.

to appoint the President (now Sir John Child, Bart.) to be  
“ Captain General and Admiral of all their forces by sea and  
“ land, in the northern parts of India, from Cape Comorin to  
“ the Gulf of Persia;” he was to be attended by a guard of  
thirty English grenadiers, while at Bombay, and this guard was  
to be commanded by Ensign Shaxton, with the rank of Cap-  
tain:—Sir John Wyborne was appointed to be Vice Admiral,  
within the same limits, and Deputy Governor of Bombay,  
with a salary of £250 per annum.

The charges of sending recruits from England to India  
having been expensive, and, from the mortality among them,  
the supply inefficient, it was ordered, that the troops should be  
recruited in India, from the crews of the shipping, with con-  
sent of the commanders, and that such Scotch, Dutch, and  
Danes, as might be disposed to enter into the service, should  
be engaged.

Discretionary  
powers gi-  
ven to him to  
recover, by  
force, the ar-  
rears of cus-  
toms at Gombroon.

A considerable force having been embarked in the pre-  
ceding season, to assist in the reduction of Bombay, the  
Court desired that it might be first employed to recover  
the arrears of customs at Gombroon, and next, to act, ac-  
cording to circumstances, for the protection of trade, which,  
notwithstanding the Phirmaunds which had, from time to  
time, been granted to the English, had been oppressed by the  
Native Governors; but explained, that these two measures should  
be left to the discretion of the Presidency, because local know-  
ledge, rather than instructions from England, must direct  
their

their servants :—this force was farther to act in repelling the encroachments of the Portuguese and Dutch.

CHAP. II.  
1685-86.

In the course of the season, more defined instructions were framed, arising out of events which will be afterwards detailed :—to protect the Factories in Bengal, and to defend the Presidency of Surat, a large equipment was prepared, which was to bring a reinforcement of two hundred English soldiers for Bombay, under a Lieutenant and Ensign, who was to act as Adjutant.

Seat of Government ordered to be transferred from Surat to Bombay.

The seat of the English Government was, at this time, ordered to be transferred from Surat to BOMBAY :—all the Company's stores were to be kept in the Castle, and the larger ships were to lay in the harbour, but a subordinate Agent and Council were to remain at Surat, which was to be reduced to a Factory only, to preserve the communication of trade, between Surat and Swally.

The Court were aware, that such a change of system might offend the Mogul Government, or excite its jealousy; but the measure was considered to be necessary to support the English character, and to afford its trade an impregnable retreat, which they trusted would satisfy the Mogul, and the Malabar Powers, that their exactions and depredations on shore, could be counterbalanced, by the capture of their vessels, at sea : and it was explained, that, in all treaties which might be formed with Sambagee Rajah, for trade in his dominions, particularly

CHAP. II. particularly at Rajahpore and Carwar, Bombay should be  
 1685-86. mentioned as the independent seat of the English government,  
 at which a maritime force would be stationed, to retaliate on  
 his subjects and on his trade, any injuries or extortions the  
 English might experience.

Court's regu-  
 lations for the  
 internal ad-  
 ministration  
 of Bombay.

The orders of the Court to the President and Council of  
 Bombay, for the internal administration of the Island, were  
 equally precise :—as the Company had been vested with au-  
 thority to exercise Admiralty Jurisdiction and martial law,  
 the Court resolved to bring to justice any of their Com-  
 manders, who might be guilty of disobedience, or refuse to  
 act against their enemies, whether European Interlopers, or  
 Dutch or Portuguese rivals; and the President was ordered to  
 enforce strict discipline in the troops, either regular, or mi-  
 litia, that the force on the Island might be adequate to its  
 defence against any enemy.

To defray the charges of this naval and military force,  
 the customs on all goods were to be encreased to five per cent.,  
 and the President and Council were, in future, to observe  
 such orders as they might receive from the Secret Committee,  
 appointed for the purpose of rendering the orders of the Court  
 less known to their domestic or foreign enemies :—in all treaties  
 with the Country Powers, it was to be a preliminary, that  
 they should deliver up all English subjects in their territories,  
 without reserve (whether they were Company's servants or  
 not),

not), to the respective Presidencies or Factories, which might demand them.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.  
1685-86

The commercial instructions, during this season, were formed on a more limited scale than in the preceding years, on account of the great quantity of Surat goods in the Company's warehouses in London; a considerable stock, however, was to be sent, on the shipping consigned to Surat, and on those intended to make an experiment of trade to China:—all old debts (as had been done at the Company's other Settlements) were to be cleared off, leaving only a small floating debt, to keep up the connexion with the Native Merchants.

Commercial  
instructions  
for Surat,  
Bombay, and  
Persia.

The Court renewed their orders for large quantities of pepper and cardamoms, and desired that the Surat cloths might be of greater breadths and finer qualities, and that the prices specified should not be exceeded.<sup>(2)</sup>

Towards the close of the season, the Court, on receiving information that the Madras Government had fixed an Agent and Council at Priaman, on the Island of Sumatra, resolved to afford this station every support, in preference to that on Hippin's Island, in the Straits of Sunda, at which Sir Thomas Grantham had left an officer and a small detachment. As a

4 B 2.

supply

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council at Surat or Bombay, 28th October and 23d December 1685, and 26th March 1686.— Commission to Sir John Child, Bart., and Sir John Wyborne, 3d February 1684-85.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the General, or President and Council, at Surat, 6th and 13th May 1685.



**CHAP. II.** supply of salt had been required for Sumatra, the Bombay  
**1685-86.** Council were ordered to direct the ships from Persia to touch at Ormus, and bring from that Island as large a quantity of salt, as their spare tonnage would hold; and that a country ship should be hired at Bombay, to carry it to Priaman and Tekoo; one half of the cargo to pay the charges of freight, and the other to be delivered to the Company's Factories in Sumatra.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Agents in PERSIA were censured, for not having afforded the Court information of the events and consequences of the war between the Persians and the Dutch, and for neglecting to let out the Company's ships on freight, during this war, which would have yielded considerable profit.<sup>(2)</sup>

The Agents in Bengal censured for their timidity respecting the Nabob.

The opinion of the Court, respecting the depressed situation of their Factories in BENGAL, was prefaced with a censure of their Agents, for having been too submissive and timid towards the Nabob and his officers.

Orders to Fort St. George, for strengthening the fortifications and improving the revenues.

It was, therefore, ordered, that the Presidency at Fort ST. GEORGE, should, if possible, obtain a Phirmaud for some of the uninhabited islands in the Ganges, and that Ingellee should be fortified; a plan having been formed, of which due notice would be given, by the Secret Committee, for re-asserting

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Surat, 17th June and 12th August 1685.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Factors in Persia, 12th August and 23d December 1685.



## CHAP. II.

1685-86.

Court's secret instructions to commence hostilities against the Mogul, and the Nabob of Dacca, with the object of obtaining possession of Chittagong; and an expedition fitted out for that service.

The instructions from the Secret Committee, disclose the resolution of the Company, (approved of by the King,) to retaliate the injuries sustained, and the loss of their privileges in Bengal, by hostilities against the Nabob of Dacca, and the Mogul, his superior. An expedition had been fitted out from England for this service, consisting of ten ships, from seventy to twelve guns, and the command given to Captain Nicholson, with the rank of Vice Admiral, till his arrival in the Ganges, when the Agent in Bengal was to act as Admiral, and Commander-in-chief of the land forces. On board this fleet were embarked six complete companies of infantry, without captains, it being intended, that the Members of Council in Bengal should act in that capacity:—this force was to be joined by a company from Priaman, and a detachment from the garrison of Fort St. George, and by the seamen from the fleet, so as to form an effective regiment of ten companies, or a thousand men:—the fleet was to be assisted by the Company's other ships, making, in the whole, nineteen sail:—King's commissions were given to Captain Nicholson, and to eighteen other commanders for this particular service; but, in the event of meeting any of the King's ships in India, the chief naval command was to devolve on the captain:—the place of debarkation was to be Chittagong, which was to be taken possession of, and fortified in the best manner:—two hundred pieces of cannon were to be mounted on it; and when in the possession of the Company, a mint was

to



**CHAP. II.** state of defence, the troops were to proceed against Dacca;  
**1685-86.** and as it was presumed the Nabob and his troops would fly from that city, peace was then to be offered to him, on the following conditions:—that he should cede the city and territory of Chittagong to the Company, and pay the debts due by him; that he should allow the rupees coined at Chittagong to pass current in his district, and restore all privileges, according to ancient Phirmaunds; each party to bear their respective losses and expences in the war:—on these conditions, alone, the Company would agree to resettle the Factories in Bengal:—if a treaty to this effect should be concluded, it was to be ratified by the Mogul, on the part of the Nabob, and by the President of Surat, on the part of the Company:—one-sixth of the prizes taken in this expedition was to be distributed among the commanders, and one-third of the money received from the Nabob, divided among the fleet and forces.

Subordinate  
objects of the  
expedition,  
to attack the  
King of Siam,  
and to at-  
tempt the  
conquest of  
Salsette.

Besides this principal object, this armament was to retaliate on the King of Siam, by seizing his vessels, to compensate for the losses which the Company had sustained in his dominions; and should the Portuguese continue to exact customs at Tannah and Caranjah, the Presidency of Surat were to refuse payment, and to employ the fleet and military forces against them, for the recovery of Salsette, and the other dependencies of Bombay, originally ceded by the treaty between Charles II. and the Crown of Portugal; and should they



CHAP. II.  
1685-86. Acheen, this station was to be encouraged, which, with Priaman, was to remain subordinate to Fort St. George :—trade was also to be attempted between China and Japan, and with Johore, at the extremity of the Peninsula of Malacca, near the Straits of Singapore. <sup>(1)</sup>

Experience having shewn the perilous situation in which a commercial Factory was placed, when protected only by grants from a Native Prince, liable to interruptions, according to his interests or caprice, or to rebellions against his power, as in the case of Bantam, the Court resolved, that the settlement at Priaman should be rendered respectable, by fortifications, and by a garrison sufficient to resist any Native, or even European enemy :—the fort was to be built on a larger scale than that at Fort St. George, and a dock constructed, to accommodate shipping in the necessary repairs, or for building such country vessels, as the Company's service might require, timber being in plenty in the country :—an arsenal and barracks also were to be erected, for the accommodation of the troops, and sufficiently large for the three hundred soldiers which had been embarked, and on a scale for five hundred men :—as non-commissioned officers had been obtained from the King's guards, to train the men to discipline, the

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Fort St. George, 12th and 26th August, and 14th October 1685.— Letter from the Secret Committee to the Presidency of Fort St. George, 14th January 1685-86.

#### EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

the Chief and Members of Council were to be captains of the companies ; an engineer to superintend the works, and gunners, trained to the service, were appointed, and the whole Settlement, in conformity to the Company's charter, was to be regulated by civil and martial law :—Mr. Ord, the Chief, was appointed Judge Advocate, and it was expected, four of the Company's ships would be, annually, loaded from this port, with pepper and cardamoms, for the Coast, and thence sent to England. <sup>(1)</sup>

To preserve the trade at TONQUIN, and to establish a connexion between the Fort and Priaman, exchanges with the Japan junks, for copper, to be sent to Priaman, was to be encouraged, that an indirect trade might be established, through these vessels, between Sumatra, Japan, and China. <sup>(2)</sup>

It would appear, that a mutiny had taken place in the Island of ST. HELENA, among some of the soldiers and inhabitants, but that the garrison had been able to suppress it :—a few of the ringleaders had been tried, and found guilty, but had been pardoned; this lenity the Court disapproved of, having, from experience, found, that such forbearance led only to a repetition of the offence; and as the Company, by the late royal grant, were vested with the power of exercising

4 C 2

civil

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Chief and Council at Priaman, 21st October 1685, and 20th January 1685-86.

(2)—Letter from the Court to the Chief and Council at Tonquin, 15th October 1685.







## CHAP. II.

1685-86.

Deficiency of  
intelligence  
from Fort St.  
George and  
Bantam.

The letters to the Court from FORT ST. GEORGE and from BENGAL, during the season 1685-86, have not been preserved among the Company's records; but, from the reciprocal communications between the Agencies in Bengal, there is evidence, that this important seat of trade continued to be oppressed, as the Factory of Hughly was surrounded by horse and foot:—Although Perwannahs, for inland trade, were given by the Nabob and his officers, it became impossible to use them with any commercial advantage;—and to add to these evils, an interloping ship had arrived at Ballasore, and orders only could be given from Hughly, to that Factory, to obstruct the captain, in the purchase of his investments. <sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Council at Hughly to the Chief and Factory at Ballasore, 29th June and 3d October 1685.



**CHAP. II.** they might acquire such territories, as would furnish supplies  
**1686-87.** to their fortified seats of trade, and give them respectability, and influence, in the political contests of the Native Powers :—hence the reference to the example of the Dutch, who owed their prosperity to the plan which the Company were, at this period, induced to adopt.

With this object, the Court, with the approbation of the King, constituted Sir John Child their President, or General at Surat, to be, what in modern times has been termed, the Governor General of the countries within their limits, and also the Director of their trade, and ordered, that implicit obedience should be paid to him :—he was to proceed, for three months, to Fort St. George, and, if necessary, to go to Bengal, to bring the whole under a regulated administration, the fullest responsibility being attached to him and to his Council ;—he was vested, farther, with discretionary powers to continue the war, or to make peace with the Mogul, according to circumstances ;—he was, next, to seize the goods and vessels of the Kings of Siam, Bantam, and Jambee, as a reparation for injuries, and to bring them, for condemnation, into any of the Courts of Admiralty in India. Mr. Zinzan was to act as President at Surat, during the absence of Sir John Child.

King's Proclamation for withdrawing British subjects from the service of the Native Powers.

To enable the Governor General to carry the orders of the Court into full effect, the Company made application to the King, who issued a Royal Proclamation, in July 1686, requiring all









CHAP. II. whole of this season, the Company were unacquainted with  
1686-87. the result of the expedition under Captain Nicholson, and  
that, proceeding upon the instructions they had given to him,  
and to the President at Surat, they could only repeat such  
orders to Fort St. George, as were compatible with their  
former measures; or, that hostilities should be continued  
against the King of Siam and his subjects, till he should  
cede a station at MERGEE, at which a Fort and Settlement  
could be established, as a seat of trade, in the event of the  
failure of the project of getting possession of Chittagong;  
—that the Bengal manufacturers should be encouraged to  
resort to Madras, as, in time, they might be able to sup-  
ply the investment;—that the Factory at Pettipolee should  
be dissolved, and the farm at Vizagapatam improved;—that  
all English subjects should be recalled from the service of  
foreign powers; and that every encouragement should be  
given to the soldiers (two hundred of whom had been em-  
barked on the ships of the season) to marry the native women,  
to whom a present of one pagoda was to be given for every  
child they might have, to promote colonization. These  
expedients mark the resolution of the Court to obtain  
fortified stations, with efficient garrisons, in the countries  
in which a fixed trade could be established; experience  
having shewn, that, without such fortifications, no reliance  
could be placed on treaties with, or grants from, the Native  
Powers.

As



**CHAP. II.** his authority to the Company to coin rupees, and other  
 1686-87. money, in the mint at Madras, and that this money might  
 be current in his dominions ; and in all future treaties with the  
 Country Powers, an article was to be introduced, stipulating  
 that the Company's coin should be allowed to be current in  
 their territories. As a general rule for the internal adminis-  
 tration of the Settlements in India, the Agents were, in  
 future, to consider the King's Charters and the Company's  
 orders to be the only constitution or laws, under which they  
 were to act. <sup>(1)</sup>

Difficulty of  
 acting in In-  
 dia, on the  
 Court's plans.

The large equipment which had been sent from England,  
 last season, under the approbation of the King, who had  
 given commissions to the officers commanding it, prepares us  
 to look for the events, in the Company's foreign Settlements,  
 with anxiety and interest. In this, as in many other cases,  
 it will be found more easy to form specious plans, than, under  
 all the circumstances in which foreign settlements are placed,  
 to

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Presidency of Fort St. George, 14th April, 9th  
 June, 3d September, 22d October 1686, (Secret); 7th January, 22d March 1686-87,  
 and 3d April 1687.— Commission for settling the Presidency of Fort St. George, 22d  
 October 1686.— Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council in Bengal, 9th June  
 1686, 7th January 1686-87, and 8th April 1687.— Letters from the Court to the  
 Agent and Council at Priaman, 29th March and 9th June 1686.





#### EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

self, and, apparently, to incur the Court's displeasure, that, in the event of adverse fortune attending the expedition, an opening might be given to the Company to negotiate with the Mogul, for the restoration of their privileges and trade, upon the same basis as they were, anterior to his, apparently, unwise proceedings:—he farther explained, that when the force should arrive, it might be employed against the Portuguese, to attempt the conquest of Salsette, and to resist the projects of the Dutch of engrossing the whole of the West Coast trade in pepper; and that he would endeavour to cultivate the friendship of Sambagee Rajah, and supply him with the ammunition, as ordered, because he considered his friendship both in a political and commercial view, under existing circumstances, to be of the highest importance;—that, however even in actual service, he would rather employ the topasses which they could easily engage at Surat, from having a good opinion of their fidelity, than bring a reinforcement, of this description of troops, from Fort St. George. <sup>(1)</sup>

The commercial transactions of the Presidency of Surat, during this season, from these circumstances, were few and uninteresting, and went only to keep up commercial relations, and to provide for the investments.

From the intrigues of the Dutch at Amoy, the commerce between China and Surat, and with Europe, had been interrupted;

VOL. II.

4 E

rupted;

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Surat, 3d July and 2d October 1686, and 10th February 1686-87 (Secret).

tained. (2)

Premature  
commence-  
ment of hos-  
tilities at  
Hughly.

If the intelligence of the intentions of the Court, respecting the Bengal expedition, had been improvidently disclosed at Bombay, and exposed the President and Council of Surat to local and commercial difficulties, unforeseen incidents, and the partial arrival of the fleet in the river Ganges, obstructed the measures of the armament, in the country in which its beneficial effects had been anticipated, in Europe. After the Agent at Hughly was informed of the Court's intentions,

(1)—General Letter from the Presidency of Surat to the Court, 10th February 1686-87.

(2)—Letter from the Company's Linguist at Ispahan to the President at Surat, 11th December 1686.

tentions, and after a part, but not the whole of the fleet, arrived, an affray at Hughly brought on hostilities, in a premature and unexpected manner:—on the 28th October 1686, three English soldiers had quarrelled, in the Bazar, with some of the Nabob's Peons, and were wounded:—a company of soldiers were called out for their defence; afterwards a second company, and then the whole of the English troops:—an action took place, in which the Nabob's troops were defeated with loss, sixty of them killed, and a considerable number wounded, a battery of eleven guns spiked and destroyed, the town of Hughly cannonaded by the fleet under Captain Nicholson, and five hundred houses burnt. The Phousdar affected alarm at this defeat, and solicited a cessation of arms, which was granted, on condition of his giving his assistance to convey the Company's goods on board the ships, particularly the saltpetre, of which a very large quantity was in store.

CHAP. II.  
1686-87.

During this suspension, the Nabob seized the English Factory at Patna, and made their servants prisoners; but the property, at this station, was inconsiderable, not exceeding two thousand rupees.

Before the action took place, orders had come from the Nabob, Shastah Khan, to compromise the differences with the English, and to submit their claims to arbitration:—to this proposition, the Agent and Council were disposed to accede, had not the orders of the Court been so positive, for taking

Demands of  
the Compa-  
ny on the  
Nabob of  
Bengal.





The Phousdar and his officers, though they offered to restore privileges of trade to the English, and to give their Perwannahs to that effect, till a Phirmaund could be procured from the Mogul, acted only to gain time; the Agent and Council, therefore, considering that Hughly was an open town, retired, on the 20th December 1686, to CHUTANUTTEE, or CALCUTTA, from its being a safer situation, during any negotiation with the Nabob, or Mogul.

CHAP. II.

1686-87.

English retire  
to Chuta-  
nuttee, or  
Calcutta.

In this situation of the English affairs in Bengal, the Dutch and French took advantage of the dispute, particularly the former, who having eleven ships in the river, obtained valuable investments, and resettled their Factories, which they were disposed to abandon.

That part of the shipping which had arrived in Bengal, required considerable repairs, and much apprehension was entertained for the safe arrival of the remainder, having on board the greater part of the troops:—it was now the opinion, that the force would not be sufficient for the principal object of the expedition, or the reduction of Chittagong.

Affairs at FORT ST. GEORGE, during these events, excited much anxiety in the President and Council:—on receiving the Court's instructions, they had detached the principal part of the garrison to assist the armament intended for Bengal, and with it, a large proportion of arms and military stores:—and they advised the General, or President, to retire, with the Company's property and servants to Bombay, because the Fac-  
tory.

Part of the  
garrison of  
Fort St.  
George dis-  
patched to  
Bengal.

**CHAP. II.** tory at Surat might be seized by the forces of the Mogul, for  
**1686-87.** reparation of injuries sustained in Bengal; and though they expressed their conviction, that, had all the force arrived from England, it might have been sufficient for the object, yet as the enemy were prepared, even should it arrive, it would be unequal; and what rendered these circumstances more alarming, was, that, at this crisis, the Mogul's army had conquered Visiapore, and would soon, in all probability, conquer Golcondah, which might lead to an attack on Madras.

President Gyfford represents to the Mogul the object of the English armament in Bengal.

To avert these evils, President Gyfford addressed the Mogul, explaining, that what had happened at Bengal was for the recovery of their ancient privileges, only, and praying for his protection, and the confirmation of the privileges which had been granted at Madras:—at the same time, he earnestly requested a reinforcement from Bombay, of men, money, and ammunition, as they had only fifteen English soldiers in garrison, and could place no reliance on the Portuguese soldiers, or topasses.

In a similar manner as in Bengal, the Dutch took advantage of the perilous situation in which Fort St. George was placed:—seized on the town of Masulipatam from the King of Golcondah, (against which the President protested,) but agreed to redeliver it, on condition of his paying a debt of 1,20,000 pagodas; a demand to which his distresses, from the conquests of the Mogul, obliged him to accede.

On

## EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

On the Company's connexions in the Southern ports INDIA, the Presidency of Fort St. George reported,—that they had made a settlement at BENCOOLEN, in the Island Sumatra, and obtained a Phirmaund for the sole government of it;—that the war with the King of Siam had, agreeable to the Court's orders, been declared, and one of his galleons, with seventy Europeans and an English captain on board, had been seized, and the ship condemned at Hughly, and that they had made another experiment to settle a Factory at Amoy, in China.

It does not appear, that any regular account of the investment was transmitted from Fort St. George, during the season.<sup>(1)</sup>

(1)—Letter from the Presidency of Fort St. George, and from the Agent and Council at Hughly, to the Court, and from Hughly and Patna to the Presidency of Fort St. George, 28th June, 19th August, 16th, 22d, and 24th November, 20th and December 1686, 17th February and 8th March 1686-87.— President Gyfford's Letter to Aurungzebe, 17th February 1686-87.













#### EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

power in India, which the Court had adopted at Bombay, was ordered for FORT ST. GEORGE. In the series of instructions of this season, they stated, that an improper fear of the Mogul had led to proceedings in the President and Council, inconsistent with the resolution of assuming this rank;—that the war against the Mogul should continue, till Chittagong, or some strong station in Bengal, should be acquired—that though the twelve hundred pagodas of quit-rent, for the territory round Madras, hitherto paid to the King of Gondah, might be continued, the future payment must depend on his keeping St. Thomé in such situation, as not to become an annoyance to the Fort; and if he would not let it on lease, or farm, to the Company, (considering his power as much decreased, by the recent victories of the Mogul, and his having been driven from Masulipatam by the Dutch,) the President, as representing an independent power, was not only to refuse payment of the quit-rent, but to declare the place the property of the Company; the Court assigning, in one of the letters, the remarkable reason, that it was impracticable to carry on trade, or maintain a seat of government, without revenue; and that this revenue must be levied on the inhabitants of the towns, or districts, under the Company protection.

The Court disapproved of the conduct of the President of Fort St. George, for not having followed up the order, with respect to Priaman, and having, in preference, made a Settlement

mer

CHAP. II. ment at BENCOOLEN; but, towards the close of this season,  
 1687-88. they altered this opinion, and recommended that YORK FORT, which had been built near Bencoolen, should be strengthened, both by fortifications, and by a garrison, that it might become the principal port from which pepper might be expected. As this fort could not withstand an attack of the Dutch, three days, the strengthening the fortifications had become indispensable; and should the Dutch capture it, they were to employ all their means to regain this station, to make reprisals on their shipping, and to attack all their small forts in India. In the event of the report of the King of Siam's death being true, the war was to continue, till possession should be obtained of TENASSERY, which, also, was to be fortified, that, from this port, and Bencoolen, a share might be regained in the pepper and Southern trades.

The relations between Fort St. George, as a seat of government, and the Indian Powers in the Islands, or more distant stations, to which the Court wished its influence and trade to be extended, were intimately connected with the internal administration to be established at the Fort, as a Regency; for it was laid down as a fixed principle, that by force (imitating the practice of the Dutch) they could, alone, render the trade and power of the English permanent.

The Union  
 flag to be  
 used at the  
 Fort.

Considering Madras as a Regency, under the protection of the King, whose authority had been delegated to the Company, the Court ordered the King's Union flag to be al-

ways

#### EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

ways used at the Fort;—the fortifications to be extended and strengthened, and the charges defrayed by a revenue levied on the inhabitants, and a duty of five per cent., on customs, to be farmed, from year to year; a tax intended to be made general over all the English Settlements in India;—two hundred soldiers, drafted from the King's troops in Ireland were to proceed on the ships of the season; and provisions (rice, &c.) were always to be in store, that the inhabitants might have sufficient for a six months' siege.

That the internal administration of Madras might correspond with its new character of a Regency, application was made to the King, to erect it, by Charter, into a Corporation, and the question had been agitated in the Privy Council whether such Charter should proceed from the King, under the Great Seal of England, or from the Company under its Broad Seal; from being vested with a right to exercise a delegated sovereignty in India. The arguments on this case are detailed with such accuracy, in the Council letter to President Yale, of the 12th December 1687, the subject will be most correctly described, in their words.

“ The Governour and Deputy were commanded,  
“ night, being Sunday, to attend His Majestie, at the Council  
“ net Council, when our intended Charter, for incorporating  
“ ing Fort St. George into a body politique, consisting  
“ mayor, alderman, and burgesses, was largely debated be

“







Bengal ; to their selfish conduct in applying the stock to their own projects of acquiring wealth, instead of giving obedience to orders ; and to their having no sense of the honor, or the interests, of the King and Company, who had confided in them :—reprobating, thus, construction given by the Agency in Bengal of the Court's orders for negotiating peace, they declared the whole to be an excuse, and not any good reason for their proceedings ; and should, by their sinister schemes, the objects of the war not be accomplished, they intimated a determination to send an additional force, to ensure the acquisition of them, and desired, that the Members of the Agency might hold themselves in readiness to embark, with the Company's property, for Fort St. George. For this purpose, a large ship, the *Defence*, fully armed, commanded by Captain Heath, and a small frigate, were dispatched with a reinforcement of one hundred and sixty soldiers to assist in the war, should it have been continued, or to bring off their servants and property, should they have made any temporary truce, or treaty, with the Mogul ; the Court farther determined, that, unless a fortification, and district round it, should be ceded, to be held as an independent sovereignty, the charges of the armament be defrayed, and permission to coin money in Bengal, to pass current in the Mogul's and Nabob's dominions, be granted, they would not consent to a peace, or send any more stock, or goods, to the Ganges.



IAP. II.

87-88.

Though the Court approved of Agent Charnock's general conduct, they condemned the irresolution with which he had acted, in this instance, and considered, that, however expedient the armistice granted to the Phousdar, after the affair of Hughly, might be, it was unwise to have prevented the soldiers from plundering the inhabitants, which would have convinced the Natives of their power;—that the delay which this armistice had occasioned, had given an opportunity to the enemy to collect his force, and to be in circumstances to resist that of the Company, which, otherwise, would have been adequate to the attainment and defence of Chittagong;—that, besides, the vessels of the King of Aracan, in co-operation with the Company's armed ships, would have distressed the Mogul's ships and salt-boats, and compelled him to cede a settlement, which might become as independent, as those of Fort St. George or Bombay;—a sudden attack, therefore, was to be made on Dacca, the conquest of which would be an additional motive with the Mogul, to acknowledge the rights of the Company to Chittagong, and to allow the trade to Dacca and Malda to be part of their privileges, and render Malda such a seat of power, as, in a few years, would draw to it the staples, manufactures, and merchandize of the neighbouring provinces;—on the whole, that the Indian Powers, however insolent and oppressive they might be to the Company's servants and trade, when apparently without the means of resisting that insolence and oppression, yet if effectually opposed,

#### **EAST-INDIA COMPANY.**

opposed, they would become obsequious, when they saw force ready to retaliate injuries, or redress wrongs.

The Court, aware, under the circumstances in which their servants and trade were placed, in Bengal, that an investment was impracticable, had retained the stock, but hoped that the ships would not return empty:—to obtain however, some supply of Bengal goods for the European market, permission was to be given to private merchants during the war with the Mogul, and six months after a peace to import into England, Bengal produce, on the Company's ships, on paying single freight, and eighteen per cent. additional, for permission, demorage, and sale charges, which goods were to be insured at the Company's new office at Fort St. George; an indulgence which was extended to the French and Dutch merchants in Bengal.

In the event of Chittagong, or any other fortified station being acquired, the Agency were ordered to use every expedient to encourage the silk and cotton manufacture, and always to have six months' provisions laid up in store, in case of a siege.<sup>(1)</sup>

The first instructions of the Court, to the Agent and Council at BENCOLEN, appear in the records of this season; and it is necessary only to recur to the orders of the preceding year, for fixing a Factory at Priaman, after all hopes of recovering

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bengal, 28th September and 12th December 1687.

CHAP. II. vering the trade at Bantam had failed, and to the measures of  
 1687-88. the Presidency of Fort St. George, who had established a  
 Factory at this station, to appreciate the resolutions of the  
 Court on this subject. The Agent, who had erected the for-  
 tifications, for the defence of Bencoolen, was ordered, by  
 every practicable means, to strengthen them, and an officer,  
 who had a knowledge of engineering, was appointed, to as-  
 sist;—storehouses were to be built, for a large quantity of  
 pepper to be ready for the Company's ships, that the im-  
 ports of this valuable article might counter-balance those of  
 the Dutch.

As the Company had adopted the plan of finding révenues  
 at their Settlements, to defray the charges, they granted per-  
 mission to individuals to load pepper at Bencoolen and Indra-  
 pore, on condition of paying one halfpenny of customs, per  
 pound of pepper, for what was loaded for China or India,  
 and one penny per pound, for what was sent to England,  
 on the Company's ships:—particular care was to be taken, to  
 place the stations of Bencoolen and Indrapore in a state of  
 defence against any sudden attack from the Dutch, and  
 always to have six months' provisions, of rice, &c., in store,  
 in case of a siege. <sup>(1)</sup>

As the Factory and trade at **TONQUIN** had been continued  
 (Bantam being lost) pepper was to be sent from Bencoolen, to  
 enable

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bencoolen, 9th September,  
 and 20th December 1687, 6th February 1687-88, and 4th April 1688.

#### EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

enable this Factory to revive trade; the returns to consist chiefly of lacquered-ware and pelong silk. <sup>(1)</sup>

The sedition of a few planters at St. HELENA, having happily been suppressed, and some of the ringleaders tried and executed, a similar plan, with that which had been adopted in India, was required for this Island:—to give respect to the Governor and Council, the King's flag was to be hoisted, that the Island, though under the management of the Company, might appear a Royal Settlement;—freeholds were, in future, not to be granted, but the property to remain in the Company only;—the estates of the late delinquents were to be forfeited, but their personal property given to their families, and such of the planters as would engage to go to Beccoolen, with their families, were to be allowed twenty acres of land at that new Settlement;—a certain number of negroes and some live stock, cows, hogs, &c., were to be embarked annually, from St. Helena, for that station, on the ships of the season. <sup>(2)</sup>

---

The critical circumstances under which, at the conclusion of the preceding year, Sir John Child and the Council of SURAT were

(1)—Letter from the Court to the Agent and Factors at Tonquin, 9th November 1687.

(2)—Letters from the Court to the Governor and Council of St. Helena, 3d and 31st August, 6th and 9th September 1687.

CHAP. II. were placed, prepares us to resume the detail of events at  
 1687-88. BOMBAY, and to describe the prudent and provident expedients  
 property at which were adopted for maintaining the English character, as  
 Surat, when intelligence should arrive of the war in Bengal. an armed but commercial people, who were endeavouring to  
 repair former errors in Bengal, and to re-establish the English  
 privileges and trade on the West Coast of India.

Sir John Child, and the Council, continued at SURAT, while not only the Company's warehouses, but the lives of their servants, were exposed to hazard, by the orders which the Mogul might issue, irritated (as he was presumed to be,) by the rash and indecisive conduct of the Company's servants in Bengal: the President, therefore, had a most difficult public duty to discharge; on the one hand, to carry the Court's orders into execution, of commencing hostilities against the Mogul, and capturing the Siam vessels; and, on the other, to keep, if possible, on such terms with the Governor of Surat, as might postpone extremities against the English; and when intelligence of the operations in Bengal should reach Surat, to find a plausible pretext for offensive measures.

It will be recollected, that Sir John Child had determined to act on the principle of ascribing the war to the injuries which the Company had received from the Interlopers, favoured by the Mogul, and to the insidious representations of the Dutch, who had endeavoured to persuade the Native Governors, that the English were acting without controul, and committing depredations, for which they could not be made responsible.

Affairs



## CHAP. II.

1687-88.

Mr. Harris  
and the Com-  
pany's pro-  
perty detain-  
ed at Surat.

The incident, however, of the Dragon having seized a Surat vessel going to Siam, gave an alarm, that the English intended hostilities, and rendered the escape of the Agent and Factors from Surat impracticable, for they were carefully watched, and detained by the Governor, though no violence had hitherto been offered to their property or persons. On this intelligence reaching Sir John Child, he detained, by way of reprisal, all the Surat ships which were then in the port of Bombay:—this decisive conduct convinced the Governor of Surat, that conciliatory measures must be resorted to, or open war be inevitable; but, as yet, he had not learned, that any captures had been made by the English ships sent to the two Gulfs.

Negotiations  
between Sir  
John Child  
and the Go-  
vernor of Su-  
rat.

The Governor of Surat, on this occasion, released Mr. Bonnel, one of the Factors, and sent him with a complimentary letter to Sir John Child, in substance, expressive of his wishes to come to an accommodation, and to know what terms would satisfy the General, or induce him to return, and re-assume the trade at that port. Cozée Ibrahim and Dungee Vorah, two eminent Surat merchants, were subsequently sent to Bombay, to treat with the General:—in reply, Sir John Child transmitted to the Governor of Surat, by these merchants, a statement of grievances sustained by the English from the Governors of Surat, comprized in thirty-five articles, prefaced with the observation, that reparation was only asked for the injury done to the character of







on the Fort, and above all, to maintain the character of the English nation, by defending Fort St. George to the last extremity. CHAP. II.  
1687-88.

These precautions being adopted, Sir John Child next tried conciliatory overtures with the Governor of Surat, by directing Mr. Harris, who still was detained there, to use every means to prevent the Siddee's fleet (which was reported to consist of two hundred gallivats) from putting to sea, because their sailing must be considered as hostile to Bombay; adding, the kindness with which the Mogul's subjects had always been treated by the English, and the unwillingness of the Presidency to proceed to actual hostilities. Negotiations  
continued  
with the Go-  
vernors of Su-  
rat.

Affairs were in this critical situation, when Captain Andrews, in the *Charles the Second*, returned from Persia to Bombay, with an Interloping ship, and six Mogul vessels, under Dutch colours, detained during his voyage:—this event rendered it impossible to conceal actual hostilities, and, therefore, Captain Andrews was dispatched to Surat, to act in conjunction with the *Cæsar*, to seize on all Mogul vessels he might meet with, on his passage, or attempting to enter the port, and to watch the Siddee's fleet, which it was not the intention of the General to destroy, if he kept in port, as this would irritate the Mogul, who had recently been victorious in Visiapore and Golcondah; but if this fleet attempted to put to sea, it must be presumed to be under the orders of the Mogul, and with

hostile



behaviour, appeared to them to be practicable; matters were left in this situation, at the close of the season 1687-88.<sup>(1)</sup>

CHAP. II.

1687-88.

In this state of the war at Bombay, and while the Mogul vessels were seized on their return from the Gulfs, the trade at GOMBROON, or in PERSIA, could be carried on, in a limited degree only:—provision was made of various kind of gums, and English cloths (had they been of proper colours and qualities) might have been disposed of, to the amount of a thousand half pieces annually; but as the Armenians had brought cloth from Turkey, in exchange for silk, it was inferred, that silk could be procured more advantageously, by barter for cloth, than by money.<sup>(2)</sup>

Trade in Persia very limited.

There is an inexplicable deficiency of information in the Company's records, both from FORT ST. GEORGE and from BENGAL, the theatre of the war, in this season; hence we can only collect from the letters from Surat, the state of affairs at the Fort, or in Bengal, at this crisis; or the Mogul's conquest of Visiapore and Golconda, and his menacing the Carnatic;

Deficiency of information, this season, from Fort St. George.

(1)—Letters from the General and Council at Bombay to the Court, 17th and 18th May, 26th September, and 7th October 1687.— Letter from the General and Council at Bombay to the President and Council at Fort St. George, 30th November 1687.— Letter from the Agent and Factors at Surat to the General at Bombay, 24th December 1687.— Commission from the General and Council at Bombay to Captain Wright, 22d August 1687.— Letter from Sir John Child to the French Directors at Surat, 8th October 1687.

(2)—Letter from the Factors at Ispahan to the General and Council at Bombay, 10th October 1687.



of the Nabob's General, with very little loss. It was at this crisis, that the Agent at Patna informed the General and Council at Bombay, that the Nabob had confiscated the Company's goods at the Factory of Cossimbuzar, to the amount of twenty-three thousand rupees, and had compelled their debtors to pay to him the money they owed to the Factory; by the secret connivance of the Governor of Patna, however, the Agent was preparing privately to leave that city, and proceed to Surat. CHAP. II.  
1687-88.

Affairs remained in this situation, till the month of September 1687, when a Perwannah was issued by the Nabob, granting permission to the English to return to Hughly, and enjoy their ancient privileges; but it can be collected from the instructions of the Court, and the foreign dispatches of the subsequent season, that this indulgence did not form the basis of a treaty, for the renewal of the Company's commerce in the Bay of Bengal, but arose only from the arrival of the large armament from England.<sup>(1)</sup>

While Fort St. George and BENGAL were in these precarious circumstances, the commerce of the Company, whether considered with regard to the sales of its exports from Europe, or the purchase of investments for the home market, was

VOL. II.

4 I

necessarily

(1)—Letter from the General and Council at Bombay to the Court, 26th September 1687.— Letter from the Agent at Patna to the General and Council at Bombay, 25th June 1687.— Copy of Perwannah from the Nabob Shastah Khan, dated Dacca, 4th September 1687.

CHAP. II. necessarily irregular, if not suspended. No accounts appear to  
1687-88. have been transmitted from the new Settlement at BENCOOLEN,  
or from any of the Factories in the SOUTHERN SEAS, or the  
Agencies attempting trade with CHINA.

## 1688-89.

THE measures of the Court, in the memorable season 1688-89, as far as regarded their foreign Settlements, furnish only a continuation of the expedients which they had adopted in the preceding year, but varied, from the effect which the disappointment in the Bengal expedition had produced. Without receding from their fixed purpose of obtaining fortified seats of trade, their Governor or General, Sir John Child, and his Council, were ordered, in future, to reside at BOMBAY only :—the ships for Europe were to clear out from this port, and not, as formerly, from Surat or Swally :—the commercial intercourse between Surat and Bombay was to be kept open, by the residence of a Company's Agent and Factors, and by small vessels, carrying to that city such of their exports as would sell at this market, and to bring off the articles which were collected for the investment, or were purchased by the Company's brokers. It was expected, by this plan, that when peace should again give confidence, or enable them to negotiate sales or purchases, or to draw articles from the inland provinces, which the Company had been in the practice

CHAP. II.

1688-89.

Court determine to make Bombay the chief seat of trade and power, and reduce Surat to an Agency.



CHAP. II. of purchasing, they might make up full assortments for the  
1688-89. investment.

Sir John Child was directed, should a peace in Bengal have been concluded with the Mogul, on terms below what had been expected, from the expedition, to endeavour, by all means, to get possession of the Island of Salsette, and to fortify it in such a manner, as to render it a barrier to Bombay: —if, however, this acquisition should be unattainable, Bombay was to be fortified in the strongest manner, and become the capital of the Company's Indian possessions, and the seat of their government and trade. The General was, on no occasion, (even the probably important one of negotiating a peace with the Mogul) to leave the seat of Government, it being considered, that his going, in person, to negotiate a peace, would be inconsistent with the dignity of the Regency, and not less with sound policy; because, if he and his Council should again reside in any, but the seat of government, they could neither deliberate with wisdom, nor conclude with efficacy; more particularly, as he was now to exercise a controlling power over the other Presidencies and Agencies. If the urgency of the case should require his presence at Fort St. George or Bengal, he was to issue such orders and instructions, as would connect the whole political and commercial interests of the Company into a fixed system, understood by the Court at home, and, with time and practice, intelligible to the Indian Powers.

The





#### **EAST-INDIA COMPANY.**

connected, not only with the appearances of alliance, or war with the Maritime Powers of Europe, but with the probable changes which might take place in the government of England, and the effect which those changes might have, on the administration of Indian affairs. This uncertainty of the situation of the Company, at home, made them consider the Convention between Sir John Child and the Governor of Surat as of more consequence than it appeared to be, when the Court first received information of its having been concluded because, from the relative circumstances of France and Holland, in Europe, there was a strong probability of a war between those two Nations; and though the first effect of such a war would be ruinous to the French affairs in the East-Indies, the next, probably, would be a war between the Dutch and the Mogul, from which the Dutch might obtain more favourable terms, for their trade and Settlement in his dominions, than the English had acquired from the Convention, or might derive from any treaty, of which it had been the projected basis.

With the object, therefore, of rendering Bombay a more efficient Regency and seat of trade, and to enable it to protect the Agency left to keep up the commercial relations between Surat and Bombay, it was ordered, that a dry dock should be built, and a duty of one dollar, per ton, levied on every ship that might be repaired, or careened, at it;—that a wharf and piers should be erected, for loading and unloading

CHAP. II. 1688-89. unloading vessels, and rates established, to be paid on landing or shipping goods;—that, to make the revenues balance the charges, a progressive duty should be imposed, of from one shilling, to two shillings and sixpence, on every house in Bombay;—that the English inhabitants, not in the Company's service, should be liable to a duty of consulage;—that a Post-Office should be established, and reasonable rates for letters imposed, either in the Island, or sent and received in the Company's commercial stations, and that an Insurance Office should be constituted, on the same principle as that at Fort St. George;—that the fortifications should be encreased, and the garrison strengthened, by recalling all Europeans who might be in the service of the Native Powers, and offering to such men encouragement to engage in the Company's military service, because, from having constitutions habituated to the climate, they would be of more use, than recruits brought from Europe, “one seasoned man being worth two fresh ones.”

Factories on  
the Malabar  
Coast to be  
fortified.

Under these arrangements for the seat of the Regency, Sir John Child was directed to be particularly attentive to the out-factories on the Malabar Coast; the station at Retorah, in the Queen of Attinga's country, was to be fortified, and the same privileges, if possible, obtained for it, as the Company enjoyed at Madras. In the same manner, the Factory at Tellicherry was to be strengthened, that the Com-  
pany

#### EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

pany might be certain of receiving an investment in pepper, and cardamoms.

The commercial views of the Company, in 1701, were necessarily connected with the plan of rendering Bombay the seat of their government and trade, on the West Coast—all the goods purchased at the subordinate factories were to be sent, with the least possible delay to England, particularly the pepper and cardamoms, and the warehouses, to be ready for the ships, that it might be enabled, in Europe, to counteract the system of the Dutch.

As Bengal goods had lately been in great demand at the Company's sales, and as the imports of them, in 1701, were uncertain, the General and Council of Bombay held out every encouragement to the Armenian merchants, that they should receive not only protection, but a free market: any charges which might be incurred by such encouragement, would be fully compensated by the trade this people would introduce: the reasons assigned were, that the Armenian merchants carried on trade on their own funds and credit, and that they traversed the provinces in India, and collected, (though in small quantities) and in a manner which had not excited the jealousy of the Natives) the most valuable commodities; if, therefore, they could be induced to make Bombay their principal mart, the commercial effect would be incalculable; and

CHAP. II. induce them to accept of this offer, they were to be allowed to  
1688-89. send their goods, on the Company's shipping, to Europe, for sale.

Encourage-  
ment to be  
given to the  
Armenians, in  
Persia.

As the Armenians were also the principal merchants in PERSIA, similar encouragements were to be held out to them, to bring silks and Caramania wool to Bombay, to be sent to Europe, as part of the Company's investment, by which means they would receive greater profits, than by sending Persian produce, through Turkey, to Aleppo.

If this commercial system could be established, the Court concluded, that, with the large stock which would be annually sent, a valuable investment might be in store, ready to be shipped for Europe, and arrive to pre-occupy the market, before the Dutch imports could depress the prices.<sup>(1)</sup>

The Govern-  
ment of Ma-  
dras blamed,  
for not co-  
operating in  
the war in  
Bengal.

As Sir John Child had been vested with unlimited control over all the Company's Settlements and trade in the Indies, he was, after establishing the new system at Bombay and Surat, to proceed to FORT ST. GEORGE, and to frame regulations for the Settlements and trade on the Coromandel Coast, and, at his discretion, to confirm, or to remove from their stations, their servants of all ranks. The Court, on intimating this appointment of their General, to the President and Council at Madras, condemned their conduct,

(1)—Letters from the Court to the General and Council of Bombay, 11th April 1st May, 26th July, 27th August, 27th September, 8th October, 5th December 1688, 11th January, 15th February, and 19th March 1688-89.





**CHAP. II.** pepper, and cardamoms; but only one ship was to proceed  
 1688-89. from England to the Fort, the charges for seamen's wages having risen very high, in consequence of a general impression that war with France was inevitable; and instead of sending stock on this ship, this Presidency would be supplied with funds by Sir John Child, from Bombay. <sup>(1)</sup>

Sir John  
 Child to proceed to Bengal, as Supervisor of the Company's Affairs.

Sir John Child, after settling affairs at Madras, was directed to proceed to BENGAL, and, in the same manner, to exercise his discretion, in continuing, or removing from their stations, the Company's servants of all ranks, and to endeavour to re-settle the Factories at Cossimbuzar and Malda, and the new station at Chutanuttee. If he should find, that the French had got possession of Mergee, he was not to attempt to dislodge them, but to solicit a station in the Aracan country, to be fortified; and, if the Company had acquired possession of Mergee, it was to be fortified, and made a depôt for their Bengal goods.

The conduct of Mr. Charnock, the chief Agent, and his Council, in Bengal, was blamed by the Court, as having been dilatory in the extreme, which had been the true cause of his having been obliged to accept of terms from the Nabob, and from the Mogul, which neither coincided with the intentions of the Court, when they sent out the armament, nor placed

(1)—Letters from the Court to the President and Council of Fort St. George, 11th April, 27th August 1688, and 15th February 1688-89.— Letter from the Court to the Great Mogul, 7th September 1688.

#### EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

placed the trade in a better situation than it had been, by coercive measures were adopted; for, instead of getting possession of Chittagong, and being able to treat as an Independent Power, the Company would be obliged to offer new bids for a station which they might have conquered:—the Council, however, confirmed Mr. Charnock as Agent at Bengal (withstanding his errors) and directed him to solicit a *maund*, for re-establishing the Factories at Cossimb Dacca, and Malda, and for the town of Uleaburrah, held of the Nabob, on the same terms as Fort St. George.

The commercial orders recommended similar encouragement to be given to the Armenians, as authorized in the instructions to Sir John Child, at Bombay, but, more especially, to offer them thirty per cent. profit on the prime cost of such fine Bengal goods, as they might furnish for the importment, and to send as many taffaties as they could procure, but neither raw-silk, nor cotton-yarn, unless they could be purchased from twenty to thirty per cent. cheaper than in the season. <sup>(1)</sup>

The only new instructions of the Court to the Governor and Council of ST. HELENA, during this season, were to permit such of the inhabitants, with their families, as might choose, to remove to the Company's Island of Bombay (previously with the view of increasing its population) to procure

(1)—Letters from the Court to the Agent and Council in Bengal, 27th August 1783, and the 15th February 1788-89.



the Charter and privileges of the London East-India Com-  
pany. It has, also, appeared, that during the reigns of 1688-89.  
Charles II. and James II., the Company experienced, from  
those Sovereigns, the most positive protection, at home and  
abroad, and were enabled to check, by authority, and, by legal  
means, to punish the Interlopers; and, that the Company,  
acting under this royal protection, had endeavoured to main-  
tain the character of the English Nation, by employing force  
to repel the injuries and breach of grants by the Mogul and  
his officers, as well as by the lesser Indian Powers, who had  
excluded them from the trade, or deprived them of their  
Factories.

Under impressions arising out of these events, the  
Court of Directors, (when the civil liberties of the country,  
and the maintenance of the established religion, were  
assailed by that sect which had been proscribed by  
their great founder, Queen Elizabeth,) proceeded, as  
might have been expected a great commercial body would  
do, whose rights had been conferred by the Crown, who  
held every consideration, but the preservation of their  
trade, to be extraneous to their duty, and whose con-  
duct was to be guided by their obligations to the Pro-  
prietors, and to the public:—on the one hand, they partici-  
pated in the general sense of national liberty, civil and reli-  
gious; and, on the other, they were influenced by the cau-  
tion of Merchants.

The

CHAP. II.  
1688-89. The East-India Company, also, were in a more embarrassed situation than any other corporate body in the Kingdom; for they could not but apprehend, that their ancient rival and enemy, the Dutch, might divide the partiality of the Sovereign, between his new subjects and his countrymen; and, of course, might render the rights of the Company less a national object, than involve them in the common interests of the two Maritime States, between whom the trade and power, in the East-Indies, might be divided;—a division which the experience of events, in 1619, had taught them to consider as hazardous, and exposed to perilous results.

When, therefore, the first intelligence arrived of the armament of the Prince of Orange, in Holland, the East-India Company were alarmed, and, (as appeared in their instructions to their foreign governments,) influenced more by commercial caution, than taking an active part in the general opinions of the kingdom:—they only described to their servants, that the Prince of Orange was expected in England, “to secure his succession to the Crown, and establish the Protestant religion,” and that the Dutch fleet were very strong at sea, and had a great army embarked on it;—that this expedition was reported to be, exclusively, with those objects, and at the sole charge of the Prince of Orange, but not an act of the States General, for an hostile invasion of the realm;—that the first effect had been to prevent the equipments of the Company from being fitted out, or proceeding to India,  
the

## EAST-INDIA COMPANY

the impress of men being so general, on the King's account that none of their vessels could proceed on their voyages.

After the landing, however, of the Prince of Orange and his army, at Dartmouth, on the 4th November 1688, and after King James had sent Lords Halifax, Nottingham, and Godolphin, to treat with him, and, by proclamation, summoned a Parliament, the Court continued the same caution, divided between their ancient allegiance, the general expectation of reforming the government, and the hope of reconciliation between the King and the Prince;—in their letters, therefore, at this crisis, they informed their servants, that the Dutch fleet had abstained from war, and from making prizes, and that their army preserved the strictest discipline, and paid for every thing which they required.<sup>(1)</sup>

While the following memorable events were occurring—or, that hostilities, between the King and the Prince were rendered impracticable, by the greatest part of the Royal forces having joined the Prince of Orange;—that the opinions of the majority of the nation were favourable to his enterprize;—that his army had proceeded to London and had taken possession of St. James's;—that the Protestant Lords had met, and agreed to address the Prince, to assume the government, civil and military, and to summon a parliament

VOL. II.

4 L

ment

(1)—Letters of the Court to the Presidency of Bombay, 8th October and 5th December 1688.

**CHAP. II.** ment, (to which address all the Commons, who had sat in  
**1688-89.** any Parliament during the reign of Charles II., assisted by the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and fifty of the Common Council of London, assented;) and that the King and Queen had fled to France, and the Lord Chancellor, and the principal Popish Lords, were imprisoned, the Court of Directors of the East-India Company confined themselves, in their instructions to their foreign Settlements, to their peculiar object, commerce.

A general stagnation of trade had been the effect of these events, but the Court trusted commerce would revive, and that they should be enabled to take such measures as were necessary, for providing the stock and shipping for the season; but added, that a large fleet and army were collecting, to be sent to Ireland, for the purpose of supporting the Protestant interest in that kingdom; that the quota of English troops, which, by the treaty of Nimeguen, had been stipulated to serve in Holland, were about to embark; and that the City of London had advanced the sum of £150,000 to the Prince, to enable him to pay his army and navy.

It was under these circumstances, that the Court directed the General at Bombay, if he had made a peace with the Mogul, to endeavour to get possession of Salsette, there being, under the new government of England, no fear of any intrigues of the Jesuits, or Popish priests, to obstruct his retaining it, and to continue the war against the King of Siam, till the

the Company received full satisfaction for the debts due to <sup>CHAP. II.</sup> them, as he could not expect assistance from any of the 1688-89. European Maritime Powers.

When the Convention of Parliament assembled, on the 22d January 1688-89, and offered the Crown to the Prince and Princess of Orange, as the next Protestant heirs, and when they accepted it, agreeably to the conditions in the Bill of Rights, and were proclaimed King and Queen of England, on the 13th February 1688-89, the Court of Directors, on the 15th February, dispatched the Chandos, with copies of the Proclamation, to their seat of Government at Bombay, to the Presidency of Madras, and to the Agency at Bengal, and ordered them to be published, with all due solemnity, not only at those places, but at all their subordinate Settlements in India. <sup>(1)</sup>

It was noticed, on the first approach of the Revolution, by the appearance of the Dutch fleet and army, that the general impress of men ordered by King James II., had prevented the sailing of the Company's ship, Chandos, Captain Bonnell, the only vessel which, in the existing circumstances of the Company, they then proposed to dispatch :—the Court had, even at this time, become apprehensive of the re-appearance of the Interlo-  

4 L 2
pers,

(1)—Letters from the Court to the General and Council at Bombay 11th and 14th January, 15th and 22d February, and 19th March 1688-89.— Letter from the Court to the President and Council at Fort St. George, 15th February 1688-89.— Letter from the Court to the Agent and Council at Bengal, 15th February 1688-89.



CHAP. II. pers, always ready to take advantage of any circumstance  
1688-89. or event, which, they might apprehend, would injure the Company in the exercise of their exclusive privileges of trade; and though this vessel did not sail, till after the settlement of the government in England, yet by secret advices, as well as by the instructions sent by Captain Bonnel, they warned their servants in India, to be on their guard against the intrusions or interferences of the Private Traders;—a class of men who had, upon so many occasions, been the means of involving them in disputes with the Country Powers, and had often brought great losses on their Factories and trade. Such apprehensions were most natural, as the immediate result of the first aspect of a change in the government, and were confirmed, by the re-appearance of interloping equipments, as soon as that change had taken place.

The Court, thus, with a steady attention to their rights, and probably anticipating questions regarding them, gave a commission to Captain Bonnell, the preamble to which enumerated the different grants which had been obtained by the Company, from Charles II. and James II., with the actual circumstances regarding the war with the Mogul and the King of Siam, and authorized him to make prizes, not only of the vessels of the Indian Powers, with whom they were at war, but of the ships employed by the Interlopers, and to seize on the individuals who might attempt to trade in their limits, without the Company's licence. The letter, furnishing the  
directions



CHAP. H. " steady, righteous government, that though they have  
 1688-89. " been frequently frustrated of their expectations, they are  
 " capable of being deceived againe, by the self-same methods  
 " as they have often been deceived with already; which cau-  
 " tion we give you, for your own sakes, more than for the  
 " Companyes." (1)

Political and  
 commercial  
 events at Su-  
 rat and Bom-  
 bay.

It will be necessary, in reviewing the foreign transactions of the East-India Company, to extend the Annals beyond the season 1688-89, to bring into view the complicated proceedings at each of the Presidencies, the effect of those proceedings on the Company's Settlements and trade, and the measures adopted, on receiving intelligence of the Revolution in England.

When the Court had determined to levy war against Aurungzebe, to resist his breach of Phirmaunds and grants, and had appointed Sir John Child to be General, or superior of the whole of the Company's Settlements, with the object of acquiring a fortified station in Bengal, they were ignorant of the conquest of the kingdoms of Visiapore and Golcondah, and of the decline of Sambagee's power.

In

(1)—Letter from the Court to the President and Council of Fort St. George, 15th February 1688-89. — Commission and Instructions to Captain Bonnell, of the Company's ship Chandos, 15th February 1688-89.

In the Foreign Annals of the preceding year, the judicious and active measures of Sir John Child were described, till the period when he assumed the government of BOMBAY, and when the return of the Company's ships from the two Gulfs, with their prizes, convinced the Governor of Surat, that hostilities were commenced. On the departure of Sir John Child from SURAT, he left Mr. Harris, as Agent, with a Council, to preserve the Company's house and property, and to avail himself of any opportunity which might occur, of opening negotiations with the Governor; but to this precaution of Sir John Child, which put the English Factory, at Surat, into the power of the Governor, as hostages, may be ascribed the ultimate failure of all the plans for which the war had been commenced.

Under these circumstances, conferences commenced between Mr. Harris and the new Governor, Muchtar Khan, the result of which induced this Agent to recommend, that the Governor General should come to Swally, to adjust the terms, in person; a copy of the conditions, which had formerly been proposed by him, having been delivered to the Governor, who had affected to give them a favourable reception.

The Convention between Muchtar Khan and Mr. Harris, an artifice to gain time.

Though there remains no evidence, in the dispatches from Bombay, of the conferences which took place, between Muchtar Khan and Sir John Child, who came from Bombay to lay off Surat, for the purpose of negotiating, it appears from the letters of the Court to Bombay, of this season, that

Muchtar

**CHAP. II.** Muchtar Khan had acceded to those terms, and that a Provisional Agreement had been made with him, on the basis of the thirty-five articles drawn up by the General; or, that the English should, in future, pay only two per cent. customs, (agreeably to their old Phirmaunds,) instead of three and a half per cent., which had been recently exacted; and it was as a reward for concluding this agreement, that the Court voted Sir John Child, a present of one thousand guineas, as stated in the home transactions of this season.

This agreement, however, was, in a short time, discovered to be an artifice on the part of Muchtar Khan, who intended only to gain time, either till he should hear of the progress of the English in Bengal, or receive instructions from the Mogul, to confirm, or to break off the negotiation. This duplicity was suspected by Sir John Child, who, on the 9th October 1688, embarked at Bombay, and again appeared off Surat, with a fleet of seven ships; and though, on this occasion, he might have taken, or destroyed, the whole of the Siddee's fleet, he avoided hostilities, both because he deemed them imprudent at the moment, from the precarious circumstances in which the Government of Madras, and the expedition to Bengal, were placed, and because the capture of this fleet might render negotiation, at either of those places, impracticable; but hoped, that his appearance, with such a force, might induce Muchtar Khan to adhere to the terms of the Provisional Agreement.

This



CHAP. II. Muchtar Khan with the appearance of this fleet near Bombay,  
 1688-89. and the report, that his intention was to invade the Island,  
 fleet would be considered as an act of hostility against Bombay. the General intimated to the Siddee, that if the fleet should put to sea, he must conclude it was with hostile intentions against Bombay, and would, therefore, consider him as an enemy.

At this crisis, also, the General addressed the President of Fort St. George, and severely reprehended his imprudent application to the Mogul, to open a treaty, for that Settlement, as manifesting apprehensions of the issue of the war, unfavorable to its progress; and that he held this application to be the probable source of the violent proceedings against the Company, at Surat. When Sir John Child transmitted the substance of this letter to the Court, he avowed his resolution to continue hostilities, and, by no means, to yield to the dishonorable expedient of purchasing a peace; but explained, that he would delay attacking the Siddee's fleet, as long as the safety of the Island of Bombay would admit of it, because he found, that the power of the Mogul had been increased by the conquest of Golcondah and Visiapore, and the probable reduction of Sambagee's country, which made it expedient to avoid those extremities, which might render accommodation difficult, if not impossible.

Court's order to occupy Salsette impracticable, and the deli-

In this situation of affairs, the General, though prepared for war, made several ineffectual attempts to negotiate with the Mogul, and informed the Court, that though he had a force which





**CHAP. II.** they had been repulsed by the English troops, notwithstanding  
**1688-89.** ing the disobedience of Captain Consett, of the Berkeley Castle, who refused to co-operate with the garrison. If any thing could add to this perplexity, desertion prevailed among the European troops; which drew from the General the natural reflection, "that the loss of one European was of more consequence to him, than the death of one hundred blacks," and that he almost regretted having employed native troops in the Company's service, because, in the moment of danger, neither their fidelity nor courage could be relied on. Hence his opinion, that Bombay, from its local vicinity to the Mogul's dominions (where his power had become almost uncontrolled), could not be considered of that importance which the Company had supposed, as they had not received from the British Government the same support, as the Dutch Company did from the States General; a support which, in fact, had been the true source of their power, and of their prosperity.

Sir John Child attempts negotiation with Ettimand Khan, the new Governor of Surat;

In this crisis of affairs, a new Governor (Ettimand Khan) was appointed for Surat; an incident which gave an opportunity to Sir John Child to attempt another negotiation, and, therefore, he addressed letters to this officer, conceiving that, from a stranger, he might expect that impartiality, and those concessions, which, in vain, he had looked for from Muchtar Khan; expectations, however, which evidently proceeded rather from the urgency of circumstances, than from his experience

#### EAST INDIA COMPANY.

experience of the duplicity which characterized the Mogul officers; for, in their late transactions, they had in one object only,---to bring the English Agent into that position, in which he could only oppose ineffectual remonstrance but make no resistance.

It was under these circumstances, that Sir John on the 10th December 1689, dispatched Mr. Weldon and Navarro, two of the Company's servants, accompanied Meah Nizammy (an eminent merchant, who had lately mediated a treaty between the Company and the Nab Damaun) to the Mogul's camp at Visiapore, to endeavour to open a negotiation with him for a treaty of peace, and to obtain a Phirmaund, for the restoration of the ancient privileges of the Company, and the recovery of the property, which had been seized by Muchtar Khan.

Negotiations could not have been attempted under circumstances more unfavorable; for Aurungzebe, at this time had taken Rairee castle, and seized the family and treasure of Sambagee, and it was even uncertain, to what country Sambagee, himself, had fled, though a few of his small forces still held out against the Mogul armies. From the Mogul conduct towards the Portuguese, it was also evident, that they had (as they were unable to resist him) determined to reduce the pretensions of the European Maritime Powers to a positive dependence on his authority; and it was in this state of affairs, that the Dutch obtained from

**CHAP. II.** a Phirmaund, enabling them to hold Pullicat, on the same  
1688-89. terms as they formerly held it, under the King of Golcondah.

This complicated state of the Company's affairs obliged Sir John Child to retain, this year, on demorage, several of the Company's ships, for the defence of the Island of Bombay and the Malabar Coast.

Death of Sir  
John Child,  
and succe-  
sion of Mr.  
Harris, at  
this time a  
prisoner at  
Surat.

In this perilous situation, Sir John Child, who had, for so many years, by his firmness and integrity, been the real support of the Company's interests in India, and who, alone, was capable to have extricated them from the difficulties in which they were involved, died at Bombay, on the 4th February 1689-90, the office of President devolving on Mr. Harris, at this time a prisoner at Surat, and that of Deputy Governor of Bombay on Mr. Vaux, who, from his subordinate situation, was, of course, to take his directions from Mr. Harris, already duped by Muchtar Khan, and from being under constraint, obliged to yield to any terms which might be imposed on him.

A consultation, on this occasion, was held at Bombay, on the 25th February 1689-90, at which it was agreed, that Mr. Vaux, the Deputy Governor of Bombay, should, in consequence of advices received from Mr. Weldon and Mr. Navarro, the Commissioners at Visiapore, proceed to Surat, and there receive the Phirmaund which they had procured from the Mogul. Mr. Vaux left Bombay on the 6th March 1689-90 for Surat, where he remained till the 4th April 1690, on which day the Phirmaund arrived, and Mr. Harris, and the Company's  
other

other servants, were released from their long imprisonment in irons.

CHAP. II.

1688-89.

This apparent reconciliation of the Mogul to the Company, was an arbitrary act of despotism towards the English; for, instead of the Phirmaund proceeding upon the propositions which had been made by Sir John Child, either for liberty of trade, in general, or any specification of the conditions, under which that able servant of the Company deemed it expedient to entrust their stock or servants at Surat, in which they had experienced successive and exorbitant oppressions, it was expressed in terms and with conditions, more humiliating, and more oppressive, than any which had occurred, from the first settlement of an English Factory in India. The Company were now to be admitted, not as the subjects of an independent sovereign, or as having a retreat at Bombay, at which they could be protected, but as criminals, whose Chief had been proscribed, and themselves admitted to live in vassalage or slavery, only.

The Phirmaund granted by Aurungzebe, at this period, reduces the Presidency of Surat to the most degraded situation.

The translation of the Phirmaund of Aurungzebe to the Company, dated February 27th 1689-90, is as follows:

“ All the English having made a most humble submissive  
 “ petition, that the crimes they have done may be pardoned,  
 “ and requested another Phirmaund, to make their being for-  
 “ given manifest, and sent their Vakkeels to the heavenly  
 ‘ palace, the most illustrious in the world, to get the royal  
 “ favor; and Ettimand Caun, the Governor of Suratt’s peti-  
 “ tion

CHAP II. 1688-89. "tion to the famous court, equal to the skie, being arrived,  
 " that they would present the great King with a fine of one  
 " hundred and fifty thousand rupees, to his most noble trea-  
 " sury, resembling the sun, and would restore the merchants  
 " goods they had taken away, to the owners of them, and  
 " would walk by the ancient customs of the port, and behave  
 " themselves, for the future, no more in such a shameful  
 " manner; therefore His Majesty, according to his duly favor  
 " to all the people of the world, hath pardoned their faults,  
 " mercifully forgiven them, and out of his princely conde-  
 " scension agrees, that the present be put into the treasury of  
 " the port, the merchants goods be returned, the town flou-  
 " rish, and they follow their trade, as in former times, and  
 " Mr. Child, who did the disgrace, be turned out and expel-  
 " led. This order is irreversible." (1)

This Phirmaund discovers, that though the Mogul might employ temporizing measures with the Company, while his conquests of Golcondah and Visiapore were unfinished, and though he might continue the like duplicity, while he was subverting the power of Sambagee, by directing the successive Governors of Surat to affect conciliation with the English, that their naval power might not be employed to assist his enemies, yet the moment he found them brought

(1)—Copy of a Phirmaund, "dated the 23d day of the month, Jammaudull Aubull, " in the thirty-third year of a Most Glorious Reign," 27th February 1689-90. (MSS. in Indian Register Office, vol. xlii, 1689-1690, No. 3973).



**CHAP. II.** all their crimes were ascribed; and in so arbitrary a manner  
**1688-89.** were the conditions of this Phirmaund acted on, that the Governor of Surat refused to issue his order for recalling the Siddee from Bombay, till the goods taken by the English, should be restored, and the fine paid to the Mogul, at Surat; and with these demands the Agent and Council were, at last, obliged, most reluctantly, to comply.

The Agent and Council at Surat, on this occasion, requested, as their affairs on the West of India had never been in so distressed a situation, that a large supply of shipping, stock, and servants, might be sent to them, as the only means by which they could be enabled to regain a proportion of the trade, or, by degrees, the benefits of the former Phirmaunds or grants.

It was not, however, till the 6th May 1690, that orders were sent, from the Governor of Surat to the Siddee, to evacuate Bombay, or till the 22d June, that he quitted the Island, or that the English again took possession of Mazagon, Mahim, and Sion.

The revenues  
and trade at  
Bombay de-  
pressed by  
these events.

During these public transactions, it was impossible the measures recommended by the Court, for improving the revenue of the Island, could be carried into effect. The Natives, it was found, would not undertake the coining of the money, or managing of the mint, as it had been supposed they would; and during the period of actual or threatened invasion, the revenues from lands or houses could

could not be collected, or the projects of establishing a Post Office, or Insurance Office, attempted;—hence it was impossible to raise a revenue equal to the Company's estimate, which had erroneously been adopted, in imitation of the Dutch, without reflecting, that what had been practicable in old establishments, could not apply to Bombay, as yet only held by the Company for a short time, and, during that period, exposed to the insubordination of the garrison and inhabitants, and to opposition by the Portuguese, occupying the stations from which supplies could be brought to the Island, or liable to perpetual alarms of invasion, by the contending powers on the neighbouring continent of India.

The commercial transactions of the Presidency of Bombay were farther impeded, by the ships being employed in the war, and by the heavy demorage which was incurred, from its being impracticable to dispatch them to the ports, at which the investments were collected, or to order them to proceed from Bombay to Europe;—the prospect, also, (even supposing peace restored in India) was discouraging, from the number of French, Dutch, and country vessels employed in the trade, which had advanced the price of freight, beyond what any competition would allow:—mean time, the encouragement ordered by the Court to be given to the Armenians, would be offered to them, that, by indirect means, a remedy for the evils, under which trade was placed, might be found. A cargo, however, of pepper from the Malabar Coast



**CHAP. II.** had been shipped, and was to be sent to England; but no  
 1688-89. Bengal goods could be procured, to make up an investment.

As considerable difficulties had arisen, from the objections made by the commanders of freighted ships, to accommodate their services to the actual state of affairs, the Presidency of Bombay recommended, that the Company should employ their own ships, only, because the captains would be obliged to conform to circumstances, without pretending to act according to the strict terms of their charter-party.

The instructions of the Court, to form a Settlement in the Attinga Country, had not been carried into execution, on account of the wars which had prevailed in its vicinity, and the commercial intercourse between Carwar, Calicut, and Bombay, had not been open, either during the war, or during the negotiations at Surat. <sup>(1)</sup>

Trade in Persia obstructed by the Dutch, and by Pirates.

The trade at Gombroon, in 1688, was less obstructed by the existing war in India, than the trade at Bombay, or on the Malabar Coast:—the Agents in PERSIA, therefore, informed the Court, that they were making every exertion to obtain an exclusive

(1)—Letters from the General and Council at Bombay to the Court, 3th December 1688, 10th February 1688-89, 7th June, and 16th December 1689, 23th February 1689-90, 22d June 1690.— Letters from Mr. Harris, &c., at Surat, to the Court, 27th February 1689-90, 28th April, and 6th May 1690.— Letter from the General and Council of Bombay to the President and Council at Fort St. George, 5th December 1688.— Letter from Sir John Child to the Mogul, February 1688-89.

sive trade in silk, by bartering broad-cloth for it, imitating the practice of the Dutch, who had formerly tried this method, by exchanging the finer spices for silk ;—that they were making similar efforts to procure the exclusive trade in Caramania wool, and should these exchanges, by barter, continue, they were of opinion, they might annually dispose of two thousand pieces of English broad-cloth ;—that the Dutch were, by means of imports of Indian goods, rivalling them in this market ; but from their being, at this juncture, not respected by the Persians, the Agent hoped to prevent their obtaining, as formerly, Caramania wool, and would continue to resist their engrossing this article.

In the following year (November 1689) the Agents in Persia stated, that the trade had further been distressed, by the appearance of an English pirate vessel in the Gulf, the crew of which had landed, and plundered the Portuguese Factory at Cong, and that the Company's ship, *Cæsar*, had been dispatched, with instructions, if possible, to capture her, but had been unsuccessful. At the close of this season, however, the same good understanding does not appear to have prevailed between the English Agent and the Persian Government at Gombroon, which refused payment of the stipulated customs, to compensate the losses which the Persian trade had experienced, during the maritime war between the English and the Mogul. <sup>(1)</sup>

The

(1)—Letters from the Agent at Gombroon to the Court, 9th October 1688, 10th May, 30th November and 7th December 1689.

CHAP. II. **The Company's transactions at FORT ST. GEORGE and in**  
 1688-89. **BENGAL**, during the season 1688-89, and part of 1689-90,  
 Affairs of were so blended, that to furnish a view of them, during the  
 Fort St. period in which those of Bombay and Surat have been detailed,  
 George and it will be necessary to follow the events, regarding the war in  
 Bengal blended, at the period of Bengal, in the first instance, and to connect those events  
 the disastrous Phirmaund of with the occurrences at Madras, that we may ascertain the  
 Aurungzebe. situation in which those Settlements were left, when a dis-  
 astrous peace was the result of all the projects of the Court  
 to become an Independent Power in India.

It will be recollected, that when the armament under Captain Nicholson sailed, the object of the Court was to obtain Chittagong, or some station which could be fortified, to become the seat of their power and trade; and, in the Annals of the preceding years, the operations of this armament, and the timid and irresolute proceedings of Mr. Charnock, the Company's Agent in Bengal, were described to have brought about, first, a kind of truce with the Phousdar, which, as soon as he could collect a force, was violated, and next a treaty with the Nabob, of which the Court disapproved; and, subsequently, had dispatched a large armed ship, the Defence, Captain Heath, attended by a frigate, with instructions to proceed direct for Bengal, and, on his arrival, to carry the original intentions of the Court into execution, or, to retire with their servants and property to Madras:—we have, therefore, to trace the events as they occurred, after  
 Captain

Captain Heath's arrival, that we may perceive the real state of CHAP. II.  
the Company's affairs, both in Bengal and at Madras, at the 1688-89.  
close of this eventful period.

Captain Heath arrived in Bengal, in October 1688, and acted rather from the impulse of his own feelings, than in concert with the Agent and Council, or in obedience to the Court's commands. It is true, that in recommending the war with the original object, he conformed to the Court's instructions, but by his imprudence (for it cannot be termed his want of courage), he lost all the advantages which might have been obtained, and, for a time, the continuance of the Company's trade in the Ganges.

*Proceedings  
of Captain  
Heath in  
Bengal, who  
retires with  
the Compa-  
ny's servants  
to Madras.*

On resuming the war in Bengal, the Company's servants and property were embarked at Calcutta, on board the *Defence*, which, with the other ships, proceeded, on the 8th November 1688, to Ballasore Roads:—a conference was opened with the Governor, who offered to release the English, whom he had seized in the Factory, and to adjust all matters in dispute:—without, however, waiting to learn the terms which would be granted, or to procure the liberation of the English in the Governor's power, Captain Heath, on the 29th November 1688, (contrary to the opinion of the Agent and Council, and notwithstanding a *Perwannah* for peace with the English had been received by the Governor from the Nabob,) landed the troops and seamen, attacked and took a battery of  
thirty

CHAP. II. thirty guns, and plundered the town of Ballasore. The  
1688-89. English Factory, on this occasion, was burned by the Governor, and the Company's servants, who had been previously taken prisoners, were carried up the country, where all subsequent efforts for their release were unavailing. The troops and seamen being reimbarcked, the fleet proceeded, on the 13th December 1688, to Chittagong, where they arrived on the 17th January 1688-89;—a council of war, was assembled, in which it was resolved to delay proceeding to farther hostilities, and again to write to the Nabob, stating their grievances and demands, and to await his answer, whether he would redress them, or not.

Captain Heath, however, instead of waiting for an answer, or making any effort to have the Company's privileges or trade restored, or endeavouring to seize on Chittagong, proceeded with the fleet to Aracan, where he arrived on the 31st January 1688-89, and sent proposals to the King, for a settlement in his dominions, according to the instructions of the Court, in case of failure of the attack on Chittagong. These propositions were rejected, when, as a last expedient, applications were made by Captain Heath to a revolted Chief in Aracan, offering assistance to him against the King:—this offer would have been accepted, and might probably have obtained for the Company, the original object of the war, but the same impatience in this, as in the preceding cases, marked the conduct of this officer, who,  
without

~~On the 1st of January 1784, the British fleet, which Captain~~ the issue of the attack on Chittagong.  
 Nicholson commanded the fleet, that Captain Heath, on  
 his arrival, deemed it inadvisable to attempt the siege,  
 although he had a force superior to that which Captain  
 Nicholson had under his command; but could give no  
 reason why such attack had not been previously made, in  
 obedience to the original order; contenting themselves with  
 offering an opinion, that should the trade in Bengal be re-  
 assumed, Chutanuttee, or Calcutta, would be a preferable  
 station to Uleaburrah, about which they acknowledged they  
 had been deceived.

Connecting these events with the political circumstances Expedients of the Agency of Fort St. George, on this emergency.  
 under which Madras was placed, at the period when the large  
 fleet from Bengal arrived at that port, we discover, that to  
 prevent the increase of expences, by demorage or dead  
 freight, the President and Council sent two ships to Bencoolen

VOL. II.

4 O

and

(1) — Letter from the Presidency of Fort St. George to the Court, January and  
 3d April 1668-89. — Agent Charnock's answer to Captain Heath's report, 22d March  
 1668-89.

**CHAP. II.** and one to China, to procure investments, and to proceed  
**1688-89.** from thence to England, and had let three or four ships  
 on freight to Persia, to the Jews and native merchants of  
 Madras.

During these unfortunate events at Bombay and in Bengal, notwithstanding the Mogul conquests of Visiapore and Golcondah, it does not appear that his army made any attack on Fort St. George. It was, under the apprehension of this event, that the President and Council had made those approaches to conciliation, which were reprobated by Sir John Child, and by the Court. From the probability of a siege, the Fort had been strengthened, a precaution, which, considering the Mogul's conduct, at Surat and in Bengal, had averted the expected attack; and so confident were the President and Council of the strength of the place, that they sent a supply of military stores to the Island of Bombay, when it was invaded by the Siddees.

Mogul's order for expelling the English from his dominions.

Though the Mogul did not besiege Fort St. George, he issued orders to expel the English from his dominions; and, under these orders, the Factory at Vizagapatam had been suddenly seized, Mr. Stables, the Chief, and four Factors, killed, and the Company's stock and effects plundered:—at this time, also, the Governor of Masulipatam seized on the English Factory, though hopes were entertained that matters might be accommodated with him.

Sambhagoe betrayed, and

During these transactions in the Company's different  
 Presidencies

#### EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

Presidencies or Settlements, an event occurred, in the end of the year 1689, or early in 1689-90, which, in first aspect, promised to consolidate the empire which Aurungzebe had obtained by his conquests in the Decan. The treachery of one of Sambagee's generals, who betrayed him into the power of the Mogul, by whom he was crucified to death. This barbarous policy, instead of depressing the spirit or animosity of the Hindoos, produced the opposite effect; for, continuing their allegiance to the family of Sambagee, they declared for the Ram-Rajah, or the second son of this great chief, who assumed the administration of the Hindoo interests, and, with the remains of Sambagee's army, took position in the strong fortress of Gingee; the vicinity of this place to Madras gave that Presidency an opportunity to receive authentic information respecting this apparently last struggle of the Hindoos, against Aurungzebe. Whether the Mogul army, which attempted to reduce the Ram-Rajah in Gingee, was composed, in part, of levies from the countries which the Mogul had recently conquered, or were the remains of the army with which he had subdued Visiapore and Golcondal, is uncertain; but the fact was, that this army, instead of pursuing the Mogul conquests, revolted in great numbers, joined the standard of the Ram-Rajah, whom they proclaimed King of India, under the title of "the Gentoo King." At this event, Aurungzebe was in danger of losing the fruit of his victories in the Decan, for the Ram-Rajah was prepa-





circumstances than they had been placed, since the first establishment of the English trade in India.

CHAP. II.  
1688-89.

The Company's interest and trade in Bengal had been abandoned; for after Mr. Charnock and his Council left Chutanuttee, and proceeded with Captain Heath and the fleet to Madras, and when there was no prospect of opening any communication with that country, an offer was unexpectedly received from the new Nabob of Bengal (the one with whom the Company had their disputes being removed) to allow the English to return, and resettle their Factories and trade, and to grant Perwannahs for that purpose. Aware of the deceptions which had been practised, and reasoning correctly from the past, that, admitting the Nabob to be sincere in his offers, the Agent and the Company's stock would be exposed to vexatious mandates, should this officer be removed, and to the avarice and oppressions of his successor, they replied, that they could not accede to the proposition, unless a Phirmaund should be previously sent by the Mogul, specifying the degree of protection under which the Company's servants and trade would be placed.

The new Nabob of Bengal's offer to the English, to resettle their Factory at Hugly, declined.

On hearing a report, that the General had concluded a treaty with the Mogul, it was intended to send Mr. Charnock and his Council to Bengal, after the Monsoon, with a stock of a lack and a half of pagodas, to re-assume the Factories and recommence the trade; but this plan shewed, that they were ignorant of the terms of the reported treaty; and, had their servants proceeded with this stock, they must have suffered  
the



collect investments, agreeably to the order of the Court, or to obtain that proportion of them from Bengal, which, hitherto, had formed the most valuable part of the assortment. CHAP. II.  
1688-89.

Referring to the dependencies, which had hitherto furnished proportions of the investment, the Presidency informed the Court, that they had been obliged to withdraw the Factories from Madapollam and Pettipolee, but the Factories at Conimere, and Porto Novo, continued in a prosperous state;—that the pepper trade, between Bencoolen and China, had been improved, three hundred tons of that article having been shipped from Bencoolen for Amoy, which sold at a profit; and, from this circumstance, a more extensive trade to China might have been expected, had not accounts from Mr. Styleman, one of the Company's servants at Amoy, to Mr. Navarro, in November 1689, intimated, that the James, an interloping ship from England, had arrived, with a very large stock, the captain of which sold his cloth at low rates, which compelled the Company's Factors to do the same.

As the season advanced, new difficulties in procuring the investment occurred. The conquest of Golcondah had obliged the weavers to fly for shelter to Masulipatam. The French were now fortifying Pollicherry or Pondicherry, and had resisted the English in seizing two Mogul vessels, which had taken shelter in that port; an event which marks the first opposition of interests between the two nations on the Coromandel Coast. In September 1689, from the arrival of the  
Company's



dred families of skilful weavers to settle at Madras, in the hope, from the protection held out to them, that this number might be doubled, and, in progress of time, that the manufacture of Coast goods could be carried on, in the Company's settlement, to supply the home market:—that, however, the Court's idea of manufacturing Bengal taffaties, at Madras, was impracticable, as it could not be done without incurring an expence of fifty per cent. difference, on the prime cost.

CHAP. II.

1688-89.

To add to the commercial embarrassments of the Presidency, new and serious obstructions had arisen, from the appearance of piratical vessels, of considerable force, under English colours, in the Indian Seas:—these vessels had been fitted out in the West-Indies, and had taken shelter in the ports of Aden, Muscat, and Madagascar. One of them, of twenty-two guns, had captured a valuable vessel belonging to Madras (the principal part of her cargo being the property of the President), and information had been received of five other English pirates cruising off Acheen. Such was the state of commerce at Fort St. George, and in its dependencies, at the close of this eventful period.

— and by the appearance of English pirates on the Coromandel Coast.

Referring to the commercial dependencies or relations of the Presidency, it had been found, that the produce from Bencoolen and Indrapore had become of considerable value, but that it was almost impossible to persuade any of the Company's servants, civil or military, to be removed to these unhealthy situations:—that it would be advisable to

State of trade of the European Maritime Powers, in the East-Indies, at this juncture.

CHAP. II. open a trade with Canton, rather than continue that at Amoy ;  
 1688-89. —that the French trade was encreasing on the Coast, and that they were fortifying Pollicherry (or Pondicherry) where they had a force of seven hundred men ; but that this place was threatened by the Dutch ;—that the French intended to dispatch three ships, this season, to Europe, and were forming a Settlement at Junkselon ;—that the Dutch had been making every effort to improve their trade in Bengal, and had sent an Ambassador to the Mogul, to solicit a Phirmaund,—but the presents intended to have been offered by him, had been intercepted by Sambagee's troops, and the object of the mission disappointed ;—that their trade on the Coromandel Coast was on the decline, but that they were fortifying Negapatam, intended to become their principal port on the Coast ;—that their power had been disturbed, by a revolt at Batavia, but, that they still kept possession of Bantam, where they had lately built a fort, or battery, mounting one hundred guns, and that they were at war, in Ceylon, with the King of Candy, the issue of which was uncertain ;—that the Portuguese trade on the Coast was also on the decline, and that no reliance could be placed on any of that nation who were in the service of the Company ;—and that the Danes, at this period, although they continued their Factory at Tranquebar, had scarcely any trade.

Report on the  
 improving  
 state of Fort

In describing the state of Fort St. George and Madras,  
 at this period, the President and Council attributed the  
 internal

EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

internal tranquillity which it had enjoyed, to the strength of fortifications, and that, by the arrival of sixty recruits in Chandos, the number of its garrison had become respectable—that the revenue was increasing, but the tax on houses, the payment of quit-rents, had been oppressive; hence it was submitted, that a less exceptionable method of raising a revenue applicable to the charges of the place, might be devised;—that the establishment of the Corporation of Madras had been acceptable to the inhabitants, the benefit of which they were now beginning to understand;—that though the Duan offered St. Thomé to be farmed by the Company, the offer was rejected, from the opinion that it would be of no material benefit to the Settlement;—that the mint at Fort St. George was in a very prosperous state, and the Company's rupees in considerable request, but on account of their intrinsic value, they had been melted down by the country people, under the idea of deriving profit, from the sale of the bullion;—and that the project of establishing an Insurance Office at Madras had hitherto answered, from the benefit arising from it, not been sufficiently understood by the merchants. <sup>(1)</sup>

4 P 2

Du

(1)—Letters from the Presidency of Fort St. George to the Court, 27th April 1688, January 1688-89, 3d April, 20th July, 21st September 1689, and 1st February 1689-90. — Letter from the Presidency of Fort St. George to the Governor and Council at Bombay, 25th March 1690. — Private letter from Mr. Styleman to Mr. Narada, dated Amoy, 27th November 1689.



## CHAP. II.

1688-89. Trade at Bencoolen and Indrapore increased and the settlement in an improving condition.

During this period, the commercial intercourse, between Madras and the Factories to the southwards, was interrupted, probably on account of the war with Siam; but it appears, from the advices from YORK FORT, or BENCOOLEN, that however unhealthy that station had been hitherto found, its commercial importance was on the increase, as, in the month of October 1689, the ship Williamson's cargo of pepper had been procured there, and that the Agents were in expectation of annually obtaining large quantities of that article; and hoped, as the ground could be cleared, that the place would become more healthy;—that, from the Factory at INDRAPORE the same advantages could not be expected, while the Dutch, who obstructed its trade, continued in possession of Quallo, at the mouth of the river on which Indrapore is situated;—that, with the object of improving the trade of Bencoolen, they had invited several Chinese traders to settle there, under their protection; and, to obviate the difficulty of making drafts of soldiers from Madras, recommended, that Caffres should be procured from Madagascar, to serve as soldiers, their constitutions being better adapted to the climate;—on the whole, that this Settlement was in a flourishing condition, but required a supply of accountants and writers, to complete the civil establishment. <sup>(1)</sup>.

IF,

(1)—Letters from the Agent and Council at York Fort to the Court, 26th October and 6th November 1689.



CHAP. II. as a Company, suffered so many commercial grievances and  
1688-89. positive disasters.

This opinion was necessarily strengthened, by the instructions received from the Directors, for commencing a war against the Mogul and King of Siam, of which the general object was to raise them from a precarious dependency on Phirmaunds, to become, at Bombay, at Madras, and at Chittagong (if it could be acquired), *Regencies*, or seats of power and trade, which, under the Royal protection, might balance the similar establishments of the Dutch in Java, and the Eastern Islands.

The foreign Governments of the Company had, besides, seen the armament arrive, bringing letters to the Mogul, desiring of that Sovereign, redress of the grievances experienced from the Governors of Surat, and the Nabobs and Phousdars in Bengal; and had felt, even at Madras, the menaces of ruin which the Mogul, after his conquest of Visiapore and Golcondah, was holding over them, but had escaped from the effects of those menaces, rather by circumstances in their enemy's wars, than by power to ward them off, or to resist them, and therefore were unprepared for a change at home, which, in a remote country, they could as little comprehend, as believe.

In the domestic Annals it was noticed, that, on the first appearance of the armament in Holland, the Court were prevented from dispatching their ships, by the crews being  
impressed

impressed into the King's service; and that the equipments of the season were suspended for many months; hence the anxieties of the General and his Council, at Bombay, were on the utmost stretch, for, at this juncture, the expedition sent to Bengal had miscarried, and the Agents at Surat were under control, and even imprisoned, by the Governor, who had deceived them by a pretended truce, or treaty. CHAP. II.  
1688-89.

It was under these distressing circumstances, that, on the 7th June 1689, the Agent and Council at Surat informed the Court, they had received a report from a Dutch vessel from Batavia, that the Prince of Orange had landed with a large army, and had made a conquest of England:—these reports they held to be as vague, as impossible, and intended, probably, to add to their embarrassments, from the calamitous occurrences in the war with the Mogul.

This disbelief, however, was soon shaken, by the letters from the Court, of the 5th December 1688, confirming the report, that the Prince had actually landed in England, and that affairs at home were in the greatest confusion;—intelligence which could not fail to distract a Presidency like Bombay, in a remote situation, ignorant of the conduct they ought to pursue, and, therefore, they could only express their attachment to their country, and apologize for any confusion that might appear in their commercial invoices. In this painful uncertainty, they remained for many months, for,  
in:



IF the circumstances which attended the Revolution in  
England, as a great national event, authenticated by public  
records, be compared with the effects of that event on the  
East-India Company, at home and abroad, drawn from the



EAST-INDIA COMPANY.

while their Presidencies abroad, under the calamitous events which had disappointed their hopes of becoming an Independent Power in the East-Indies, mingled their commercial prudence with loyal deference to the enlightened and public spirit, which had placed the British Constitution on new and broad foundations. <sup>CHAF</sup>  
1688 <sup>✓</sup> (1)

(1)—Letters from the General and Council to the Deputy Governor of Bombay, 7th June, and 26th December 1689, and 22d June 1690.— Letters from the Presidency of Fort St. George to the Court, 21st September 1689, and 1st February 1689-90.— Letter from the Presidency of Fort St. George to the General and Council at Bombay, January 1688-89.



## CHAP. II.

**RESULTS**  
from the pre-  
ceding detail  
of events, as-  
certaining the  
Company's  
rights, from  
the Restora-  
tion of King  
Charles II. to  
the Revo-  
lution,  
1688-89.

If the results from the detail of events, affecting the rights and trade of the London East-India Company, from their establishment by Queen Elizabeth to the Restoration of Charles II., afforded inferences exhibiting the actual state of East-Indian affairs, those which may be drawn from the events which occurred from the Restoration to the Revolution, will afford, in like manner, a succinct view of the real history of the East-India Company. In connecting this authenticated information, it must always be recollected, that the Company had, by their Charters, been vested with the perpetual right of being a Corporate Body, with succession, and the temporary right of enjoying exclusive privileges of trade, on a Joint Stock.

I.—From the preceding detail of events it appears, that, from the changing aspects of the political relations between England and the Maritime Powers, having trade or Factories in the East-Indies, the London East-India Company could not adopt fixed regulations, either for the administration of their affairs in Europe or in India; but were obliged, according to circumstances, to adopt broader or narrower commercial plans, corresponding with the encouragement or depression which they experienced at home, or the encouragement or opposition which they expected, or received, abroad, from the Sovereigns,

Sovereigns, or their Governors, in the countries in which the  
seats of their trade, or Factories, were situated.

CHAP. II.

RESULTS.

*II.*—That, on the Restoration, or the re-establishment of the ancient Government of England, under King Charles II., the great objects with which he commenced his reign were, first, the adoption of the Act of Navigation, which was of so much importance to the commercial interests of the realm, and, next, the revival of the former treaties with the European States, to establish a Balance of Power on the continent of Europe;—that though, under this principle, treaties were formed between England, the States General, France, Spain, and Portugal, yet, very early in his reign, the King gave proofs of political partialities, and, therefore, excited political jealousies; for, at one time, he supported the Dutch in repelling the invasions of France, that the States General, and the north of Germany, might not fall under the dominion or control of that ambitious monarchy; and, at another, he depressed them, and afforded to France an opportunity to extend her northern frontier; and thus, though the Treaties of Breda and Nimeguen partially promoted the aggrandizement of France, and though the King still kept in view the principle of a Balance of Power, yet neither the one, nor the other of those treaties, sufficiently guarded against the encroachments of France, or of the States General, on the colonies or settlements of  
England,



for the reparation of wrongs, or for the redress of injuries in  
the East-Indies.

CHAP. II.  
RESULTS.

*V.*—That the treaty of Alliance and Marriage, between Portugal and England, by which Bombay and its dependencies were ceded to King Charles II., though specious in its conditions, was in practice inefficient, for the Portuguese were as jealous of the English, as they were inimical to the Dutch;—hence the armament sent to take possession of Bombay was obstructed equally by the friends, and by the enemies of England; and the Island of Bombay, only, but not its dependencies, at last ceded, on conditions not less repugnant to the treaty itself, than to the object of the King, in acquiring for the nation seats of trade and power in the East-Indies. The jealousies, thus, of the Portuguese destroyed the commercial balance in the East-Indies, which it was the object of the treaty to establish; and rendered Bombay, when it was granted by the King, to the London East-India Company, an inefficient and unproductive seat of power and trade.

*VI.*—That, in all the commercial and marine treaties, between England and the States General, though the conditions stipulated by the contracting parties were observed in Europe, the articles, as far as they checked the Dutch system of exclusion, were uniformly evaded in the East-Indies, and that, by a commanding maritime force, and considerable military establishments, the Dutch persevered in the fixed plan of maintaining their exclusive possession of the  
Spice











## CHAP. II.

## RESULTS.

X.—That the East-India Company, after finding Phirmaunds, or grants of privileges, and exemptions from customs, insufficient to protect either the seats of their trade, or the transit of their goods, through the interior provinces, resolved to commence hostilities against the Mogul, and to assume the rank of an Independent Power, by constituting *Regencies* at Bombay and Fort St. George, and a similar *Regency* at Chittagong, should the large armament sent to the East-Indies, succeed in obtaining possession of that station:—that, to consolidate this system, it was necessary to incur the charges of erecting fortifications and maintaining garrisons, for the protection of trade, and not less so, to have, in the Indian Seas, a naval force, superior to that possessed by any of the Native Princes, and equal to resist (in the event of war in Europe) the armaments of the Maritime Powers, having Settlements or trade in the East-Indies.

XI.—That, at the close of this period, when the Revolution established the free constitutional government of the realm, the Court of Committees, or Directors, at home, observed the commercial caution and prudence which were dictated to them by their particular duty, of acting for the interests of a great commercial body, of whose rights they were the guardians; and as they had, from their establishment, on no occasion, been parties in the changes which the government of their country had experienced, they directed their whole views to the maintenance of their trade, and the preservation

preservation of their settlements, a line of conduct in which CHAP. II.  
they were imitated by their foreign Presidencies and Agencies; RESULTS.  
—but when events, in their native country, called upon them  
to act for the general interests of the nation, they united in  
loyalty and in principles, in approving and in supporting, both  
at home and abroad, the free constitution, which this great  
event so happily accomplished.

END OF VOL. II.

---

LONDON:  
*Printed by Cox, Son, and Baylis,*  
Great Queen Street.













3 6105 010 419 898

STANFORD UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES  
STANFORD AUXILIARY LIBRARY  
STANFORD, CALIFORNIA 94305-6004  
(415) 723-9201

All books may be recalled after 7 days

DATE DUE

JUN 30 1999

FEB 1 1999

MAR 29 1999

JAN 2 1999

66809



